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
Date: NOV 17 2005

IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:



PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as an Other, Unskilled Worker pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is involved in residential construction. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a cement mason. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the Department of Labor. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief and additional evidence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the U.S. Department of Labor. See 8 CFR § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification as certified by the U.S. Department of Labor and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on April 27, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$25.94 per hour (\$53,955.20 per year). The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires one year of related experience.

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as a C corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1990, to have a gross annual income of \$1.2 million, and to currently employ ten workers. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal years lasts from April 1 to March 31. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary on March 3, 2001, the beneficiary claimed to have worked for the petitioner since January 2001.

With the petition, the petitioner submitted the following documents: federal corporate tax returns for 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the beneficiary's individual income tax returns for 2000 and 2001¹.

On November 4, 2003, because the director deemed the evidence submitted insufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, the director requested additional evidence pertinent to that ability. In accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), the director specifically requested that the petitioner provide copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements to demonstrate its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. The director specifically requested the petitioner's 2002 corporate tax return and any evidence of wages paid to the beneficiary in that year, and pointed out that the petitioner reported losses on its tax returns for 1999, 2000, and 2001. Finally, the director also inquired about whether or not the beneficiary would fill a newly created petition, to which the petitioner responded "No," and indicated that the former employee/incumbent "still working" for the petitioner who currently holds the position is the beneficiary.

In response, the petitioner submitted a letter from counsel stating that "[the beneficiary] has held, and continues to hold [the proffered position] since 2000"; copies of W-2 forms issued by the petitioner to the beneficiary in 2001 and 2002 reflecting wages paid in the amounts of \$24,690 and \$30,845.10, respectively; and the petitioner's 2001 and 2002 corporate tax returns reflecting that the petitioner's fiscal years runs from April 1 through March 31. The petitioner also submitted a letter from the petitioner's representative who stated that the depreciation shown on the petitioner's tax returns "did not represent monies actually expended by the business, but rather was entered on the returns for accounting purposes only" and could be added back to the petitioner's net income. That letter also stated that the beneficiary was not working for the petitioner in 2001 until April of that year and should be pro-rated accordingly. A letter from Union Savings Bank stating the petitioner's bank balance on January 28, 2004 was also submitted².

The director denied the petition on May 5, 2004, finding that the evidence submitted with the petition and in response to its Request for Evidence did not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date because it did not have sufficient net income or net current assets in 2001. The director conceded that the petitioner established its ability to pay the proffered wage in 2002.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the director failed to consider the petitioner's letter about depreciation and pro-rating the proffered wage. On appeal, the petitioner submits a letter from [REDACTED] from Correia, Rivero & LeFebvre, Inc., an accounting and tax services firm, who does not indicate his employment

¹ Evidence preceding the priority date in 2001 is not necessarily dispositive of the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

² Reliance on the balances in the petitioner's bank account is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax return, such as the petitioner's taxable income (income minus deductions) or the cash specified on Schedule L that will be considered below in determining the petitioner's net current assets.

capacity there. ██████████ restates counsel and the petitioner's assertion about depreciation being an expense that is not actual monies expended by the petitioner and could be added by to the net income.

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered prima facie proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner paid partial wages in the amounts of \$24,690 in 2001 and \$30,845.10 in 2002, which is \$29,265.20 less than the proffered wage in 2001 and \$23,110.10 less than the proffered wage in 2002. The petitioner is obligated to demonstrate that it could pay the difference between the wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, CIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses, contrary to the petitioner's, counsel, and ██████████ assertions. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now CIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. The court in *Chi-Feng Chang* further noted:

Plaintiffs also contend the depreciation amounts on the 1985 and 1986 returns are non-cash deductions. Plaintiffs thus request that the court *sua sponte* add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year. Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for this proposition. This argument has likewise been presented before and rejected. See *Elatos*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. [CIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.

(Emphasis in original.) *Chi-Feng* at 537.

The tax returns demonstrate the following financial information concerning the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage of \$53,955.20 per year from the priority date.

In 2002, the Form 1120 stated net income³ of \$2,312.
In 2001, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$1,110.

³ Taxable income before net operating loss deduction and special deductions as reported on Line 28.

Therefore, for the years 2001 and 2002, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the difference between the wage paid and the proffered wage.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, CIS will review the petitioner's assets. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, CIS will consider net current assets as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.⁴ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets.

The petitioner's net current assets during 2001 were \$19,632.

The petitioner's net current assets during 2002 were \$82,909.

The petitioner's net current assets are sufficient to pay the difference between the wage paid and the proffered wage in 2002 but not in 2001.

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the U. S. Department of Labor, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the difference between the wage paid and the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

Counsel requests that CIS prorate the proffered wage for the portion of the year that occurred after the priority date. We will not, however, consider 12 months of income towards an ability to pay a lesser period of the proffered wage any more than we would consider 24 months of income towards paying the annual proffered wage. The petitioner's fiscal year and the beneficiary's employment commencement date correlate.

Counsel's assertions on appeal cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the tax returns as submitted by the petitioner that demonstrates that the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage from the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor.

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

⁴ According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

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The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

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