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U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Citizenship and Immigration Services

PUBLIC COPY

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE
CIS, AAO, 20 Mass, 3/F
425 I Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20536

[redacted]

File: [redacted] Office: California Service Center Date: DEC 17 2003

IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary: [redacted]

Petition: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional Pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

[redacted]

Identifying data deleted to prevent clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy

INSTRUCTIONS:
This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. *Id.*

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of $110 as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.7.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was initially approved by the Director, California Service Center. On the basis of new information received and on further review of the record, the director determined that the beneficiary was not eligible for the benefit sought. Accordingly, the director properly served the petitioner with notice of intent to revoke the approval of the preference visa petition, and his reasons therefore, and ultimately revoked the approval of the petition. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a travel agency. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as an assistant manager. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by an individual labor certification approved by the Department of Labor. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the financial ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date of the visa petition.

The petition was approved on August 30, 2000. The director stated that an investigation was conducted, and after consideration, the approval of the petition was revoked on November 8, 2002. The revocation was based on the finding that the petitioner did not have the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date of the petition.

The director, in his revocation notice, stated in pertinent part that:

> The petitioner has responded to our ITR and has submitted the following: a single-page cover letter from the applicant, along with Forms 1120 for Bravo Travel for years 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001, The petitioner has also submitted copies of IRS Forms 1120 for a separate entity, Bravo Express Bus Co., and a photocopy of the applicants IRS Form 1040EZ for year 2001. The Service will not entertain the tax documents for Bravo Express Bus Co. This is a separate legal entity with a different IRS tax identification number and is not the same enterprise named on the I-140 petition and on the labor certification.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which

qualified workers are not available in the United States.

8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

> *Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

On appeal, counsel argues that the "[t]he facts in the instant case are far more analogous to In re Soengawa. Bravo's Federal Tax Returns [previously submitted and attached here for reference] for the years from 1997 to 2001 show a progressive increase in gross receipts and sales from $9 million dollars in 1997 to $22 million in 2001."

Matter of Sonegawa, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967) relates to petitions filed during uncharacteristically unprofitable or difficult years but only within a framework of profitable or successful years. The petitioning entity in *Sonegawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about $100,000.00. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations, and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in Time and Look magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere.

Counsel has provided no evidence which establishes that unusual circumstances existed in this case which parallel those in *Sonegawa*, nor has it been established that 1997 was an

uncharacteristically unprofitable year for the petitioner.

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, the CIS will examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well-established by both CIS and judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F.Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F.Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F.Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F.Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983).

The Form 1120 for 1997 shows a taxable income of -$9,081. The petitioner could not pay a salary of $28,681.32 from this figure.

In addition, the tax returns for 1998 through 2001 continue to show an inability to pay the wage offered.

Upon review, the petitioner has been unable to present sufficient evidence to overcome the findings of the district director in his decision to revoke the approval of the petition. The petitioner has not established eligibility pursuant to section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Act and the petition may not be approved.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.