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
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


U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

B4



FILE:



LIN 07 021 52652

Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

Date: DEC 19 2008

IN RE:

Petitioner:

Beneficiary:



PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Multinational Executive or Manager Pursuant to Section 203(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(C)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).


John F. Grissom, Acting Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner, a Florida corporation, claims to be an "electronics store" and to be a subsidiary of the beneficiary's foreign employer located in Peru. Accordingly, the petitioner endeavors to classify the beneficiary as an employment-based immigrant pursuant to section 203(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(C), as a multinational executive or manager.¹

The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that it would employ the beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity.

On appeal, counsel disputes the director's findings, asserts that the beneficiary will primarily perform qualifying duties in the United States, and submits a brief and additional evidence.

Section 203(b) of the Act states in pertinent part:

(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who are aliens described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C):

* * *

(C) Certain Multinational Executives and Managers. -- An alien is described in this subparagraph if the alien, in the 3 years preceding the time of the alien's application for classification and admission into the United States under this subparagraph, has been employed for at least 1 year by a firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and who seeks to enter the United States in order to continue to render services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial or executive.

The language of the statute is specific in limiting this provision to only those executives and managers who have previously worked for a firm, corporation or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary of that entity, and who are coming to the United States to work for the same entity, or its affiliate or subsidiary.

A "United States employer" may file a petition on Form I-140 for classification of an alien under section 203(b)(1)(C) of the Act as a multinational executive or manager. No labor certification is required for this

¹According to Florida state corporate records, the petitioner's corporate status in Florida was "administratively dissolved" on September 14, 2007. Therefore, since the corporation may not carry on any business except that necessary to wind up and liquidate its affairs, and the petitioner has not taken steps under Florida law to seek reinstatement, the company can no longer be considered a legal entity in the United States. *See Fla. Stat. 607.1421 (2006)*. Therefore, if the appeal were not being dismissed for the reasons set forth herein, this would call into question the petitioner's continued eligibility for the benefit sought.

classification. The prospective employer in the United States must furnish a job offer in the form of a statement which indicates that the alien is to be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive capacity. Such a statement must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the alien.

Title 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(3) explains that a petition filed for a multinational executive or manager under section 203(b)(1)(C) must be accompanied by a statement from an authorized official of the "petitioning United States employer" which demonstrates that:

- (A) If the alien is outside the United States, in the three years immediately preceding the filing of the petition the alien has been employed outside the United States for at least one year in a managerial or executive capacity by a firm or corporation, or other legal entity, or by an affiliate or subsidiary of such a firm or corporation or other legal entity; or
- (B) If the alien is already in the United States working for the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate of the firm or corporation, or other legal entity by which the alien was employed overseas, in the three years preceding entry as a nonimmigrant, the alien was employed by the entity abroad for at least one year in a managerial or executive capacity;
- (C) The prospective employer in the United States is the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate of the firm or corporation or other legal entity by which the alien was employed overseas; and
- (D) The prospective United States employer has been doing business for at least one year.

The primary issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner provided sufficient evidence to establish that it will employ the beneficiary in a primarily managerial or executive capacity.

Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(A), provides:

The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily--

- (i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of the organization;
- (ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization;
- (iii) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel

actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and

- (iv) exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are professional.

Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(B), provides:

The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily--

- (i) directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the organization;
- (ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function;
- (iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and
- (iv) receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization.

The petitioner does not clarify in the initial petition whether the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial duties under section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, or primarily executive duties under section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, and indicates in the response to the Request for Evidence that the beneficiary will perform both managerial and executive duties. A petitioner may not claim that a beneficiary will be employed as a hybrid "executive/manager" and rely on partial sections of the two statutory definitions. If the petitioner is indeed representing the beneficiary as both an executive *and* a manager, it must establish that the beneficiary meets each of the four criteria set forth in the statutory definition for executive and the statutory definition for manager.

The petitioner describes the beneficiary's duties as "president" of the alleged two-location electronics business in a letter dated October 2, 2006 as follows:

- (25%) Plan, organize, manage, direct, control, and coordinate the daily operation of the organization. He is responsible for constantly reviewing the operation making changes if necessary and implementing new procedures.
- (20%) He ensures the effectiveness of financial programs; oversee[s] financial and

administrative management issues, identification of problems, and direct implementation of solutions. He directs the establishment of internal financial controls and ensures the financial/audit operation and reporting requirements are in compliance with applicable federal and state laws, policies, standards, regulations, and generally accepted accounting principles and practices[.]

- (15%) Negotiation of contracts with vendors.
- (15%) Directing and coordinating the day-to-day activities of the subordinate managers and supervisors; [r]ecruiting and hiring of staff, promotion of firing when necessary.
- (10%) Maintain regular communication with the foreign parent company.
- (15%) Research and investigation of other prospective markets for expansion and develop marketing strategy accordingly.

The petitioner indicates in the Form I-129 that it currently employs four workers. Consistent with this averment, the petitioner submitted an organizational chart for the United States operation. The chart shows the beneficiary at the top of the organization directly supervising two "store managers." One of the store managers is, in turn, portrayed as supervising a single "sales associate." The remaining positions listed on the organizational chart appear to be vacant.

Finally, the petitioner described the duties of its three additional workers as follows:

Store Manager/Sanford Store. [REDACTED]. Responsibilities include general management of the Sanford location, being primary [sic] in charge of planning, organizing, and managing the assigned administrative, operational, and customer service activities designated by executive personnel. [REDACTED] monitors and evaluates performance to ensure compliance with goals and policies. Also, assists with all the accounting operations and maintenance of appropriate documentation and recordkeeping.

Store Manager/Deltona Store. Store. [REDACTED] Responsibilities include general management of the Deltona location being primary [sic] in charge of planning, organizing, and managing the assigned administrative, operational, and customer service activities designated by executive personnel. [REDACTED] monitors and evaluates performance to ensure compliance with goals and policies. Also, assists with all the accounting operations and maintenance of appropriate documentation and recordkeeping.

Sales Associates, [REDACTED] Responsible for customer service at the Deltona location. Her responsibilities include retail sales, service contracts, general information and advice and general store duties including any errands needed, help stocking, main cashier, answer any phone calls, etc.

On July 30, 2007, the director requested additional evidence. The director requested, *inter alia*, a more detailed description of the beneficiary's proposed duties, complete position descriptions for each of the beneficiary's subordinate workers, and copies of work schedules pertaining to the petitioner's retail locations.

In response, the petitioner submitted a letter dated September 4, 2007 in which it further described the beneficiary's duties as follows:

- Ensure compliance with all applicable laws: licenses, permits, regulations, employment, etc.
- Oversee expansions, moves and major projects, working with Store Managers.
- Approve Store Managers' purchase, lease and service contracts.
- Ensure development of company maintenance and security programs.
- Ensure adequate insurance for all company operations.
- Work with area managers to ensure proper activities and programs are being carried out.
- Ensure regular financial reports and analysis.
- Approve capital expenditures for expenditures over \$200.
- Develop proposals and negotiate contracts as needed.
- Monitor deviations from budget, take corrective action.
- Review store and department financial performance reports with Store Managers, and plan corrective action as needed.
- Ensure margin control and take corrective actions if needed to stay within budget.
- Develop annual business plan with capital, operating and cash budgets.
- Investigate new business opportunities[.]
- Set objectives for Store Managers for store and department sales, margin, turns and labor costs.
- Coordinate Operational Management Team meetings.
- Diagnose, develop and evaluate the performance of all business employees, including other store managers[.]

The petitioner also further described the staffing of the United States operation, the duties of the beneficiary's subordinate staff, and the size of the enterprise. The petitioner describes six subordinate staff members in the September 4, 2007 letter, excluding the beneficiary, working at three locations, even though the petitioner claims in the initial petition to employ only three subordinate workers at two locations. While not clarified by the petitioner, it appears that these three additional workers were hired after the filing of the initial petition. Regardless, the job descriptions for the sales associate and one of the store managers are materially identical to those descriptions submitted with the initial petition. The job description for the other store manager, [REDACTED] differs significantly from the earlier description. Although [REDACTED] was originally described as a "store manager," she is described in the September 4, 2007 letter as an "administrative assistant" and is ascribed basic administrative and clerical duties.

Finally, the petitioner submitted sample work schedules for its various locations. These schedules indicate, *inter alia*, that the store manager, [REDACTED], and the sales associate, [REDACTED] are responsible for

staffing one of the locations at different times, while the beneficiary and
at a second location.

work simultaneously

On January 7, 2008, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in a managerial or executive capacity.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the beneficiary will primarily perform qualifying duties in the United States.

Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive.

In examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) will look first to the petitioner's description of the job duties. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(5). The actual duties themselves reveal the true nature of the employment. *Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava*, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), *aff'd*, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). A petitioner cannot claim that some of the duties of the position entail executive responsibilities, while other duties are managerial. Again, a petitioner may not claim that a beneficiary will be employed as a hybrid "executive/manager" and rely on partial sections of the two statutory definitions.

As a threshold issue, it is noted that employees hired, and locations opened, after the filing of the initial petition may not be considered in determining whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary will be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity in the United States. A visa petition may not be approved based on speculation of future eligibility or after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. *See Matter of Michelin Tire Corp.*, 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978); *Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Comm. 1971). A petitioner may not make material changes to a petition in an effort to make a deficient petition conform to USCIS requirements. *See Matter of Izummi*, 22 I&N Dec. 169, 176 (Assoc. Comm. 1998). At the time the instant petition was filed, the petitioner claimed to employ four workers, including the beneficiary, in the operation of two locations. Accordingly, the petitioner's claim in its response to the director's Request for Evidence to have employed three additional workers after the filing of the instant petition, and its attempt to ascribe to its workers new job titles and duties, will not be considered by the AAO. Likewise, the petitioner's claim to have opened a third location may not be considered.

In this matter, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties fails to establish that the beneficiary will act in a "managerial" or "executive" capacity. In support of the petition, the petitioner has submitted a vague and non-specific job description which fails to sufficiently describe what the beneficiary will do on a day-to-day basis. For example, the petitioner states that the beneficiary will devote most of his time to directing the "daily operation of the organization;" overseeing financial and administrative issues; directing internal financial controls, audits, and reporting; negotiating contracts; and researching and developing marketing and expansion strategies. However, the petitioner does not explain what, exactly, the beneficiary will do to direct "daily operations" other than to act as a first-line supervisor of three subordinate workers. Furthermore, the petitioner has not established that his duties pertaining to finance, auditing, reporting, contract negotiating, and market research are qualifying duties given that the petitioner does not appear to employ subordinate staff members dedicated to relieving the beneficiary of performing the non-qualifying tasks inherent to these duties. The fact that the petitioner has given the beneficiary a managerial or executive

title and has prepared a vague job description which includes inflated job duties does not establish that the beneficiary will actually perform managerial or executive duties. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature; otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. *Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava*, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), *aff'd*, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972).

Consequently, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary will primarily perform qualifying duties in his operation of the business. As noted above, the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary will "manage" the petitioner's business operations through three subordinate workers. However, the record does not establish that the beneficiary will be relieved of the need to perform many of the other non-qualifying tasks inherent to his ascribed duties by a subordinate staff. Accordingly, it appears more likely than not that the beneficiary will primarily perform non-qualifying first-line supervisory, administrative, or operational tasks in his administration of the business. An employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also *Matter of Church Scientology International*, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988). A managerial employee must have authority over day-to-day operations beyond the level normally vested in a first-line supervisor, unless the supervised employees are professionals. 101(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; see also *Matter of Church Scientology International*, 19 I&N Dec. at 604.

The petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary will supervise and control the work of other supervisory, managerial, or professional employees, or will manage an essential function of the organization. As asserted in the record, the beneficiary will directly supervise two "store managers," one of which will supervise a "sales associate." However, it has not been established that either of these store managers is truly a supervisory or managerial worker. One of the store managers does not supervise a subordinate staff. The other store manager, while claimed to supervise a "sales associate," is not described as having any supervisory or managerial authority over this worker. For example, the work schedule shows the "sales associate" and the "store manager" splitting responsibility for staffing a store location. Accordingly, it appears that both the "sales associate" and the "store manager" are more likely than not performing the same job duties, i.e., the tasks necessary to the provision of a service or the production of a product. An employee will not be considered to be a supervisor simply because of a job title, because he or she is arbitrarily placed in a position superior to other employees on an organizational chart, or because he or she supervises daily work activities and assignments. Rather, the employee must be shown to possess some significant degree of control or authority over the employment of subordinates. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that any of these subordinate workers is truly a managerial or supervisory employee. Finally, as the petitioner failed to establish the skills and education required to perform the duties of the subordinate positions, the petitioner has

not established that the beneficiary will manage professional employees.² Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in a managerial capacity.³

Similarly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act in an "executive" capacity. The statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that person's authority to direct the organization. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization. Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of employees for the beneficiary to direct, and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making" and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or

²In evaluating whether the beneficiary will manage professional employees, the AAO must evaluate whether the subordinate positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor. Section 101(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(32), states that "[t]he term *profession* shall include but not be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." The term "profession" contemplates knowledge or learning, not merely skill, of an advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and study of at least baccalaureate level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into the particular field of endeavor. *Matter of Sea*, 19 I&N Dec. 817 (Comm. 1988); *Matter of Ling*, 13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968); *Matter of Shin*, 11 I&N Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966).

³While the petitioner has not argued that the beneficiary will manage an essential function of the organization, the record nevertheless would not support this position even if taken. The term "function manager" applies generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the organization. See section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. The term "essential function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a petitioner claims that the beneficiary will manage an essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written job offer that clearly describes the duties to be performed in managing the essential function, i.e., identify the function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the beneficiary's daily duties that will be attributed to managing the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(2) and (5). In addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary will manage the function rather than perform the tasks related to the function. In this matter, the petitioner has not provided evidence that the beneficiary will manage an essential function. The petitioner's vague job description fails to document that the beneficiary's duties will be primarily managerial. Also, as explained above, the record indicates that the beneficiary will primarily be a first-line supervisor of non-professional employees and will perform non-qualifying tasks. Absent a clear and credible breakdown of the time spent by the beneficiary performing his duties, the AAO cannot determine what proportion of his duties will be managerial, nor can it deduce whether the beneficiary will primarily perform the duties of a function manager. See *IKEA US, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice*, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22, 24 (D.D.C. 1999).

stockholders of the organization." *Id.* For the same reasons indicated above, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act primarily in an executive capacity. As explained above, it appears instead that the beneficiary will be primarily employed as a first-line supervisor and will perform the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide a service. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in an executive capacity.

In reviewing the relevance of the number of employees a petitioner has, federal courts have generally agreed that USCIS "may properly consider an organization's small size as one factor in assessing whether its operations are substantial enough to support a manager." *Family, Inc. v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services*, 469 F.3d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing with approval *Republic of Transkei v. INS*, 923 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1991); *Fedin Bros. Co. v. Sava*, 905 F.2d 41, 42 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam); *Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS*, 293 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29 (D.D.C. 2003)). Furthermore, it is appropriate for USCIS to consider the size of the petitioning company in conjunction with other relevant factors, such as a company's small personnel size, the absence of employees who would perform the non-managerial or non-executive operations of the company, or a "shell company" that does not conduct business in a regular and continuous manner. *See, e.g. Systronics Corp. v. INS*, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001).

Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial or executive duties, and the petition may not be approved for that reason.

Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has failed to establish that the petitioner "is the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate of the firm or corporation or other legal entity by which the alien was employed overseas." 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(3)(C).

A "subsidiary" is defined at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(2) as:

[A] firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent owns, directly or indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, 50 percent of a 50-50 joint venture and has equal control and veto power over the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, less than half of the entity, but in fact controls the entity.

Likewise, an "affiliate" is defined in pertinent part at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(2) as:

- (A) One of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the same parent or individual; [or]
- (B) One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of individuals, each individual owning and controlling approximately the same share or proportion of each entity[.]

"Doing business" is defined in part as "the regular, systematic, and continuous provision of goods and/or services." *Id.*

The regulations and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be examined in determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between United States and foreign entities for purposes of this visa classification. *Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc.*, 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); *Matter of Hughes*, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comm. 1982); see also *Matter of Church Scientology International*, 19 I&N Dec. 593. In the context of this petition, ownership refers to the direct or indirect legal right of possession of the assets of an entity with full power and authority to control; control means the direct or indirect legal right and authority to direct the establishment, management, and operations of an entity. *Matter of Church Scientology International*, 19 I&N at 595.

In this matter, the petitioner claims to be 100% owned by the foreign employer, a Peruvian company. In support, the petitioner submitted organizational documents, including a stock certificate representing the issuance of 1,000 shares of stock to the foreign employer. However, the record contains serious inconsistencies which undermine the petitioner's claim to be owned and controlled by the foreign employer. For example, the petitioner's 2005 and 2006 IRS Forms 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Returns, indicate in Schedules K that no entity owned, directly or indirectly, 50% or more of the petitioner's stock. The returns also indicate that no foreign companies owned 25% or more of the petitioner's stock. Both of these averments directly contradict the petitioner's claim to be 100% owned by a Peruvian company. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. *Id.* at 591.

Furthermore, the record contains significant inconsistencies which undermine the petitioner's claim to be doing business in the United States. While the petitioner submitted evidence of the conduct of business activities at the locations listed in the petition, the petitioner also submitted copies of the leases for these locations. Upon review, it appears that the petitioner is not the lessee for any of these locations. To the contrary, the lessees at the locations are the beneficiary (identified as a "sole proprietor"), the beneficiary and ██████████, and ██████████. As the petitioner is not the lessee for any of its claimed business locations, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the petitioner is actually doing business at any of these locations. Instead, it appears more likely than not that these businesses are being conducted by the individuals who are listed as the lessees. Once again, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Id.* at 591-92.

Accordingly, as the petitioner has failed to establish that it and the foreign employer are qualifying organizations, the petition may not be approved for this additional reason.

An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See *Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); see also *Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews

appeals on a *de novo* basis).

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's enumerated grounds. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc.*, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043.

As a final note, USCIS records indicate that the beneficiary has previously been approved for L-1 employment with the instant petitioner. However, with regard to the beneficiary's L-1 nonimmigrant classification, it should be noted that, in general, given the permanent nature of the benefit sought, immigrant petitions are given far greater scrutiny by USCIS than nonimmigrant petitions. The AAO acknowledges that both the immigrant and nonimmigrant visa classifications rely on the same definitions of managerial and executive capacity. *See* §§ 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44). Although the statutory definitions for managerial and executive capacity are the same, the question of overall eligibility requires a comprehensive review of all of the provisions, not just the definitions of managerial and executive capacity. There are significant differences between the nonimmigrant visa classification, which allows an alien to enter the United States temporarily for no more than seven years, and an immigrant visa petition, which permits an alien to apply for permanent residence in the United States and, if granted, ultimately apply for naturalization as a United States citizen. *Cf.* §§ 204 and 214 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154 and 1184; *see also* § 316 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1427.

In addition, unless a petition seeks extension of a "new office" petition, the regulations allow for the approval of an L-1 extension without any supporting evidence and USCIS normally accords the petitions a less substantial review. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(14)(i) (requiring no supporting documentation to file a petition to extend an L-1A petition's validity). Because USCIS spends less time reviewing Form I-129 nonimmigrant petitions than Form I-140 immigrant petitions, some nonimmigrant L-1 petitions are simply approved in error. *Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS*, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 29-30 (recognizing that USCIS approves some petitions in error).

Moreover, each nonimmigrant and immigrant petition is a separate record of proceeding with a separate burden of proof; each petition must stand on its own individual merits. The prior nonimmigrant approvals do not preclude USCIS from denying an extension petition. *See e.g. Texas A&M Univ. v. Upchurch*, 99 Fed. Appx. 556, 2004 WL 1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). The approval of a nonimmigrant petition in no way guarantees that USCIS will approve an immigrant petition filed on behalf of the same beneficiary. USCIS denies many I-140 immigrant petitions after approving prior nonimmigrant I-129 L-1 petitions. *See, e.g., Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS*, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 25; *IKEA US v. US Dept. of Justice*, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 22; *Fedin Brothers Co. Ltd. v. Sava*, 724 F. Supp. at 1103.

Furthermore, if the previous nonimmigrant petition was approved based on the same unsupported and contradictory assertions that are contained in the current record, the approval would constitute material and gross error on the part of the director. The AAO is not required to approve applications or petitions where eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. *See, e.g. Matter of Church Scientology International*, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). It would be absurd to

