


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
U.S. Citizenship
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FILE:



Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER

Date:


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
Petitioner:

Beneficiary:



PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Acting Center Director (Director), Texas Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a retail store. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a retail store manager. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the Department of Labor. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition.

The record shows that the appeal makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's June 30, 2005 denial, the single issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the U.S. Department of Labor. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification as certified by the U.S. Department of Labor and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on April 9, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$23.39 per hour (\$48,651.20 per year). The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires two years of experience in the job offered or two years of experience in the related occupation of computer system analyst.

The AAO takes a *de novo* look at issues raised in the denial of this petition. *See Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a *de novo* basis). The AAO considers all

pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal¹. Relevant evidence in the record includes the petitioner's corporate federal tax returns for 2001 through 2004, the beneficiary's W-2 forms for 2001 through 2004, the petitioner's quarterly reports for the first and second quarters of 2005, copies of two paychecks issued by the petitioner in July 2005 to the beneficiary, bank statements for the petitioner's business checking account covering June to October of 2003 and a Certificate of Time Deposit for the petitioner. The record does not contain any other evidence relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the wage.

On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 2001, to have a gross annual income of \$197,715, to have a net annual income of \$63,554, and to currently employ 4 workers. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is based on a calendar year. On the Form ETA 750B signed by the beneficiary on March 28, 2001, he did not claim to have worked for the petitioner.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the certificate of deposit evidences that the petitioner had additional funds available to pay the proffered wage, and that pursuant to Yates May 4, 2004 memorandum the petitioner established its ability to pay the proffered wage since it is currently paying the beneficiary the proffered wage.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, CIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner submitted the beneficiary's W-2 forms, paychecks and the petitioner's quarterly reports. However, the beneficiary's W-2 form for 2001 was not issued by the petitioner, and therefore, cannot be considered as wage paid in determining the petitioner's ability to pay in the instant case. These documents show that the petitioner paid the beneficiary \$18,297.17 in 2002, \$17,520 in 2003, \$26,400 in 2004 and \$24,1255 in the first half year of 2005. The petitioner has established that it is paying the beneficiary the proffered wage in 2005, however, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that it paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage from 2001 to 2004. The petitioner is obligated to demonstrate that it could pay the proffered wage of \$48,651.20 in 2001, and the difference of \$30,354.03 in 2002, \$31,131.20 in 2003 and \$22,251.20 in 2004 between wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage.

¹ Although the submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1) and the record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal, *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, CIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). The petitioner's reliance on its gross income and gross profit on appeal is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's total income exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now CIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The letter from the petitioner's accountant asserts that the depreciation expense is not actual expenses, thus should be considered as part of ability to pay the proffered wage in the instant case. Reliance on the petitioner's depreciation in determining its ability to pay the proffered wage is misplaced. The court in *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava* specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. The court in *Chi-Feng Chang* further noted:

Plaintiffs also contend the depreciation amounts on the 1985 and 1986 returns are non-cash deductions. Plaintiffs thus request that the court *sua sponte* add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year. Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for this proposition. This argument has likewise been presented before and rejected. See *Elatos*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. [CIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.

(Emphasis in original.) *Chi-Feng* at 537.

The record contains copies of the petitioner's federal tax returns for 2001 through 2004. The petitioner filed mixed tax forms for these years. The petitioner's tax returns for 2001 through 2004 demonstrate the following financial information concerning the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage and/or the difference between wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage from the priority date:

- In 2001, the Form 1120 stated a net income² of \$(2,133).
- In 2002, the Form 1120S stated a net income³ of \$(4,654).

² Taxable income before net operating loss deduction and special deductions on Line 28 of the Form 1120.

³ Where an S corporation's income is exclusively from a trade or business, CIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner's Form 1120S. The instructions on the Form 1120S U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation state on page one, "Caution: Include only trade or business income and expenses on lines 1a through 21."

Where an S corporation has income from sources other than from a trade or business, net income is found on Schedule K. The Schedule K form related to the Form 1120S states that an S corporation's total income from its various sources are to be shown not on page one of the Form 1120S, but on lines 1 through 6 of the

- In 2003, the Form 1120S stated a net income of \$26,749.
- In 2004, the Form 1120 stated a net income of \$17,994.

Therefore, for the year of 2001, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage of \$48,651.20; for the years 2002, 2003 and 2004, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the difference of \$30,354.03, \$31,131.20 and \$22,251.20 between wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage respectively.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, CIS will review the petitioner's assets. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, CIS will consider net current assets as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.⁴ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets.

- The petitioner's net current assets during 2001 were \$10,457.
- The petitioner's net current assets during 2002 were \$9,976.
- The petitioner's net current assets during 2003 were \$2,635.
- The petitioner's net current assets during 2004 were \$89,816.

Therefore, for the year 2004 the petitioner had sufficient net current assets to pay the difference of \$22,251.20 between wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage that year, however, the petitioner did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage of \$48,651.20 for 2001, and the difference of \$30,354.03 in 2002, and \$31,131.20 in 2003 between wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage respectively.

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the U. S. Department of Labor, the petitioner had not established that it had the ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage for the years

Schedule K, Shareholders' Shares of Income, Credits, Deductions, etc. For example, an S corporation's rental real estate income is carried over from the Form 8825 to line 2 of Schedule K. Similarly, an S corporation's income from sales of business property is carried over from the Form 4979 to line 5 of Schedule K. See Internal Revenue Service, Instructions for Form 1120S (2003), available at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/i1120s--2003.pdf>; Instructions for Form 1120S (2002), available at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/i1120s--2002.pdf>.

⁴According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

2001, 2002 and 2003 through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income; or net current assets.

Counsel asserts in his brief accompanying the appeal that there is another way to determine the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date. On appeal, counsel asserts that since the petitioner has paid the beneficiary at the proffered wage rate since 2005, according to the language in Mr. Yates' memorandum, it has established its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. Counsel asserts that Mr. Yates makes a clear distinction between past and current salaries and since he used the conjunction "or" in the context of evidence that the petitioner "has paid or currently is paying the proffered wage," counsel urges CIS to consider the wage rate paid in 2005 as satisfying that particular method of demonstrating a petitioning entity's ability to pay.

The Yates' memorandum relied upon by counsel provides guidance to adjudicators to review a record of proceeding and make a positive determination of a petitioning entity's ability to pay if, in the context of the beneficiary's employment, "[t]he record contains credible verifiable evidence that the petitioner is not only is employing the beneficiary but also has paid or currently is paying the proffered wage."

The AAO consistently adjudicates appeals in accordance with the Yates memorandum. However, counsel's interpretation of the language in that memorandum is overly broad and does not comport with the plain language of the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) set forth in the memorandum as authority for the policy guidance therein. The regulation requires that a petitioning entity demonstrate its *continuing* ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. If CIS and the AAO were to interpret and apply the Yates memorandum as counsel urges, then in this particular factual context, the clear language in the regulation would be usurped by an interoffice guidance memorandum without binding legal effect. The petitioner must demonstrate its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which in this case is April 9, 2001. Thus, the petitioner must show its ability to pay the proffered wage not only in 2005, when counsel claims it actually began paying the proffered wage rate, but it must also show its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage in 2001 through 2004. Demonstrating that the petitioner is paying the proffered wage in a specific year may suffice to show the petitioner's ability to pay for that year, but the petitioner must still demonstrate its ability to pay for the rest of the pertinent period of time.

Counsel's reliance on the balance in the petitioner's bank account is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax return, such as the petitioner's taxable income (income minus deductions) or the cash specified on Schedule L that was considered in determining the petitioner's net current assets. Counsel claims that the petitioner's certificate of deposit in the amount of \$50,000 in a 12 month term establishes the petitioner's additional funds available. Counsel's reliance on the time deposit is misplaced. As discussed above, the amount in the time deposit has already been reflected on Schedule L for 2004, it would not bring the petitioner any additional funds beyond Schedule L. In addition, the term of the time deposit was from March 4, 2004 to March 4, 2005. Counsel does not explain how money in 2004 establishes the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage for 2001 through 2003. A petitioner must establish the beneficiary's eligibility for the visa classification at the time of filing; a petition cannot be approved at a

future date after eligibility is established under a new set of facts. *Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Comm. 1971).

The petitioner's assertions on appeal cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the tax returns as submitted by the petitioner that demonstrates that the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage in the years of 2001 through 2003. The evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date to 2003.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.