U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Citizenship and Immigration Services

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PUBLIC COPY

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE
CIS, AAO, 20 Mass, 3/F
425 I Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20536

[redacted]

File: [redacted] Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER Date: OCT 30 2003

IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary: [redacted]

Petition: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional Pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

[redacted]

Identifying data deleted to prevent clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy

INSTRUCTIONS:
This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. *Id.*

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of $110 as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.7.

Helen E. Crawford for

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The employment-based preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center. The director's decision to deny the petition was affirmed by the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The matter is now before the AAO on a motion to reopen. The motion will be granted. The petition will be denied.

The petitioner is a restaurant. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a specialty cook. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by an individual labor certification approved by the Department of Labor. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the financial ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date of the visa petition. The AAO affirmed this determination on appeal.

On motion, counsel submits a brief and additional documentation.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

> *Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

Eligibility in this matter hinges on the petitioner's ability to pay the wage offered as of the petition's priority date, which is the date the request for labor certification was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977). Here, the petition's priority date is October 29, 1999. The beneficiary's salary as stated on the labor certification is $24,000.00 per annum.

The AAO affirmed the director's decision to deny the petition, noting that the petitioner had not submitted evidence of its

ability to pay the proffered wage as of the filing date of the petition.

On motion, counsel reiterates his argument that the petitioner could use his personal assets to pay the wage offered. Counsel also argues that the petitioner "would unhesitatingly lower his annual salary of $81,000+ to assure payment of [the beneficiary's] $24,000 per year salary."

As stated by the AAO, however, "[a] corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners or stockholders. Consequently, any assets of its stockholders or of other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of M*, 8 I&N Dec.24 (BIA 1958; AG 1958); *Matter of Aphrodite Investments Limited*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm. 1980); and *Matter of Tessel*, 17 I&N Dec. 631 (Act. Assoc. Comm. 1980).

Counsel argues that the petitioner's case is analogous to *Matter of Sonegawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967), and *Matter of Masonry Masters, Inc. v. Thornburg*, 875 F.2d 898. (D.C. Circ. 1989.)

Matter of Sonegawa, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967) relates to petitions filed during uncharacteristically unprofitable or difficult years but only within a framework of profitable or successful years. The petitioning entity in *Sonegawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about $100,000.00. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations, and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in Time and Look magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere.

Counsel has provided no evidence which establishes that unusual circumstances existed in this case which parallel those in *Sonegawa*, nor has it been established that 1999 was an uncharacteristically unprofitable year for the petitioner.

Matter of Masonry Masters, Inc. v. Thornburg, 875 F.2d 898. (D.C. Circ. 1989) is a decision that is not binding outside the District

of Columbia. The court held that the Service should not require a petitioner to show the ability to pay more than the prevailing wage. Counsel has not provided evidence that there is a difference between the proffered wage and the prevailing wage in this proceeding, and the petitioning organization is not located in the District of Columbia.

The petitioner must show that it has the ability to pay the proffered wage at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Based on the evidence submitted, it cannot be found that the petitioner had sufficient funds available to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage at the time of filing the application for alien employment certification as required by 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). Therefore, the petition may not be approved.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not sustained that burden.

ORDER: The AAO's decision of July 30, 2001, is affirmed. The petition is denied.