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**U.S. Citizenship
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Services**

B6



FILE: [REDACTED]
SRC-05-055-51415


Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER

Date: JAN 05 2006

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3).

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



PUBLIC COPY

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.


Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be sustained. The petition will be approved.

The petitioner is a software development and implementation consulting firm. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a software engineer. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the Department of Labor. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief and additional evidence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the U.S. Department of Labor. See 8 CFR § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification as certified by the U.S. Department of Labor and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on December 12, 2002. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$67,000 per year. The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires five years experience in the proffered position or in the related occupation of programmer analyst/business analyst.

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as an S corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1998, to have a gross annual income of \$2.7+ million, and to currently employ 40 workers. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal is based on a calendar year. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary on December 4, 2002, the beneficiary did not claim to have worked for the petitioner.

With the petition, the petitioner submitted its checking account statements from January through September 2004, a letter from the petitioner explaining that it has sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage, compiled financial statements for 2003, a notarized affidavit from the petitioner's owner, (Mr. [REDACTED] who states that the compiled financial statements were provided in lieu of its 2003 tax return which was unavailable because the petitioner sought an extension of time to file it with the IRS, and bank statements for 2003.

On June 25, 2005, because the director deemed the evidence submitted insufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, the director issued a notice of intent to deny. In accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), the director specifically requested that the petitioner provide copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements to demonstrate its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. The director specifically requested the petitioner's tax returns or W-2 forms issued by the petitioner to the beneficiary for 2003 and 2004.

In response, the petitioner submitted excerpts from its 2002, 2003, and 2004 corporate federal tax returns, bank statements for each month in 2002, 2003, 2004, and half of 2005, and pay stubs issued by the petitioner to the beneficiary from February through June 2005 reflecting a total of \$36,249.84 paid in that year for that time period. Counsel's accompanying letter claims that the petitioner is only responsible for showing that it could pay the proffered wage for the last two weeks in 2002. Counsel submitted copies of AAO decisions¹ and *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967) as support for her argument that the petitioner has "consistently shown a positive current asset to current liability ratio," has significant bank balances, and thus has a reasonable expectation of further growth that establishes the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

The director denied the petition on July 29, 2005, finding that the evidence submitted with the petition and in response to its request for evidence did not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

On appeal, in addition to reasserting prior arguments, counsel asserts that the petitioner establishes its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage based on an accrual basis of accounting, and she submits a letter from Mark S. Dickens (Mr. Dickens), a certified public accountant, and reviewed financial statements to support her assertion. The petitioner submits complete tax returns.

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered prima facie proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner did not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage in 2002, 2003, or 2004. The petitioner paid the

¹ While 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) provides that precedent decisions of CIS are binding on all its employees in the administration of the Act, unpublished decisions are not similarly binding. Precedent decisions must be designated and published in bound volumes or as interim decisions. 8 C.F.R. § 103.9(a). The decisions submitted are not precedent decisions.

beneficiary \$48,557.52² in 2005. The petitioner is obligated to demonstrate that it could pay the difference between the wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage in 2005.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, CIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now CIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. The court in *Chi-Feng Chang* further noted:

Plaintiffs also contend that depreciation amounts on the 1985 and 1986 returns are non-cash deductions. Plaintiffs thus request that the court *sua sponte* add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year. Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for this proposition. This argument has likewise been presented before and rejected. See *Elatos*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. [CIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.

(Emphasis in original.) *Chi-Feng* at 537.

The tax returns demonstrate the following financial information concerning the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage of \$67,000 per year from the priority date.

In 2002, the Form 1120S stated net income³ of -\$9,139.

² The petitioner updated the paystubs contained in the record of proceeding on appeal with additional paystubs showing total wages paid to the beneficiary as of July 29, 2005.

³ Ordinary income (loss) from trade or business activities as reported on Line 21. Where an S corporation's income is exclusively from a trade or business, CIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner's Form 1120S. The instructions on the Form 1120S, U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation, state on page one, "Caution, Include only trade or business income and expenses on lines 1a through 21." Where an S corporation has income from sources other than from a trade or business, net income is found on Schedule K. The Schedule K form related to the Form 1120 states that an S corporation's total income from its various sources are to be shown not on page one of the Form 1120S, but on lines 1 through 6 of the Schedule K, Shareholders' Shares of Income, Credits, Deductions, etc. See Internal Revenue Service, Instructions for Form 1120S, 2003, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-03/i1120s.pdf>.

In 2003, the Form 1120S stated net income of -\$46,244.

In 2004, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$20.

Therefore, for the years 2002 through 2004, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, CIS will review the petitioner's assets. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, CIS will consider net current assets as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.⁴ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets.

The petitioner's net current assets during 2002 were \$33,070.

The petitioner's net current assets during 2003 were \$8,094.

The petitioner's net current assets during 2004 were \$81,338.

The petitioner could not establish its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage out of its net current assets in 2002 or 2003; however, it establishes its ability to pay the proffered wage in 2004 out of its net current assets.

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the U. S. Department of Labor, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through 2003 through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

Counsel asserts in her brief accompanying the appeal that there is another way to determine the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date. Counsel and Mr. [REDACTED] state that the petitioner's tax returns were prepared pursuant to cash convention, in which revenue is recognized when it is received, and expenses are recognized when they are paid. This office would, in the alternative, have accepted tax returns prepared pursuant to accrual convention, if those were the tax returns the petitioner had submitted to

Instructions for Form 1120S, 2002, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-02/i1120s.pdf>, (accessed February 15, 2005).

⁴ According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such as accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

IRS.

This office is not, however, persuaded by an analysis in which the petitioner, or anyone on its behalf, seeks to rely on tax returns or financial statements prepared pursuant to one method, but then seeks to shift revenue or expenses from one year to another as convenient to the petitioner's present purpose. If revenues are not recognized in a given year pursuant to the cash accounting then the petitioner, whose taxes are prepared pursuant to cash rather than accrual, and who relies on its tax returns in order to show its ability to pay the proffered wage, may not use those revenues as evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage during that year. Similarly, if expenses are recognized in a given year, the petitioner may not shift those expenses to some other year in an effort to show its ability to pay the proffered wage pursuant to some hybrid of accrual and cash accounting. The amounts shown on the petitioner's tax returns shall be considered as they were submitted to IRS, not as amended pursuant to the accountant's adjustments. If the accountant wished to persuade this office that accrual accounting supports the petitioners continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, then the accountant was obliged to prepare and submit audited financial statements pertinent to the petitioning business prepared according to generally accepted accounting principles.

Counsel's reliance on the balances in the petitioner's bank accounts is also misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax return, such as the petitioner's taxable income (income minus deductions) or the cash specified on Schedule L that was considered in determining the petitioner's net current assets.

Counsel also requests that CIS prorate the proffered wage for the portion of the year that occurred after the priority date. We will not, however, consider 12 months of income towards an ability to pay a lesser period of the proffered wage any more than we would consider 24 months of income towards paying the annual proffered wage. While CIS will prorate the proffered wage if the record contains evidence of net income or payment of the beneficiary's wages specifically covering the portion of the year that occurred after the priority date (and only that period), such as monthly income statements or pay stubs, the petitioner has not submitted such evidence.

The record of proceeding contains reviewed and compiled financial statements. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) makes clear that where a petitioner relies on financial statements to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage, those financial statements must be audited. An audit is conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards to obtain a reasonable assurance whether the financial statements of the business are free of material misstatements. The unaudited financial statements that were submitted are not persuasive evidence. The accountant's report that accompanied those financial statements makes clear that they were produced pursuant to a compilation rather than an audit. A compilation is the management's representation of its financial position and is the lowest level of financial statements relative to other forms of financial statements. Likewise, reviews are governed by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' Statement on Standards for Accounting and Review Services (SSARS) No.1., and accountants only express limited assurances in reviews. As the account's report makes clear on both the reviewed and compiled versions, the financial statements are the representations of management and the accountant

expresses no opinion pertinent to their accuracy. The unsupported representations of management are not reliable evidence and are insufficient to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage.

There is another consideration for S corporations. The sole shareholder of a corporation has the authority to allocate expenses of the corporation for various legitimate business purposes, including for the purpose of reducing the corporation's taxable income. Compensation of officers is an expense category explicitly stated on the Form 1120S U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return. For this reason, the petitioner's figures for compensation of officers may be considered as additional financial resources of the petitioner, in addition to its figures for ordinary income.

The documentation presented here indicates that Mr. [REDACTED] holds 100 percent of the company's stock. According to the petitioner's 2002 and 2003 IRS Form 1120 Compensation of Officers listed on the first page, Mr. [REDACTED] elected to pay himself \$101,923 and \$63,885 in those years, respectively. We note that the compensation received by the company's owner during those two years was not a fixed salary.

CIS (legacy INS) has long held that it may not "pierce the corporate veil" and look to the assets of the corporation's owner to satisfy the corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. It is an elementary rule that a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders. See *Matter of M*, 8 I&N Dec. 24 (BIA 1958), *Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm. 1980), and *Matter of Tessel*, 17 I&N Dec. 631 (Act. Assoc. Comm. 1980). Consequently, assets of its shareholders or of other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the present case, however, CIS would not be examining the personal assets of the petitioner's owners, but, rather, the financial flexibility that the employee-owners have in setting their salaries based on the profitability of their corporation. In the instant case, no evidence was submitted to show that Mr. [REDACTED] could forego any portion of his officer's compensation in 2002 or 2003.

The petitioner has established its ability to pay the proffered wage out of its net current assets in 2004. It demonstrated it was paying the beneficiary at the proffered wage pay rate in 2005 and has thus established its ability to pay the proffered wage in that year.

Although CIS will not consider gross income without also considering the expenses that were incurred to generate that income, the overall magnitude of the entity's business activities should be considered when the entity's ability to pay is marginal or borderline. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967). The petitioner was incorporated in 1998 and employs approximately 40 employees. Their gross income has always been between \$2.5 and \$3.5 million and they pay salaries and wages each year of over \$1 million. Thus, assessing the totality of circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has demonstrated its financial strength and viability and has the ability to pay the proffered wage.

In examining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, the fundamental focus of the CIS' determination is whether the employer is making a realistic job offer and has the overall financial ability to satisfy the proffered wage. *Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 145 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977). Accordingly, after a review of the petitioner's federal tax returns and all other relevant evidence, we conclude that the petitioner has established that it had the ability to pay the salary offered as of the priority date of the petition and continuing to present.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is sustained. The petition is approved.