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EAC-03-263-50270

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
Petitioner:

Beneficiary:

PETITION:

Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.


Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a construction company. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a carpenter. As required by statute, a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification approved by the Department of Labor, accompanied the petition. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition and denied the petition accordingly.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief and previously submitted evidence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states, in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor. *See* 8 CFR § 204.5(d). Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing on April 26, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$16.82 per hour, which amounts to \$34,985.60 annually.

On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1975, to have a gross annual income of \$1,831,742, and to currently employ 25 workers. In support of the petition, the petitioner submitted its 2002 corporate tax return reflecting a fiscal year from April 1 through March 31.

Because the director deemed the evidence submitted insufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, on December 10, 2003, the director requested additional evidence pertinent to that ability. In accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), the director specifically requested that the petitioner provide copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements to demonstrate its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. The director specifically requested evidence pertaining to 2001, any evidence of wages actually paid to the beneficiary, annual reports for 2001 and 2002 accompanied by audited or reviewed financial statements¹ as an alternative submission, and pointed out that the petitioner's 2002 tax return did not establish its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

¹ The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) requires copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

In response, the petitioner submitted its Form 1120 Corporate tax returns for 2001; a letter from its accountant stating that the petitioner can pay the proffered wage for two petitions, has been in business for 18 years, has an excellent record with creditors, a payroll of approximately \$500,000, only reports a loss on its tax returns because bonuses are estimated towards the end of the year as a way to pay out all profits and avoid double taxation, and has delayed profiting from customer work orders; reviewed financial statements; and a letter from the petitioner's "agent" stating that the beneficiary does not work for the petitioner.

The petitioner's tax returns reflect the following information for the following years:

| | <u>2001</u> | <u>2002</u> |
|-------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Net income ² | -\$50,039 | -\$3,543 |
| Current Assets | \$130,137 | \$104,013 |
| Current Liabilities | \$185,804 | \$179,692 |
| Net current assets | -\$55,667 | -\$75,679 |

The director determined that the evidence submitted did not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, and, on March 31, 2004, denied the petition.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the director failed to consider the petitioner's accountant's letter that explained that the petitioner's business structure and accounting principles reflect that its reported current liabilities are greater than the amount shown on Schedule L since its customers' deposits are reported as liabilities until the petitioner can actually perform the work orders and receive payment. Counsel also asserts that the petitioner pays bonuses to the petitioner's two officers, who are married, so that the petitioner pays little tax and they pay taxes on those funds in their individual capacity. Counsel references the petitioner's total assets, gross profits, and common stock profits.

The unaudited financial statements that were submitted in response to the director's request for evidence and again on appeal are not persuasive evidence. According to the plain language of 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), where the petitioner relies on financial statements as evidence of a petitioner's financial condition and ability to pay the proffered wage, those statements must be audited. Unaudited statements, such as those that are compiled or reviewed, are the unsupported representations of management. The unsupported representations of management are not persuasive evidence of a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner did not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage in 2001 or 2002.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, CIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income

² Taxable income before net operating loss deduction and special deductions as reported on Line 28.

tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient. In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now CIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income.

Nevertheless, the petitioner's net income is not the only statistic that can be used to demonstrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, CIS will review the petitioner's assets. We reject, however, counsel's argument that the petitioner's total assets should have been considered in the determination of the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, CIS will consider *net current assets* as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.³ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If a corporation's end-of-year net current assets are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage out of those net current assets.

The petitioner has not demonstrated that it paid any wages to the beneficiary during 2001 or 2002. In both years, the petitioner reports a loss and negative net current assets. The petitioner has not, therefore, shown the ability to pay the proffered wage during 2001 or 2002 out of its net income or net current assets.

Counsel and the petitioner's accountant's assertion that the petitioner's current liabilities are excessively reported is without merit because the petitioner's tax returns were prepared pursuant to cash convention, in which revenue is recognized when it is received, and expenses are recognized when they are paid. This office is not, however, persuaded by an analysis in which the petitioner, or anyone on its behalf, seeks to rely on tax returns or financial statements prepared pursuant to one method, but then seeks to shift revenue or expenses from one year to another as convenient to the petitioner's present purpose. If revenues are not recognized in a given year pursuant to the cash accounting then the petitioner, whose taxes are prepared pursuant to cash rather than accrual, and who relies on its tax returns in order to show its ability to pay the proffered wage, may not use those revenues as evidence of

³ According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

its ability to pay the proffered wage during that year. Similarly, if expenses are recognized in a given year, the petitioner may not shift those expenses to some other year in an effort to show its ability to pay the proffered wage pursuant to some hybrid of accrual and cash accounting. The amounts shown on the petitioner's tax returns shall be considered as they were submitted to IRS.

Counsel's final appellate assertion concerning officer compensation is also without merit. The sole shareholder of a corporation has the authority to allocate expenses of the corporation for various legitimate business purposes, including for the purpose of reducing the corporation's taxable income. Compensation of officers is an expense category explicitly stated on the Form 1120 U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return. For this reason, the petitioner's figures for compensation of officers may be considered as additional financial resources of the petitioner, in addition to its figures for ordinary income.

The documentation presented here indicates that Charles and Peggy Werts hold 100% percent of the company's stock. According to the petitioner's 2002 IRS Form 1120 Schedule E (Compensation of Officers), they elected to pay themselves \$118,500, in the aggregate but in 2001, they elected to pay themselves \$176,000. We may extrapolate that the compensation received by the petitioner's owners during these two years was not a fixed salary.

CIS has long held that it may not "pierce the corporate veil" and look to the assets of the corporation's owner to satisfy the corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. It is an elementary rule that a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders. See *Matter of M*, 8 I&N Dec. 24 (BIA 1958), *Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm. 1980), and *Matter of Tessel*, 17 I&N Dec. 631 (Act. Assoc. Comm. 1980). Consequently, assets of its shareholders or of other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the present case, however, counsel is not suggesting that CIS examine the personal assets of the petitioner's owners, but, rather, the financial flexibility that the owners have in setting their salaries based on the profitability of their corporation. In this case, however, the record of proceeding does not contain evidence from Mr. or Mrs. Werts about their ability or willingness to forego any portion of their compensation in order to pay the proffered wage. As noted above, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. at 190).

The AAO notes that in any additional proceedings concerning this matter, the petitioner must also address the issue of multiple pending petitions since the petitioner must show that it had sufficient income to pay all the wages at the priority date until final disposition of those cases.

The petitioner failed to submit evidence sufficient to demonstrate that it had the ability to pay the proffered wage during 2001 or 2002. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.