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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
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Washington, DC 20529



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

B6

FILE:

[REDACTED]
LIN 03 050 52069

Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

Date:

DEC 29 2004

IN RE:

Petitioner:
Beneficiary:

[REDACTED]

PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the preference visa petition that is now before the Administrative Appeals Office on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a restaurant. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a cook. As required by statute, a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification approved by the Department of Labor accompanied the petition. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition and denied the petition accordingly.

On appeal, counsel submits a statement.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for granting preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states, in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor. *See* 8 CFR § 204.5(d). Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing on March 9, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$17.10 per hour, which equals \$35,560 per year.

On the petition, the petitioner stated that it was established on September 22, 1995 and that it employs 15 workers. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary, the beneficiary did not claim to have worked for the petitioner. Both the petition and the Form ETA 750 indicate that the petitioner will employ the beneficiary in Waterford, Michigan.

In support of the petition, counsel submitted a copy of the petitioner's 2001 Form 1120 U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return. That return indicates that the petitioner declared taxable income before net operating loss deduction and special deductions of \$8,516 during that year. The corresponding Schedule L shows that at the end of that year the petitioner had current assets of \$7,775 and current liabilities of \$2,243, which yields net current assets of \$5,532.

Counsel also submitted compiled financial statements for the period from January 1, 2002 through September 30, 2002.

Because the evidence submitted was insufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, the Nebraska Service Center, on January 27, 2003, requested, *inter alia*, additional evidence pertinent to that ability.

In response, counsel submitted a copy of the petitioner's 2002 Form 1120 U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return. That return shows that the petitioner reported taxable income before net operating loss deduction and special deductions of \$27,641 during that year. The corresponding Schedule L shows that at the end of that year the petitioner had current assets of \$24,531 and current liabilities of \$2,053, which yields net current assets of \$22,478.

Counsel also submitted the petitioner's compiled financial statements for the 2003 calendar year.

Finally, counsel submitted a letter, dated April 18, 2003, from the petitioner's partner and chief accountant. That letter stresses the sum of the petitioner's income, depreciation deduction, end-of-year cash, and amortization as evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage during 2001 and 2002.

The director determined that the evidence submitted did not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, and, on June 20, 2003, denied the petition.

On appeal, counsel submits a near duplicate of the April 18, 2003 letter, except that it is dated July 2, 2003. Again, this letter stresses the amount of the petitioner's income, depreciation, cash, and amortization as evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage.

Counsel's reliance on the amount of the petitioner's depreciation and amortization deductions is misplaced. A depreciation deduction does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. It is a systematic allocation of the cost of a long-term asset. It may be taken to represent the diminution in value of buildings and equipment, or to represent the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. The value lost as equipment and buildings deteriorate is an actual expense of doing business, whether it is spread over more years or concentrated into fewer.

While the expense does not require or represent the current use of cash, neither is it available to pay wages. No precedent exists that would allow the petitioner to add its depreciation deduction to the amount available to pay the proffered wage. *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F.Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989). *See also Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F.Supp. 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The petitioner's election of accounting and depreciation methods accords a specific amount of depreciation expense to each given year. The petitioner may not now shift that expense to some other year as convenient to its present purpose, nor treat it as a fund available to pay the proffered wage.

Counsel's reliance on the petitioner's compiled financial statements is also misplaced. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) makes clear that where a petitioner relies on financial statements to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage, those financial statements must be audited. The financial statements

submitted were produced pursuant to a compilation rather than an audit. Financial statements produced pursuant to a compilation are the representations of management compiled into standard form. The unsupported representations of management are not reliable evidence and are insufficient to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Counsel's addition of the petitioner's end-of-year cash to its profit is incorrect, as it might be duplicative. The petitioner's end-of-year cash is part of its current assets, and is correctly included in the calculation of the petitioner's net current assets, which calculation is addressed below.

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, CIS will examine whether the petitioner employed the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner did not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, the AAO will, in addition, examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. CIS may rely on federal income tax returns to assess a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F.Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F.Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F.Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F.Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983).

Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient. In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now CIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that CIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income.

The petitioner's net income is not the only statistic that may be used to show the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. If the petitioner's net income, if any, during a given period, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, the AAO will review the petitioner's assets as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

The petitioner's total assets, however, are not available to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner's total assets include those assets the petitioner uses in its business, which will not, in the ordinary course of business, be converted to cash, and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Only the petitioner's current assets, those expected to be converted into cash within a year, may be considered. Further, the petitioner's current assets cannot be viewed as available to pay wages without reference to the petitioner's current liabilities, those liabilities projected to be paid within a year. CIS will consider the petitioner's net current assets, its current assets net of its current liabilities, in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

The proffered wage is \$35,560 per year. The priority date is March 9, 2001.

During 2001 the petitioner declared taxable income before net operating loss deduction and special deductions of \$8,516 during that year. That amount is insufficient to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner ended that year with net current assets of \$5,532. That amount is also insufficient to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner has not demonstrated that any other funds were available to it with which it might have paid the proffered wage during that year. The petitioner has not demonstrated the ability to pay the proffered wage during 2001.

During 2002 the petitioner declared taxable income before net operating loss deduction and special deductions of \$27,641 during that year. That amount is insufficient to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner ended that year with net current assets of \$22,478. That amount is also insufficient to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner has not demonstrated that any other funds were available to it with which it might have paid the proffered wage during that year. The petitioner has not demonstrated the ability to pay the proffered wage during 2002.

The petitioner failed to submit evidence sufficient to demonstrate that it had the ability to pay the proffered wage during 2001 and 2002. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely upon the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.