


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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. A3042
Washington, DC 20529



U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

PUBLIC COPY



BG

FILE: [Redacted] Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER
EAC 03 155 50652

Date: AUG 16 2005

IN RE: Petitioner: [Redacted]
Beneficiary: [Redacted]

PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:
[Redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a Mexican restaurant. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a Mexican specialty cook. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the Department of Labor. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

On appeal, the counsel submits a brief and additional evidence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the U.S. Department of Labor. The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification as certified by the U.S. Department of Labor and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on April 30, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$15.00 per hour (\$31,200.00 per year). The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires two years experience.

With the petition, counsel submitted the following documents: the original Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the Department of Labor, a copy of petitioner's Form 1120 U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return for 2001, and, copies of documentation concerning the beneficiary's qualifications.

Because the Director determined the evidence submitted was insufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, the Vermont Service Center on June 11, 2003, requested evidence pertinent to that issue.

Consistent with 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), the Service Center requested pertinent evidence of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. The Service Center specifically requested.

Submit the 2002 United States federal income tax return(s), with all schedules and attachments, for your business. If your business is organized as a corporation, submit the corporate tax returns. If the business is organized as a sole proprietorship, submit the owner's individual tax return (Form 1040) as well as Schedule C relating to the business.

If the beneficiary was employed by you in 2001 and 2002, submit copies of the beneficiary's Form W-2 Wage and Tax Statement(s) showing how much the beneficiary was paid by your business.

In response to the Request for Evidence of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, counsel submitted 2002 bank statements only.

The director denied the petition on October 20, 2003, finding that the evidence submitted did not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

On appeal, counsel asserts:

"The Center Director erred in determining that the petitioner did not have the ability to meet the proffered wage."

On appeal, the petitioner submitted the following additional copies of documents: Form 1120 United States federal income tax returns for 2001 and 2002; a deed for the place of business; a letter from petitioner's president; company bank statements, and a letter from petitioner's accountant.

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. No evidence was submitted to show that the petitioner employed the beneficiary, but according to the Form 750B submitted into evidence the petitioner had employed the beneficiary since January 1999. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states that the director may request additional evidence in appropriate cases. Although specifically and clearly requested by the director, the petitioner declined to provide copies of the beneficiary's Form W-2 Wage and Tax Statements. The Form W-2 Wage and Tax Statements would have further reveal its ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner's failure to submit these documents cannot be excused. The failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(14).

Alternatively, in determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, CIS will examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F.Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305, (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F.Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc.*

v. Sava, 623 F.Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F.Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, the court held that the Service had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. *Supra* at 1084. The court specifically rejected the argument that the INS, now CIS, should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. Finally, no precedent exists that would allow the petitioner to "add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year." *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh, Supra* at 537. See also *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava, Supra* at 1054.

The tax returns demonstrated the following financial information concerning the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage of \$31,200.00 per year from the priority date.

- In 2001, the Form 1120 stated taxable income loss¹ of <\$1,216.00>.²
- In 2002, the Form 1120 stated taxable income of \$ 37,877.00.

Therefore, in 2001 the petitioner did not have taxable income available to pay the proffered wage.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, CIS will review the petitioner's assets. The petitioner's net current assets can be considered in the determination of the ability to pay the proffered wage especially when there is failure of the petitioner to demonstrate it has taxable income to pay the proffered wage. In the subject case, as set forth above, petitioner did not have taxable income to sufficient pay the proffered wage in year 2001 for which petitioner's tax returns are offered for evidence.

CIS will consider *net current assets* as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.³ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. That schedule is included with, as in this instance, the petitioner's filing of Form 1120 federal tax return. The petitioner's year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If a corporation's end-of-year net current assets are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage.

Examining the two Form 1120 U.S. Income Tax Returns submitted by petitioner, Schedule L found in each of those returns indicates the following.

- In 2002, petitioner's Form 1120 return stated current assets of \$29,125.00 and \$16,722.00 in current liabilities. Therefore, the petitioner had \$12,403.00 in net current assets for 2002. Since the proffered wage was \$31,200.00 per year, this sum is less than the proffered wage.

¹ IRS Form 1120, Line 28.

² The symbols <a number> indicate a negative number, or in the context of a tax return or other financial statement, a loss, that is below zero.

³ According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

- In 2001, petitioner's Form 1120 return stated current assets of \$25,611.00 and \$17,322.00 in current liabilities. Therefore, the petitioner had an \$8,289.00 in net current assets for 2001. Since the proffered wage was \$31,200.00 per year, this sum is less than the proffered wage.

Therefore, for the period 2001 through 2002 from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the U. S. Department of Labor, the petitioner had not established that it had the ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage at the time of filing through an examination of its current assets.

Counsel asserts in his brief accompanying the appeal that there is another way to determine the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date through an analysis of the petitioner's bank account, by including depreciation and amortization deductions from the returns, by including the rent paid to the shareholder and owner by petitioner, and by examining the totality of the petitioner's business circumstances.⁴ Counsel cites no legal precedent for these items, and, according to regulation,⁵ copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements are the means by which petitioner's ability to pay is determined. In his calculations, counsel is selecting and combining data from various schedules of petitioner's tax return and adding them to reach a result. This is a duplicative and misleading method of viewing the petitioner's true financial data and its ability to pay the proffered wage on the priority date, April 30, 2001. Counsel assertions are erroneous. Proof of ability to pay begins on the priority date, that is, when petitioner's Application for Alien Employment Certification was accepted for processing by the U. S. Department of Labor.

Counsel's reliance on the balances in the petitioner's bank account is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax return, such as the cash specified on Schedule L that will be considered below in determining the petitioner's net current assets.

Petitioner's accountant advocates the addition of depreciation and amortization⁶ taken as a deduction in those years' tax returns to eliminate the abovementioned deficiencies. Petitioner's counsel cited no legal precedent for his position. Since depreciation is a deduction in the calculation of taxable income on tax Form 1120, this method would eliminate depreciation as a factor in the calculation of taxable income.

There is established legal precedent against counsel's contention that depreciation may be a source to pay the proffered wage. The court in *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburg*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Tex. 1989) noted:

⁴ Counsel in prior correspondence in the record of proceedings also asserts that compensation of officers; cash assets and retained earnings can be included with taxable income. There is no probative evidence submitted in the record of proceedings for these assertions. Simply going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. See *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972).

⁵ 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2).

⁶ Intangible assets on a balance sheet are included as "other assets" and they are amortized over a term of years. Amortization is the equivalent of depreciation for those intangibles.

“Plaintiffs also contend that depreciation amounts on the 1985 and 1986 returns are non-cash deductions. Plaintiffs thus request that the court *sua sponte* add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year. Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for this proposition. This argument has likewise been presented before and rejected. *See Elatos*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. [CIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner’s ability to pay. Plaintiffs’ argument that the court should revise these figures by adding back depreciation is without support. (Original emphasis.) *Chi-Feng* at 537.”

As stated above, following established legal precedent, CIS relied on the petitioner's net income without consideration of any depreciation deductions, in its determinations of the ability to pay the proffered wage on and after the priority date.

A shareholder has volunteered to forgo receipt of rental payments for the business premises owned by shareholder and others to pay the proffered wage. Because a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders, the assets of its shareholders or of other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation’s ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm. 1980). In a similar case, the court in *Sitar v. Ashcroft*, 2003 WL 22203713 (D.Mass. Sept. 18, 2003) stated, “nothing in the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5, permits [CIS] to consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage.” Further the rent payment is a present expense of the petitioner and therefore, like depreciation, cannot also be considered an asset. Petitioner’s taxable income is examined from the priority date. It is not examined contingent upon some event in the future.

Counsel asserts that by examining the totality of the petitioner’s business circumstances, the petitioner as it reported its finances in the record of proceedings was, on the priority date, a viable business able to pay the proffered wage. *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967), relates to petitions filed during uncharacteristically unprofitable or difficult years but only in a framework of profitable or successful years. No unusual circumstances have been shown to exist in this case to parallel those in *Sonogawa*, nor has it been established that the year 2001 was an uncharacteristically unprofitable period for the petitioner. The petitioner’s accountant’s explanation for the shortfall and the income loss is not persuasive.

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

Counsel’s additive calculations cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the corporate tax return as submitted by petitioner that by any test shows that the petitioner has not demonstrated its ability to pay the proffered wage from the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

