



U.S. Citizenship
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FILE: [REDACTED]
EAC-03-229-50194

Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER

Date: **DEC 21 2005**

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition and a subsequent motion to reconsider were denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center, and the matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a restaurant. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a cook. As required by statute, a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification approved by the Department of Labor, accompanied the petition. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition and denied the petition accordingly.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states, in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor. *See* 8 CFR § 204.5(d). Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing on April 27, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$18.89 per hour, which amounts to \$39,291.20 annually. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary, the beneficiary did not claim to have worked for the petitioner.

On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 2002, to have a gross annual income of \$704,807, and to currently employ 25 workers. In support of the petition, the petitioner submitted a letter stating that its corporate name changed as a result of corporate restructuring which “has not affected our business operation. We still use the same trade name, premises telephone number, same business nature, shareholders and workers.” The petitioner submitted a 2001 federal corporate tax return for Zenecon Corp. with the same address and employer identification number as the petitioning entity.

Because the director deemed the evidence submitted insufficient to demonstrate the petitioner’s continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, on October 10, 2003, the director requested additional evidence pertinent to that ability. In accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), the director specifically requested that the petitioner provide copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements to demonstrate its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. The director noted Zenecon Corp.’s net income and net current assets as insufficient evidence of the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage and requested additional evidence for 2001. Additionally, the petitioner requested evidence of

wages actually paid to the beneficiary in 2001 or 2002, the petitioner's 2002 federal corporate income tax return, and/or the petitioner's annual reports for 2001 and 2002 accompanied by audited or reviewed financial statements.

In response, the petitioner submitted a letter stating that its 2002 federal corporate income tax return was unavailable due to delays caused by its restructuring and name change. Additionally, the petitioner stated that certain expenses, such as depreciation, should be added back to its net income, as well as \$18,600 that was paid to Mrs. [REDACTED] one of the petitioner's cooks who left the job in June 30, 2001.

The director determined that the evidence submitted did not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, and, on April 16, 2004, denied the petition.

On appeal, counsel asserted that the director erred by failing to add together the petitioner's depreciation expenses, current assets, and salary paid to another worker and cited to *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967) for the premise that the director must consider the totality of circumstances surrounding the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date instead of just the petitioner's net profit.

The petitioner's appeal was filed late so the director construed and adjudicated it as a motion to reconsider. The director determined, on July 23, 2004, that counsel's arguments failed to overcome its determination in its April 16, 2004 decision.

The petitioner appealed the director's decision on the motion to reconsider, making similar arguments and submitting a copy of *Ranchito Coletero*, 2002-INA-104 (2004 BALCA), a case decided by the Board of Alien Labor Certification Appeals (BALCA), and an excerpt from www.loanuniverse.com with highlighted text stating that "[p]rofits and earnings are created by accounting conventions and include non-cash items such as depreciation."

At the outset, counsel's citation to *Ranchito Coletero*, 2002-INA-104 (2004 BALCA) fails to include citation to legal authority for how the Department of Labor's (DOL) BALCA precedent is binding on the AAO. While 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) provides that precedent decisions of Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) are binding on all its employees in the administration of the Act, BALCA decisions are not similarly binding. Precedent decisions must be designated and published in bound volumes or as interim decisions. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.9(a). Moreover, *Ranchito Coletero* deals with a sole proprietorship and is not directly applicable to the instant petition, which deals with a corporation.

The petitioner's tax returns reflect the following information:

	<u>2001</u>
Net income ¹	-\$1,591
Current Assets	\$51,061
Current Liabilities	\$28,402
Net current assets	\$22,659

¹ Taxable income before net operating loss deduction and special deductions as reported on Line 28.

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, CIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner did not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage in 2001.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, CIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses, contrary to counsel's assertions. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient. In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now CIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now CIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. The court in *Chi-Feng Chang* further noted:

Plaintiffs also contend the depreciation amounts on the 1985 and 1986 returns are non-cash deductions. Plaintiffs thus request that the court *sua sponte* add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year. Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for this proposition. This argument has likewise been presented before and rejected. See *Elatos*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. [CIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.

(Emphasis in original.) *Chi-Feng* at 537.

Nevertheless, the petitioner's net income is not the only statistic that can be used to demonstrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, CIS will review the petitioner's assets. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, CIS will consider *net current assets* as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage. Net current assets

are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.² A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If a corporation's end-of-year net current assets are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage out of those net current assets.

The petitioner has not demonstrated that it paid any wages to the beneficiary during 2001. In 2001, [REDACTED] shows a net income of -\$1,591 and net current assets of only \$22,659 and has not, therefore, demonstrated the ability to pay the proffered wage out of its net income or net current assets.

The petitioner has not demonstrated that any other funds were available to pay the proffered wage. *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967), relates to petitions filed during uncharacteristically unprofitable or difficult years but only in a framework of profitable or successful years. The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere.

No unusual circumstances have been shown to exist in this case to parallel those in *Sonogawa*, nor has it been established that 2001 was an uncharacteristically unprofitable year for the petitioner. The petitioner has not, therefore, shown the ability to pay the proffered wage during 2001.

Counsel advised that the beneficiary would replace a worker. The record does not, however, state Mrs. [REDACTED] wages, verify her full-time employment, or provide evidence that the petitioner has replaced or will replace them with the beneficiary. In general, wages already paid to others are not available to prove the ability to pay the wage proffered to the beneficiary at the priority date of the petition and continuing to the present. Moreover, there is no evidence that Mrs. [REDACTED] position involves the same duties as those set forth in the Form ETA 750. The petitioner has not documented the position, duty, and termination of the worker who performed the duties of the proffered position. If that employee performed other kinds of work, then the beneficiary could not have replaced him or her. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

² According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

Beyond the decision of the director, the record contains no evidence that the petitioner qualifies as a successor-in-interest to ██████████ Corp.³ This status requires documentary evidence that the petitioner has assumed all of the rights, duties, and obligations of the predecessor company. The fact that the petitioner is doing business at the same location as the predecessor does not establish that the petitioner is a successor-in-interest. In addition, in order to maintain the original priority date, a successor-in-interest must demonstrate that the predecessor had the ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Dial Auto Repair Shop, Inc.*, 19 I&N Dec. 481 (Comm. 1986). In the instant petition, the petitioner has conceded that a restructuring took place but provided no documentation to corroborate the assertion that it “still use[s] the same trade name, premises telephone number, same business nature, shareholders and workers.” As noted above, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. at 190).

Considering the totality of circumstances, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that it had the ability to pay the proffered wage during 2001. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

³ An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 299 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis).