


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U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
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
Petitioner:



Beneficiary:


PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.


Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a medical electronics manufacturer and distributor. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a technical writer. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the Department of Labor. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

On appeal, the counsel submits a brief and additional evidence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the U.S. Department of Labor. The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification as certified by the U.S. Department of Labor and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on April 27, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$46,925.00 per year. The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires one year's experience.

With the petition, counsel submitted the following documents: the original Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the Department of Labor, a copy of petitioner's Form 1120 U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return for 2001, and, copies of documentation concerning the beneficiary's qualifications.

Because the Director determined the evidence submitted was insufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, the Vermont Service Center on June 19, 2003, requested evidence pertinent to that issue.

Consistent with 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), the Service Center requested pertinent evidence of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. The Service Center specifically requested:

Your 2000 U.S. corporate Income Tax Return shows a Taxable Income as \$7,811.

Submit additional evidence to establish that the employer had the ability to pay the proffered wage or salary of \$46,925 per year as of April 27, 2001, the date of filing and continuing to the present.

Submit the 2001 and 2002 federal income tax return(s), with all schedules and attachments, for your business. If your business is organized as a corporation, submit the corporate tax returns. If the business is organized as a sole proprietorship, submit the owner's individual tax return (Form 1040) as well as Schedule C relating to the business.

In response to the Request for Evidence of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, counsel submitted or resubmitted the petitioner's Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 1120 tax returns for years 2001, and 2002¹ as well as other documents.

The tax returns demonstrated the following financial information concerning the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage of \$46,925.00 per year from the priority date.

- In 2002, the Form 1120 stated taxable income² of \$22,180.00.
- In 2001, the Form 1120 stated taxable income of \$4,314.00.
- In 2000, the Form 1120 stated taxable income of \$7,811.00

The director denied the petition on March 8, 2004, finding that the evidence submitted did not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

On appeal, counsel asserts:

"The decision ignored Matter of Sonogawa 12 I&N Dec 612 (Reg.Comm R 1967). For the reasons stated in the attached Response to the RFE and expert report, ability to pay was shown and proven."

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. No evidence was submitted to show that the petitioner employed the beneficiary.

Alternatively, in determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, CIS will examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F.Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305, (9th Cir.

¹IRS Form 1120 for tax year 2000 was originally submitted in support of the petition.

²IRS Form 1120, Line 28.

1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F.Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F.Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F.Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, the court held that the Service had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. *Supra* at 1084. The court specifically rejected the argument that the INS, now CIS, should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. Finally, no precedent exists that would allow the petitioner to "add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year." *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh, Supra* at 537. *See also Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava, Supra* at 1054.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, CIS will review the petitioner's assets. The petitioner's net current assets can be considered in the determination of the ability to pay the proffered wage especially when there is failure of the petitioner to demonstrate it has taxable income to pay the proffered wage. In the subject case, as set forth above, petitioner did not have taxable income to sufficient pay the proffered wage at any time between the years 2001 through 2002 for which petitioner's tax returns are offered for evidence.

CIS will consider *net current assets* as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.³ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. That schedule is included with, as in this instance, the petitioner's filing of Form 1120 federal tax return. The petitioner's year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If a corporation's end-of-year net current assets are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage.

Examining the three Form 1120 U.S. Income Tax Returns submitted by petitioner, Schedule L found in each of those returns indicates the following:

- In 2002, petitioner's Form 1120 return stated current assets of \$30,686.00 and \$22,022.00 in current liabilities. Therefore, the petitioner had \$8,664.00 in current net assets for 2002. Since the proffered wage was \$46,925.00 per year this sum is less than the proffered wage.
- In 2001, petitioner's Form 1120 return stated current assets of \$3,496.00 and \$6,755.00 in current liabilities. Therefore, the petitioner had a <\$3259.00> in current net assets for 2001. Since the proffered wage was \$46,925.00 per year, this sum is less than the proffered wage.
- In 2000,⁴ petitioner's Form 1120 return stated current assets of \$18,983.00 and \$4,789.00 in current liabilities. Therefore, the petitioner had a \$14,194.00 in current net assets for 2000. Since the proffered wage was \$46,925.00 per year, this sum is less than the proffered wage.

Therefore, for the period 2001 through 2002 from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the U. S. Department of Labor, the petitioner had not established that it had the ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage at the time of filing through an examination of its current assets.

³ According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

⁴ Since the priority date in this case was April 27, 2001, Tax Form 1120 and its data is presented for its value to show the financial status of the petitioner over a three year period for which tax returns were submitted.

Counsel asserts in his brief accompanying the appeal that there are other ways to determine the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date through an examination of depreciation as a corporate asset, and the anticipated increase of revenues generated by the addition of another employee (i.e. the beneficiary).

Counsel cites no legal precedent for his positions above mentioned (other than *Matter of Sonogawa* mentioned below), and, according to regulation,⁵ copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements are the means by which petitioner's ability to pay is determined.

Petitioner's counsel advocates the addition of depreciation taken as a deduction in those years' tax returns to eliminate the abovementioned deficiencies. Since depreciation is a deduction in the calculation of taxable income on tax Form 1120, this method would eliminate depreciation as a factor in the calculation of taxable income.

There is established legal precedent against counsel's contention that depreciation may be a source to pay the proffered wage. The court in *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburg*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Tex. 1989) noted:

"Plaintiffs also contend that depreciation amounts on the 1985 and 1986 returns are non-cash deductions. Plaintiffs thus request that the court *sua sponte* add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year. Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for this proposition. This argument has likewise been presented before and rejected. See *Elatos*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. [CIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that the court should revise these figures by adding back depreciation is without support. (Original emphasis.) *Chi-Feng* at 537."

As stated above, following established legal precedent, CIS relied on the petitioner's net income without consideration of any depreciation deductions, in its determinations of the ability to pay the proffered wage on and after the priority date.

Counsel states that the director failed to take into account, "...the anticipated increase of revenues generated by the addition of another employee (i.e. the beneficiary)." In this instance, no detail or documentation has been provided to explain how the beneficiary's employment as a technical writer will significantly increase petitioner's profits.⁶ This hypothesis cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the corporate tax returns. The record does not contain evidence of the beneficiary's contribution to petitioner's taxable income for tax years 2000 through 2002. Counsel argues that consideration of the beneficiary's potential to increase the petitioner's revenues is appropriate, and establishes with even greater certainty that the petitioner has more than adequate ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner has not, however, provided any standard or criterion for the evaluation of such earnings. For example, the petitioner has not demonstrated

⁵ 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), *Supra*.

⁶ Petitioner relies upon an unaudited financial statement for evidence of the beneficiary's future contribution to petitioner's profitability. As mentioned elsewhere in this discussion, such an unaudited statement has little probative value under the regulations or in the context of its presentation. According to the plain language of 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), where the petitioner relies on financial statements as evidence of a petitioner's financial condition and ability to pay the proffered wage, those statements must be audited. Unaudited statements are the unsupported representations of management. The unsupported representations of management are not persuasive evidence of a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

that the beneficiary will replace less productive workers, or has a reputation that would increase the number of customers. The assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980).

The financial analysis statements that petitioner submitted is not persuasive evidence. According to the plain language of 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), where the petitioner relies on financial statements as evidence of a petitioner's financial condition and ability to pay the proffered wage, those statements must be audited. Unaudited statements are the unsupported representations of management. The unsupported representations of management are not persuasive evidence of a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Thus, the unaudited "Projection of Salary Payment Capability" statements are of little evidentiary value in this matter. In our present case petitioner's accountant qualifies his analysis by stating:

We have not audited, reviewed or compiled the financial information on which are opinion is based and we express no opinion as to the accuracy or completeness of such information. We assume that information provided by ... [the petitioner's president], and others is [sic are] materially accurate. Our opinion could change significantly if this were not the case.

Counsel relies upon *Matter of Sonogawa*, for the proposition that its rationale applies identically to the present financial affairs of the petitioner. We disagree. *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967), relates to petitions filed during uncharacteristically unprofitable or difficult years but only in a framework of profitable or successful years. The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere.

No unusual circumstances have been shown to exist in this case to parallel those in *Sonogawa*, nor has it been established that the period 2000 through 2002 was an uncharacteristically unprofitable period for the petitioner.

Counsel's additive calculations cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the three corporate tax returns as submitted by petitioner that by any test shows that the petitioner has not demonstrated its ability to pay the proffered wage from the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

