


**Identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy**



**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**

PUBLIC COPY



Bk


FILE: [REDACTED]
SRC-03-037-50363

Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: **JUN 22 2005**

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.


Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a mortgage broker. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a loan financial analyst. As required by statute, a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification approved by the Department of Labor, accompanied the petition. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that the beneficiary was qualified for the proffered position and denied the petition accordingly.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief and re-submits previously submitted evidence. Another attorney representative submitted amending materials for the appeal claiming to be the beneficiary's representative; however, no properly executed Form G-28, Notice of Entry of Appearance as Attorney or Representative, is in the record of proceeding. Additionally, the beneficiary is not the appropriate party to appellate proceedings¹. Thus, the attorney representative submitting amending materials will not be acknowledged by the AAO and a copy of this decision will be sent to the attorney of record with a properly executed Form G-28.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The issue to be discussed in this case is whether or not the petitioner established the beneficiary's qualifications for the proffered position. To be eligible for approval, a beneficiary must have the education and experience specified on the labor certification as of the petition's filing date, which is December 18, 2001. See *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

To determine whether a beneficiary is eligible for an employment based immigrant visa, Citizenship & Immigration Services (CIS) must examine whether the alien's credentials meet the requirements set forth in the labor certification. In evaluating the beneficiary's qualifications, CIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. CIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. See *Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986). See also, *Mandany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008, (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

In the instant case, the Application for Alien Employment Certification, Form ETA-750A, items 14 and 15, set forth the minimum education, training, and experience that an applicant must have for the position of loan financial analyst. In the instant case, item 14 describes the requirements of the proffered position as follows:

- 14. Education
 - Grade School
- 6

¹ Citizenship and Immigration Services' (CIS) regulations specifically prohibit a beneficiary of a visa petition, or a representative acting on a beneficiary's behalf, from filing an appeal. 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1)(iii)(B).

High School	4
College	Blank
College Degree Required	Blank
Major Field of Study	Blank

The applicant must also have two years of training in order to perform the job duties listed in Item 13, which states "Evaluates quality of commercial loans and assigns risk rating. Selects loans to evaluate for credit risk with knowledge and experience of financial and taxes regulations in Colombia and Venezuela." Item 15 indicates that there are no special requirements.

The beneficiary set forth his credentials on Form ETA-750B and signed his name under a declaration that the contents of the form are true and correct under the penalty of perjury. On Part 15, eliciting information of the beneficiary's work experience, he indicated that he was employed as a financial and project analyst at Integracion En Informatica Y Tecnologia Ltda (IIT), located in Bogota, Colombia, from January 1999 to September 2000 evaluating commercial loans and assigning risk ratings. He also stated that he was employed as a financial analyst advisor at Coliseo El Campin [REDACTED] also located in Bogota, Colombia, failing to indicate the starting and ending dates of employment but stating that he evaluated the quality of commercial businesses and assigned risk ratings.

With the initial petition, the petitioner submitted a letter on IIT letterhead signed by [REDACTED] (Mr. [REDACTED]) in his capacity as President of IIT, who stated that the beneficiary worked full time as a financial and project analyst from January 1999 to September 2000. No description of duties was provided. The petitioner also submitted a letter on [REDACTED] letterhead signed by [REDACTED] (Mr. [REDACTED]) in his capacity as "Gerente General," who stated that the beneficiary worked for [REDACTED] from October 2000 to May 2001 as a financial analyst. No description of duties was provided. Both the letter from IIT and the letter from [REDACTED] were in English.

Because the director obtained information that the petitioner's then counsel of record, Mr. [REDACTED] (Mr. [REDACTED]) was arrested and charged with conspiracy to commit immigration fraud by making false representation in multiple visa petitions, knowingly accepting visas procured by fraud, harboring illegal aliens for profit, and making materially false, fictitious statements to CIS, she issued a notice of intent to deny (NOID) on July 7, 2003. The director's NOID requested additional evidence to ensure fraud and/or misrepresentation was not committed by Mr. [REDACTED] and/or the petitioner and/or beneficiary in the instant case.

In response to the director's request for evidence, the petitioner provided many documents to prove the legitimacy of the petitioning business and its sponsorship of the beneficiary. In addition, the petitioner submitted an affidavit, in Spanish with a certified English translation, from Mr. [REDACTED] who stated that his profession is a systems engineer and legal representative for IIT. Mr. [REDACTED] stated that the beneficiary worked as an independent contractor as an analyst and financial consultant "permanently on call" during the company's working hours from January 1999 to September 2000. Mr. [REDACTED] also stated that the beneficiary did not receive any monetary compensation that resulted in his departure from the company. No description of duties was provided. The petitioner also submitted Colombian corporate registration paperwork in Spanish with a certified English translation evidencing IIT's actual existence that also reflects that Mr. [REDACTED] is its president and legal representative. The petitioner also submitted a "professional services contract" executed between the beneficiary and Mr. [REDACTED] as legal representative of IIT, in Spanish with a certified English translation. The contract reflects that the beneficiary would be employed as a contractor financial

analyst and advisor and would be involved in projects that, among other professional duties, would include processing credit applications and procuring financing. The contract also reflects that the beneficiary would have professional autonomy and the capability to work for other companies not presenting conflicts of interest.

The petitioner also submitted a letter in Spanish with an English translation from Mr. [REDACTED] (Mr. [REDACTED] who states that he is the "substitute legal representative" of Compania de Inversiones y Proyectos Coinverpro Ltda (CIPC), which took over the contract for Coliseo. He states that the beneficiary worked as a financial analyst and consultant helping with various investment projects between October 2000 and May 2001. The petitioner also submitted Colombian corporate registration paperwork in Spanish with a certified English translation evidencing CIPC's actual existence which also reflects that Mr. [REDACTED] is a substitute legal representative. Additionally, the petitioner submitted newspaper stories, in Spanish with some translations, reflecting claims of mismanagement and contract dispute between CIPC and Coliseo, which counsel claims is the reason the beneficiary could not obtain a sworn statement from the company's general manager or president.

Counsel also stated that the beneficiary gave Mr. [REDACTED] his former counsel, a copy of an employment experience letter from his brother-in-law, but Mr. [REDACTED] decided not to submit it to CIS. Substituted counsel submits the letter and asserts that it is additional proof of the beneficiary's qualifications. The letter, in Spanish with a certified English translation, is on Metodos Ltda. (Metodos) letterhead and is signed by [REDACTED] (Mr. [REDACTED] and states that the beneficiary was a financial and project analyst from April 1997 to November 1998 working on projects "related with credits to those affected by the Cofee Zone earthquake in Colombia." The petitioner also submitted Colombian corporate registration paperwork in Spanish with a certified English translation evidencing Metodos' actual existence that also reflects that Mr. [REDACTED] is the president and legal representative. The petitioner submitted another letter from [REDACTED] (Ms. [REDACTED] who claims to be Metodos' accountant and that Metodos paid the beneficiary a salary between April 1997 and November 1998.

The director denied the petition on January 15, 2004 stating that the IIT letter and affidavit from Mr. [REDACTED] contain conflicting information about the services provided by the beneficiary. The director noted the following:

While the letter indicates that the beneficiary worked full time at IIT . . . , the affidavit indicates that the beneficiary was an independent contractor who never received any compensation from IIT . . . The true nature of the beneficiary's relationship with IIT . . . is unclear. Based on the affidavit, it can be concluded that the beneficiary never performed any services for IIT . . . and thus did not gain any work experience.

Additionally, the director noted that the affidavit from Mr. [REDACTED] indicates that CIPC "took possession and control for administering [Coliseo]," and thus it "is unclear if the beneficiary worked full time for [CIPC] or [Coliseo]." Finally, the director noted that while the letter state that the beneficiary's prior employment experience was in the capacity of financial analyst, none of the letters, including the one from Metodos, "indicate that the beneficiary has any experience with loans."

On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner and beneficiary are victims of Mr. [REDACTED] fraud and rebut any presumption of fraud to this case. Counsel states that the director overlooked evidence contained in the record of proceeding that addressed all of the director's concerns. Subsequently counsel submits a brief detailing rebuttals to

the director's concerns. Counsel states that Mr. [REDACTED] profession in his affidavit was not translated as "president" of IIT but being called "legal representative" was effectively the same position. Counsel also states that there is no conflicting information between the first IIT letter and Mr. [REDACTED] affidavit because the beneficiary was working on a full-time, permanent basis for IIT. Counsel states that the IIT letter states that the beneficiary's employment was a full-time job and Mr. [REDACTED] affidavit states that the beneficiary was permanently on call during working hours, which she asserts are the same and do not conflict.

Counsel also asserts that the professional services contract details the specific duties of the beneficiary's position at IIT that included knowledge of financial institutions, risk mitigation, and credit applications. She asserts that the contract also demonstrates that the position was permanent and full time since it required "permanent availability" from "Monday to Friday within the normal company working schedule." She references an affidavit submitted by the beneficiary for the first time on appeal in which he declares he worked at least 40 hours per week for the company on a daily basis, Monday through Friday, and sometimes on weekends and holidays. He states that although he was not inside the physical premises of the company, he met with area managers or directors at least three times per week, was present at managerial meetings, and maintained contacts with company clients, suppliers, financial institutions, and local and overseas contacts, relishing his professional autonomy to perform the duties.

With respect to the salary issue, counsel states that Mr. [REDACTED] statement that the beneficiary was not compensated actually qualified a preceding sentence concerning the time period of January 1999 to September 2000, but does not indicate that the beneficiary did not perform his duties or worked for the company. Instead, counsel states that the beneficiary "did not receive compensation because the projects did not materialize," and that such a form of payment was outlined in the professional services contract. Counsel cautions against valuing the beneficiary's employment based upon the amount of compensation noting that many professionals' compensation is contingent upon successful outcomes. Counsel submits copies of the beneficiary's Colombian tax returns to show that he lived off of stock dividends to support himself without compensation from IIT.

With respect to whether or not the beneficiary worked for Coliseo or CPIC, counsel states that the beneficiary "worked for both" because Coliseo is a stadium and CPIC manages events at the stadium. Counsel also asserts that the CPIC letter and Mr. [REDACTED] affidavit both illustrate that the beneficiary has experience with loans because they states that the beneficiary "played an important role . . . on taking financial decisions" and assisted "in developing various investment projects." Thus, counsel states, "[a]lthough these letters do not provide a detailed job description, they indicate that [the b]eneficiary dealt with financing for investment projects which, by default, requires commercial loans. Businesses use commercial loans as a source of financing for investment projects." She makes a similar assertion with respect to the qualifying employment experience obtained by the beneficiary during his period of employment with Metodos.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(1)(3) provides:

(ii) *Other documentation*—

(A) *General.* Any requirements of training or experience for skilled workers, professionals, or other workers must be supported by letters from trainers or employers giving the name, address, and title of the trainer or employer, and a description of the

training received or the experience of the alien.

(B) *Skilled workers.* If the petition is for a skilled worker, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the alien meets the educational, training or experience, and any other requirements of the individual labor certification, meets the requirements for Schedule A designation, or meets the requirements for the Labor Market Information Pilot Program occupation designation. The minimum requirements for this classification are at least two years of training or experience.

Additional evidence is in the record of proceeding that is pertinent to the adjudication of the beneficiary's stated qualifications for the proffered position. In connection with an application to adjust status to lawful permanent resident based upon the underlying visa petition, the beneficiary submitted Form G-325, Biographic Information sheet. The Form G-325 has multiple sections and two sections that elicit employment information for the past five years as well as the beneficiary's last occupation prior to coming to the United States. The beneficiary signed the form in January 2003 above a statement informing the signatory of penalties for knowingly and willfully falsifying or concealing a material fact. On the Form G-325, the beneficiary left only the portion concerning his employment during the last five years and last occupation abroad blank.

The problem that arises in this case is the multiple inconsistencies in information and representations provided by the petitioner and the beneficiary. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591 (BIA 1988) states: "Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition." *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-592 also states: "It is incumbent on the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice."

Additionally, the AAO notes that many of the factual assertions put forth came from counsel throughout these proceedings. The assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980).

The AAO's first concern has to do with the nature of the beneficiary's employment at IIT. While counsel's point that some professionals receive compensation on a contingency basis is viable, the nature of the work the beneficiary performed for IIT, as a consultant able to work for other companies at the same time, appeared to be more ad hoc, sporadic, and autonomous than a full-time employee showing up during regularly set hours. Being "permanently on call" does not reflect a full-time, regular employment scenario as that individual is only called on to perform when needed, not to perform at a regularly established time and place. The beneficiary's apparent independent contractor consultant role also does not reflect a full-time, regular employment scenario because full-time regular staff are regularly paid. Thus, the AAO finds it unlikely that the beneficiary worked *40 hours* per week, Monday to Friday, and on weekends and holidays, as he claimed in his affidavit. Typically consultants who are independent contractors perform work irregularly and seek compensation based upon services they provide. If the beneficiary worked for less than 40 hours per week in the capacity described in the professional services contract, then it would not amount to the 18 months he alleges on the Form ETA 750B.

The AAO's second concern has to do with the representations made by the beneficiary concerning his employment experience with Coliseo or CPIC. The evidence illustrates that CPIC was managing Coliseo since 1994, before the beneficiary claims he commenced employment with Coliseo. The beneficiary used "Coliseo" on the Form ETA 750B but did not indicate dates of employment. If the beneficiary's actual employer was CPIC, then the beneficiary should have represented CPIC as the employer on the Form ETA 750B. Counsel asserts that the beneficiary worked for both CPIC and Coliseo, but this cannot be so unless the beneficiary worked less than full time for them both at the same time. If the beneficiary was working one job alone, which is what he represented on the Form ETA 750B, then both CPIC and Coliseo are separate business entities -- one is a stadium and the other is a management company -- so the beneficiary would have had to work for one or the other. If the beneficiary's employment for CPIC meant that the beneficiary's physical work location was at Coliseo, then this does not mean that he worked for both. The beneficiary cannot claim that Mr. [REDACTED] representation was the cause for misrepresenting his employment because he signed the Form ETA 750B above where the employment information is set forth and the name of Coliseo was written in Spanish.

The AAO's third concern has to do with the beneficiary's complete omission of employment experience on the Form G-325 accompanying his adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident application. The omission makes cross-referencing representations impossible and does not corroborate the beneficiary's assertions. Likewise, faulting Mr. [REDACTED] is not a persuasive explanation since there are many immigration lawyers from whom to choose for representation before CIS and the Department of Labor (DOL). If the petitioner felt the employment experience at Metodos was critical to proving the beneficiary's eligibility, then the petitioner could have changed lawyers or demanded Mr. [REDACTED] follow his instructions. The AAO notes that the record of proceeding does not contain competent evidence that the beneficiary sought to penalize Mr. [REDACTED] for providing ineffective assistance of counsel².

Thus, because of the inconsistencies and implausible information and representations made concerning the beneficiary's prior employment experience, the AAO concurs with the director's determination that the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary is qualified to perform the duties of the proffered position because there

² Any appeal or motion based upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires: (1) that the claim be supported by an affidavit of the allegedly aggrieved respondent setting forth in detail the agreement that was entered into with counsel with respect to the actions to be taken and what representations counsel did or did not make to the respondent in this regard, (2) that counsel whose integrity or competence is being impugned be informed of the allegations leveled against him and be given an opportunity to respond, and (3) that the appeal or motion reflect whether a complaint has been filed with appropriate disciplinary authorities with respect to any violation of counsel's ethical or legal responsibilities, and if not, why not. *Matter of Lozada*, 19 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), *aff'd*, 857 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988). Additionally, contrary to counsel's appellate argument, the holding in *Escobar-Grijalva v. INS*, 206 F.3d 1331 (9th Cir. 2000) is not applicable as the facts are distinguishable from the instant case. In *Escobar-Grijalva*, the asylum applicant in that case never consented to being represented by the counsel whose assistance was deemed ineffective, but was ordered by the immigration judge over the objections of opposing counsel, the beneficiary, and the attorney to be represented by an attorney unfamiliar with the applicant's case. In the instant petition, the beneficiary clearly consented to being represented by Mr. [REDACTED]

is insufficient evidence that he has two years of qualifying work experience.

Beyond the decision of the director, there is insufficient evidence that the petitioner has established its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage. An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 299 F. Supp.2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states, in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor. *See* 8 CFR § 204.5(d). Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing on December 18, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$17.79 per hour, which amounts to \$37,003.20 annually. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary, the beneficiary did not claim to have worked for the petitioner and there is no evidence that he actually worked for and received wages from the petitioner³.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, CIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient. In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now CIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income.

³ In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, CIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

Nevertheless, the petitioner's net income is not the only statistic that can be used to demonstrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, CIS will review the petitioner's assets. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, CIS will consider *net current assets* as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.⁴ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If a corporation's end-of-year net current assets are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage out of those net current assets.

The petitioner's tax returns for 2001 and 2002 are contained in the record of proceeding and reflect net income and net current assets less than the proffered wage⁵. Thus, the petitioner cannot demonstrate its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date out of its net income or net current assets. No other evidence of an alternative source of income was provided. Thus, in any additional proceedings in this matter, the petitioner would have to overcome the additional evidentiary deficiency with respect to its failure to demonstrate its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

⁴ According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

⁵ The petitioner's net incomes in 2001 and 2002 are negative. Its net current assets are \$2,835 in 2001 and \$16,919 in 2002, which are both less than the proffered wage of \$37,003.20 per year.