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U.S. Department of Justice
Immigration and Naturalization Service

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OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536

[Redacted]

File: [Redacted] Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER

Date: JUN 24 2002

IN RE: Petitioner: [Redacted]
Beneficiary: [Redacted]

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to Section 203(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(1)(C)

IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

[Redacted]

PUBLIC COPY

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The employment-based preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center. The director's decision to deny the petition was affirmed by the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The matter is now before the Associate Commissioner on a motion to reopen and motion to reconsider. The motion will be dismissed.

The petitioner is an organization incorporated in New York that claims to be engaged in the import of clothes that are manufactured by its claimed parent company. It seeks classification of the beneficiary as an employment-based immigrant pursuant to section 203(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(1)(C), as a multinational executive or manager.

The director initially approved the petition. Upon review of the record, the director determined that the petitioner had not established that the beneficiary's current or proposed duties would be primarily executive or managerial in nature. The Associate Commissioner affirmed this determination on appeal noting that the director had good cause to issue the notice of intent to revoke.

On motion, counsel asserts that the Service is estopped from rescinding its previous approval of the I-140 petition because of its affirmative misconduct. Counsel further asserts that the petitioner, the beneficiary and his family members relied on the Service's approval and changed their legal standing to their detriment.

8 CFR 103.5(a)(2) states, in pertinent part: "A motion to reopen must state the new facts to be provided in the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence."

Based on the plain meaning of "new," a new fact is found to be evidence that was not available and could not have been discovered or presented in the previous proceeding. Review of counsel's motion does not reveal any new fact or facts that are relevant to the issue of the executive or managerial nature of the beneficiary's job position with the petitioner.

As the petitioner has not submitted any new relevant facts, there is no proper basis for a motion to reopen.

Motions for the reopening of immigration proceedings are disfavored for the same reasons as are petitions for rehearing and motions for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992) (citing INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 (1988)). A party seeking to reopen a proceeding bears a "heavy burden." INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. at 110. With the current motion, the movant has not met that burden. The motion to reopen will be dismissed.

Furthermore, 8 CFR 103.5(a)(2) states, in pertinent part:

A motion to reconsider must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions to establish that the decision was based on an incorrect application of law or Service policy. A motion to reconsider a decision on an application or petition must, when filed, also establish that the decision was incorrect based on the evidence of record at the time of the initial decision.

Although counsel has submitted a motion entitled "Motion to Reopen and Reconsider," counsel asserts that the Service should be estopped from rescinding its previous approval of the I-140 petition because of its affirmative misconduct. Counsel further asserts in the same motion that the petitioner, the beneficiary and his family members relied on the Service' approval and changed their legal standing to their detriment.

The Administrative Appeals Office, like the Board of Immigration Appeals, is without authority to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel so as to preclude a component part of the Service from undertaking a lawful course of action that it is empowered to pursue by statute or regulation. See Matter of Hernandez-Puente, 20 I&N Dec.335, 338 (BIA 1991). Estoppel is an equitable form of relief that is available only through the courts. The jurisdiction of the Administrative Appeals Office is limited to that authority specifically granted to the Associate Commissioner for Examinations, through the regulations at 8 C.F.R. 103.1(f)(3)(iii). Accordingly, the Service has no authority to address the petitioner's equitable estoppel claim.

Counsel does not state any other reasons for reconsideration nor cite any precedent decisions in support of a motion to reconsider on the relevant issue of whether the beneficiary's proposed duties for the petitioner would be managerial or executive in nature. Counsel's assertions that the previous decisions were inequitable do not form the proper basis for a motion to reconsider. The petitioner's motion to reconsider will be dismissed.

Finally, it should be noted for the record that, unless the Service directs otherwise, the filing of a motion to reopen or reconsider does not stay the execution of any decision in a case or extend a previously set departure date. 8 CFR 103.5(a)(1)(iv).

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1361. The petitioner has not sustained that burden. 8 CFR 103.5(a)(4) states that "[a] motion that does not meet applicable requirements shall be dismissed." Accordingly, the motion will be dismissed, the proceedings will not be reopened, and the previous decisions of the director and the Associate Commissioner will not be disturbed.



ORDER: The motion is dismissed.