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**U.S. Citizenship  
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Services**

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FILE: [REDACTED]  
EAC 03 232 56366

Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER

Date: **SEP 08 2005**

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]  
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

  
Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a plumbing contractor. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as an assistant plumber. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the Department of Labor. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

On appeal, the counsel submits a brief and additional evidence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the U.S. Department of Labor. The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification as certified by the U.S. Department of Labor and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on April 20, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$23.15 per hour (\$48,152.00 per year). The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires two years experience.

With the petition, counsel submitted the following documents: the original Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the Department of Labor, a copy of petitioner's Form 1120 U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return for 2000, and, copies of documentation concerning the beneficiary's qualifications.

Consistent with 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), the Service Center requested pertinent evidence of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. The Service Center specifically requested:

\* \* \*

Submit the 2001 and 2002 United States federal income tax return(s), with all schedules and attachments, for your business. If your business is organized as a corporation, submit the corporate tax returns. If the business is organized as a sole proprietorship, submit the owner's individual tax return (Form 1040) as well as Schedule C relating to the business.

Evidence in the record indicates that the petitioner has employed the beneficiary since February of 1995; submit copies of the beneficiary's 2000, 2001 and 2002 Form W-2 Wage and Tax Statement(s) showing how much the beneficiary was paid by the business.

Submit a statement from a financial officer of the company, which establishes ability to pay.

Submit annual reports for 2000-2002, which are accompanied by audited or reviewed financial statements.

\* \* \*

Additional evidence such as accredited profit/loss statements, bank account records, or personnel records may be considered but only as supplementary evidence to establish employer's ability to pay.

In response to the Request for Evidence of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, counsel submitted the petitioner's Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 1120 tax return for year 2001 covering the period November 1, 2001 to October 31, 2002

The tax return<sup>1</sup> demonstrated the following financial information concerning the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage of \$48,152.00 per year from the priority date:

- In 2001, the Form 1120 stated taxable income of \$9,123.00.

The director denied the petition on February 20, 2004, finding that the evidence submitted did not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

On appeal, counsel asserts:

The Service was in error in its interpretation of the documentation presented to prove the ability of petitioner to pay the prevailing wages. Net income, total assets [sic assets] and salary actually paid to the beneficiary clearly demonstrated that petitioner could pay the prevailing wage ....

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Evidence was submitted to show that the petitioner employed

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<sup>1</sup> In 2000, the Form 1120 stated taxable income loss of <\$17,516.00>, which was before the priority date, and it was not considered probative evidence of the ability to pay the proffered wage.

the beneficiary. The petitioner paid the beneficiary \$20,000.00 in 2002, \$19,500.00 in 2001, and, \$19,650.00 in 2000. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$23.15 per hour (\$48,152.00 per year). The wages paid are less than the proffered wage.

Alternatively, in determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, CIS will examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F.Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305, (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F.Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F.Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F.Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, the court held that the Service had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. *Supra* at 1084. The court specifically rejected the argument that the INS, now CIS, should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. Finally, no precedent exists that would allow the petitioner to "add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year." *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh, Supra* at 537. See also *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava, Supra* at 1054.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, CIS will review the petitioner's assets.

- In 2001, the Form 1120 stated taxable income of \$9,123.00. The petitioner paid the beneficiary wages of \$19,500 in 2001. The proffered wage is \$48,152.00 per year. The sum of taxable income and wages is \$28,623.00, which is less than the proffered wage.

The petitioner's net current assets also can be considered in the determination of the ability to pay the proffered wage. In the subject case, as set forth above, petitioner did not have taxable income to sufficient pay the proffered wage at any time for the year 2001 for which petitioner's tax return is offered for evidence.

CIS will consider *net current assets* as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.<sup>2</sup> A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. That schedule is included with, as in this instance, the petitioner's filing of Form 1120 federal tax return. The petitioner's year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If a corporation's end-of-year net current assets are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage.

Examining the Form 1120 U.S. Income Tax Return submitted by petitioner, Schedule L found in that return indicates the following:

<sup>2</sup> According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such as accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

- In 2001, petitioner's Form 1120 return stated current assets of \$16,576.00 and \$3,233.00 in current liabilities. Therefore, the petitioner had a \$13,343.00 in net current assets for 2001. Since the proffered wage was \$48,152.00 per year, this sum is less than the proffered wage.

Therefore, for the year 2001 from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the U. S. Department of Labor, the petitioner had not established that it had the ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage at the time of filing through an examination of its current assets.

Counsel asserts that there is another way to determine the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date by considering "depreciation" considered as an asset rather than a deduction, "net income," "total assets," and salary actually paid to beneficiary,<sup>3</sup> and bank statements. Counsel cites no legal precedent for his contentions, and, according to regulation,<sup>4</sup> copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements are the means by which petitioner's ability to pay is determined. In his calculations, counsel is selecting and combining data from various schedules of petitioner's tax return and adding them to reach a result. Counsel's assertion is erroneous. Proof of ability to pay begins on the priority date, that is April 20, 2001, when petitioner's Application for Alien Employment Certification was accepted for processing by the U. S. Department of Labor. Petitioner's taxable income is examined from the priority date. It is not examined contingent upon some event in the future.

Petitioner's counsel advocates the addition of depreciation taken as a deduction in those years' tax returns to eliminate the abovementioned deficiencies. Petitioner's counsel cited no legal precedent for his position. Since depreciation is a deduction in the calculation of taxable income on tax Form 1120, this method would eliminate depreciation as a factor in the calculation of taxable income.

There is established legal precedent against counsel's contention that depreciation may be a source to pay the proffered wage. The court in *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburg*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Tex. 1989) noted:

"Plaintiffs also contend that depreciation amounts on the 1985 and 1986 returns are non-cash deductions. Plaintiffs thus request that the court *sua sponte* add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year. Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for this proposition. This argument has likewise been presented before and rejected. See *Elatos*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. [CIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support. (Original emphasis.) *Chi-Feng* at 537."

As stated above, following established legal precedent, CIS relied on the petitioner's net income without consideration of any depreciation deductions, in its determinations of the ability to pay the proffered wage on and after the priority date.

We reject the petitioner's assertion that the petitioner's total assets should have been considered in the determination of the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage.

<sup>3</sup> The beneficiary's salary actually paid compared to the prevailing wage added with taxable income was discussed above.

<sup>4</sup> 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2),.

Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

Counsel submits bank statements to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage. Counsel's reliance on the balances in the petitioner's bank account is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax return, such as the cash specified on Schedule L that will be considered below in determining the petitioner's net current assets.

Counsel's hypothesis cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the corporate tax return as submitted by petitioner that by any test demonstrates that petitioner could not pay the proffered wage from the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor.

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.