



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

B-6



FILE: [Redacted] Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: JUL 13 2004

IN RE: Petitioner: [Redacted]  
Beneficiary: [Redacted]

PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

*for*  
  
Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

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**DISCUSSION:** The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a convenience store and gas station. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as an assistant manager. As required by statute, a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification approved by the Department of Labor, accompanied the petition. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition and denied the petition accordingly.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief and additional evidence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states, in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor. *See* 8 CFR § 204.5(d). Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing on April 30, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$7.25 per hour, which amounts to \$13,195 annually based on a thirty-five hour work week.

With the petition, the petitioner submitted the petitioner's Form 1120S, U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation for the years 2001.

Because the evidence submitted was insufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, on April 15, 2003, the director requested additional evidence pertinent to that ability. The director requested a copy of the petitioner's 2002 corporate tax return, a copy of W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, forms for each employee in 2001 and 2002, copies of the petitioner's bank statements from April 2001 to the present, and any other documentation to prove its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

In response, the petitioner submitted Form 1120S, U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation for the petitioner for 2002, bank statements from April 2001 to March 2003, and an affidavit signed by Niranjana Patel stating that

he is the president of the petitioner, which is a family business with three employees including himself, his wife, and his daughter. He also states that “W2s for 2001 and 2002 were not issued as the profits were distributed as dividends, not salaries.”

The petitioner’s tax returns reflect the following information for the following years:

	<u>2001</u>	<u>2002</u>
Ordinary income	\$-55,565	\$1,428
Current Assets	\$64,399	\$82,568
Current Liabilities	\$23,722	\$89,455
Net current assets	\$40,677	\$-6,887

The director determined that the evidence submitted did not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, and, on June 6, 2003, denied the petition.

On appeal, counsel asserts that “[a]ccording to both federal and administrative decisions, the depreciation amount can be added to the figure for the net profit on a tax return in order to properly determine a company’s financial capability.” Counsel also states that the petitioner’s bank statements also reflect an ability to pay the proffered wage, when it is calculated based on a thirty-five hour work week instead of a forty hour work week. The petitioner submits copies of prior AAO decision and copies of evidence previously submitted.

Counsel’s reliance on the balances in the petitioner’s bank account is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner’s ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material “in appropriate cases,” the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner’s bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax return, such as the cash specified on Schedule L that will be considered below in determining the petitioner’s net current assets. Instead, the director noted that the petitioner reported no cash assets at its year end in 2001 and 2002 which directly contradicts the petitioner’s bank statements. Counsel does not address these points on appeal. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988).

In determining the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner did not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary the proffered wage in 2001 or 2002.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, CIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). The petitioner's net income for 2001 and 2002 was \$-55,565 and \$1,428, respectively, which are both too low to cover the proffered wage. Thus, the petitioner cannot demonstrate an ability to pay the proffered wage out of its net income.

The director accurately quoted part of the holding in *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh* for the premise that "[t]here is no precedent that would allow the petitioner to 'add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year.'" 719 F. Supp. at 537. Counsel does not cite legal authority for her premise that CIS should consider depreciation. She offers no context or methodology for considering depreciation. After acknowledging a federal district court's holding that depreciation should not be added back to net income, she then references unpublished AAO cases, which are not precedent, that erroneously added depreciation back to net income. While 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) provides that AAO precedent decisions are binding on all CIS employees in the administration of the Act, unpublished decisions are not similarly binding. Furthermore, the AAO is not required to approve applications or petitions where eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. See, e.g. *Matter of Church Scientology International*, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). It would be absurd to suggest that CIS or any agency must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. *Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. Montgomery*, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), *cert denied*, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). Since depreciation is a deduction to lower tax liability based on the measured value of an asset's loss of value, which is only measured because of tax preparation, the only way to reverse the effect of depreciation is to add it back to the net income, which is not permitted by precedent to prove ability to pay in these proceedings. Thus, the director correctly analyzed the petitioner's financial situation without adding depreciation back to its net income.

Nevertheless, counsel is correct that the petitioner's net income is not the only statistic that can be used to demonstrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, CIS will review the petitioner's assets. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, CIS will consider *net current assets* as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.<sup>1</sup> A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities

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<sup>1</sup> According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid

are shown on lines 16 through 18. If a corporation's end-of-year net current assets are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage out of those net current assets. The petitioner's net current assets during the years in question, 2001 and 2002, were \$40,677 and \$-6,887, respectively. The petitioner could have paid the proffered wage out of its net current assets in the year 2001 and has thus established the ability to pay for that year. However, 2002 remains a problem. The petitioner shows negative net current assets for 2002 and could not pay the proffered wage out of its net current assets for that year. The petitioner must demonstrate a *continuing* ability to pay and its demonstrated inability for 2002 results in an adverse determination. As such, the director's failure to consider the petitioner's net current assets did not prejudice the petitioner's cause.

The petitioner has not demonstrated that it paid any wages to the beneficiary during 2001. In 2001, the petitioner shows a loss of \$-55,565 and has not, therefore, demonstrated the ability to pay the proffered wage out of its net income. However, the petitioner reported net current assets of \$40,677, which sufficiently cover the amount of the proffered wage. The petitioner has therefore shown the ability to pay the proffered wage during 2001.

The petitioner has not demonstrated that it paid any wages to the beneficiary during 2002. In 2002, the petitioner shows a net income of only \$1,428 and negative net current assets and has not, therefore, demonstrated the ability to pay the proffered wage out of its net income or net current assets. The petitioner has not demonstrated that any other funds were available to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner has not, therefore, shown the ability to pay the proffered wage during 2002.

The petitioner failed to submit evidence sufficient to demonstrate that it had the ability to pay the proffered wage during 2002. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.

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expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.