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U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

Identifying data deleted to prevent clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy

[Redacted]

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536

File: EAC 01 241 56361

Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER

Date:

JAN 31 2003

IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:

[Redacted]

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to Section 203(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(1)(C)

IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

[Redacted]

PUBLIC COPY

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The employment-based visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center. The matter is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a corporation organized in the State of Pennsylvania in May of 1998. At the time of filing the petition it was engaged in the sale, distribution, and servicing of printing machines and parts invented and patented by its majority shareholder. It seeks to employ the beneficiary as its president. Accordingly, the petitioner endeavors to classify the beneficiary as an employment-based immigrant pursuant to section 203(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(1)(C), as a multinational executive or manager. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that the beneficiary would be employed in a primarily executive capacity.

On appeal, counsel for the petitioner confirms that some of the beneficiary's duties were not executive in nature but explains that this is because the company is a start up company. Counsel also submits that the beneficiary's primary duties and responsibilities are executive in nature. Counsel cites two unpublished decisions in support of his assertions.

Section 203(b) of the Act states, in pertinent part:

(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C):

* * *

(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers.
-- An alien is described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding the time of the alien's application for classification and admission into the United States under this subparagraph, has been employed for at least 1 year by a firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and who seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to render services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial or executive.

The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives and managers who have previously worked for the firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary of that entity, and are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its affiliate or subsidiary.

A United States employer may file a petition on Form I-140 for classification of an alien under section 203(b)(1)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is required for this classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job offer in the form of a statement that indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the alien. 8 C.F.R. 204.5(j)(5).

The issue in this proceeding is whether the beneficiary will perform primarily managerial or executive duties for the petitioner.

Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(44)(A), provides:

The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily-

i. manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of the organization;

ii. supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization;

iii. if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and

iv. exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are professional.

Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(44)(B), provides:

The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily-

- i. directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the organization;
- ii. establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function;
- iii. exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and
- iv. receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization.

The petitioner does not request that the beneficiary's position be considered a managerial position and the evidence submitted does not contribute to a finding of managerial capacity for the beneficiary.

Counsel's assertion on appeal that the petitioner is a new business in a start up capacity in an effort to explain why the beneficiary performs non-executive tasks is not persuasive. As noted by the director and confirmed by counsel on appeal, the beneficiary orders parts, repairs machines, handles complaints from customers and performs other routine clerical activities. These duties are not executive duties. An employee who primarily performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988). Counsel's explanation that the petitioner is a start up company does not contribute to a finding of eligibility of the beneficiary at the time of filing. The petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing; a petition cannot be approved at a future date after the beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. Matter of Katigbak, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Comm. 1971). In addition, the petitioner must be an established business in order for the beneficiary to qualify for this immigrant classification. See 8 C.F.R. section 204.5(j)(3)(i)(D). Counsel's reference to an unpublished decision that the business, after expansion, will warrant a managerial or executive position is inapplicable to the case at hand for two reasons. First, as noted above, the petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing the petition, and second, unpublished decisions are not binding in the administration of the Act. See 8 C.F.R. 103.3(c).

Counsel's assertion that even though the beneficiary performs non-executive duties, the beneficiary's primary duties and responsibilities are executive in nature is also not persuasive. The assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 BIA 1980). Counsel has provided no evidence to overcome the director's well-reasoned decision in this case. Going on record without supporting documentary

evidence is not sufficient for the purpose of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972). Counsel does not provide any evidence that the second cited unpublished decision is analogous to the case at hand and as noted above, unpublished decisions are not binding in the administration of the Act.

At the time of filing the petition, the petitioner was a three-year-old distribution company that employed the beneficiary as its president. A month after the filing of the petition the petitioner employed a second individual in the position of secretary. Counsel's assertion that the secretary began to take on more of the non-executive duties previously performed by the beneficiary does not contribute to a finding of eligibility for the beneficiary. At the time of filing the petition, the beneficiary's primary duties were to engage in the operational activities of the company including performing the sales and repair work for the company. The petitioner has not established that a majority of the beneficiary's tasks relate to operational or policy management rather than the performance of the daily tasks necessary to continue the operations of the business.

The record contains insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the beneficiary has been employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity or that the beneficiary's duties will be primarily managerial or executive in nature. The descriptions of the beneficiary's job duties indicate that a majority of his duties relate to the performance of basic operational tasks for the petitioner. The description of the duties to be performed by the beneficiary does not demonstrate that the beneficiary will have managerial control and authority over a function, department, subdivision or component of the company. Further, the record does not sufficiently demonstrate that the beneficiary has managed a subordinate staff of professional, managerial, or supervisory personnel who will relieve him from performing non-qualifying duties. The Service is not compelled to deem the beneficiary to be a manager or executive simply because the beneficiary possesses an executive or managerial title. The petitioner has not established that the beneficiary at the time of filing the petition had been or would be employed in either a primarily managerial or executive capacity.

In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.