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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
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Washington, DC 20529



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services



FILE: [REDACTED] Office: HARLINGEN Date: **AUG 02 2004**


IN RE: Obligor: [REDACTED]
Bonded Alien

IMMIGRATION BOND: Bond Conditioned for the Delivery of an Alien under Section 103 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103

ON BEHALF OF OBLIGOR:
[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.


Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

**identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy**

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DISCUSSION: The delivery bond in this matter was declared breached by the Field Office Director, Detention and Removal, Harlingen, Texas, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record indicates that on November 12, 1998, the obligor posted a \$3,000 bond conditioned for the delivery of the above referenced alien. A Notice to Deliver Alien (Form I-340) dated April 29, 2003, was sent to the obligor via certified mail, return receipt requested. The notice demanded the bonded alien's surrender into the custody of an officer of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at 10:00 a.m. on May 29, 2003, at [REDACTED]. The obligor failed to present the alien, and the alien failed to appear as required. On June 19, 2003, the field office director informed the obligor that the delivery bond had been breached.

On appeal, counsel states that the bonded alien is a national of Nicaragua. Counsel opines that the bonded alien is eligible for Temporary Protected Status (TPS). Counsel argues that a grant of TPS would terminate ICE's detention and removal authority and require cancellation of the delivery bond.

On appeal, counsel further argues that the immigration judge (IJ) administratively closed the case on January 5, 1999 and did not take any action on the case for over four years.

The present record indicates that the IJ administratively closed the alien's case on January 5, 1999. The record fails to contain evidence that, as a native and citizen of Nicaragua, the alien has applied for and/or has been granted TPS. A delivery bond remains in effect until removal proceedings are finally terminated or the alien is actually accepted for removal. Administrative closing of a case does not result in a final order. It is merely an administrative convenience which allows the removal of cases from the calendar in appropriate situations. *See Matter of Gutierrez-Lopez*, 21 I&N Dec. 479 (BIA 1996).

Jurisdiction to determine whether an alien is eligible for TPS lies with CIS or the immigration judge, not the obligor for the alien's delivery bond. Counsel has not submitted evidence that the bonded alien has been granted Temporary Protected Status by either CIS or an immigration judge.

Temporary Protected Status is by definition a temporary status for certain qualifying aliens from designated countries. At the expiration of a validly granted TPS period, absent some further change of the alien's status, the alien will be required to depart the United States.

The obligor is bound by the terms of the contract to which it obligated itself. It is noted that the terms of the Form I-352 for bonds conditioned upon the delivery of the alien establish the following condition: "the obligor shall cause the alien to be produced or to produce himself/herself . . . upon each and every written request until *exclusion/deportation/removal proceedings* . . . are finally terminated." (Emphasis added). Thus, the obligor is bound to deliver the alien by the express terms of the bond contract until either exclusion, deportation or removal proceedings are finally terminated, or one of the other conditions occurs.

Counsel posits that once ICE no longer has detention authority over the alien, the delivery bond must terminate by operation of law. However, this is contrary to the holdings of *Zadvydus v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) and *Doan v. INS*, 311 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2002). In *Zadvydus*, the Supreme Court expressly recognized the authority of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (legacy INS) to require the posting of a bond as a condition of release after it lost detention authority over the alien, even though a bond was not provided as a condition of release by the statute. In *Doan*, the 9th Circuit held the legacy INS had the authority to require a \$10,000 delivery bond in a supervised release context even though it did not have detention authority. Even

though these cases arose in the post-removal period, it is obvious from the rulings that detention authority is not the sole determining factor as to whether ICE can require a delivery bond.

The bond contract provides that it may be canceled when (1) exclusion/deportation/removal proceedings are finally terminated; (2) the alien is accepted by ICE for detention or deportation/removal; or (3) the bond is otherwise canceled. The circumstances under which the bond may be "otherwise canceled" occur when the Secretary or the Attorney General imposes a requirement for another bond, and the alien posts such a bond, or when an order of deportation has been issued and the alien is taken into custody. As the obligor has not shown that any of these circumstances apply, the bond is not canceled.

On appeal, counsel claims that sections 244(a)(3)(B) and (C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), require that the alien be informed of his eligibility for TPS.

Sections 244(a)(3)(B) and (C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(3)(B) and (C), require notice to aliens in removal proceedings of their eligibility for Temporary Protected Status. While the alien within the context of removal proceedings must be provided notice of his or her eligibility for TPS, this requirement has no bearing on the obligor's contractual duty to deliver an alien. Even assuming that ICE were to lose detention authority over an alien who may be eligible for TPS, as noted above, this would not require cancellation of the delivery bond.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the obligor routinely files a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request with each bond breach appeal involving TPS to obtain the relevant information, but that the AAO frequently decides the appeal before the obligor receives a response.

As noted above, whether or not the alien has been granted TPS is not determinative, as a loss of detention authority would not require cancellation of the delivery bond. Further, the alleged failure of the District Office to respond to the obligor's FOIA request has no bearing in this matter, as bond proceedings are separate and apart from any other proceedings. The mere filing of a FOIA request does not excuse the obligor from delivering the alien as demanded.

The present record contains evidence that a properly completed questionnaire with the alien's photograph attached was forwarded to the obligor with the notice to surrender pursuant to the Amwest/Reno Settlement Agreement, entered into on June 22, 1995 by the legacy INS and Far West Surety Insurance Company.

Delivery bonds are violated if the obligor fails to cause the bonded alien to be produced or to produce himself/herself to an immigration officer or immigration judge, as specified in the appearance notice, upon each and every written request until removal proceedings are finally terminated, or until the said alien is actually accepted by ICE for detention or removal. *Matter of Smith*, 16 I&N Dec. 146 (Reg. Comm. 1977).

The regulations provide that an obligor shall be released from liability where there has been "substantial performance" of all conditions imposed by the terms of the bond. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(c)(3). A bond is breached when there has been a substantial violation of the stipulated conditions of the bond. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(e).

8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(a)(2) provides that personal service may be effected by any of the following:

- (i) Delivery of a copy personally;

(ii) Delivery of a copy at a person's dwelling house or usual place of abode by leaving it with some person of suitable age and discretion;

(iii) Delivery of a copy at the office of an attorney or other person including a corporation, by leaving it with a person in charge;

(iv) Mailing a copy by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, addressed to a person at his last known address.

The evidence of record indicates that the Notice to Deliver Alien was sent to the obligor at [REDACTED] on April 29, 2003 via certified mail. This notice demanded that the obligor produce the bonded alien on May 29, 2003. The domestic return receipt indicates the obligor received notice to produce the bonded alien on May 5, 2003. Consequently, the record clearly establishes that the notice was properly served on the obligor in compliance with 8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(a)(2)(iv).

It is clear from the language used in the bond agreement that the obligor shall cause the alien to be produced or the alien shall produce himself to an ICE officer upon each and every request of such officer until removal proceedings are either finally terminated or the alien is accepted by ICE for detention or removal.

It must be noted that delivery bonds are exacted to insure that aliens will be produced when and where required by ICE for hearings or removal. Such bonds are necessary in order for ICE to function in an orderly manner. The courts have long considered the confusion which would result if aliens could be surrendered at any time or place it suited the alien's or the surety's convenience. *Matter of L-*, 3 I&N Dec. 862 (C.O. 1950).

After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the conditions of the bond have been substantially violated, and the collateral has been forfeited. The decision of the field office director will not be disturbed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.