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U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

FILE: [REDACTED]  
WAC 02 145 50443

Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER

Date: **MAY 19 2006**

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]  
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Michael Valdes", written over a light blue background.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, California Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be remanded for further consideration.

The petitioner is a jeweler. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a jeweler and precious stone and metal worker. As required by statute, a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification approved by the Department of Labor, accompanied the petition. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that the beneficiary met the experience requirements as stated on the Form ETA 750. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into this decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's November 30, 2004 denial, the single issue in this case is whether or not the beneficiary meets the requirements of the labor certification as of the priority date.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3) states, in pertinent part:

(ii) *Other documentation* – (A) *General*. Any requirements of training or experience for skilled workers, professionals, or other workers must be supported by letters from trainers or employers giving the name, address, and title of the trainer or employer, and a description of the training received or the experience of the alien.

(B) *Skilled workers*. If the petition is for a skilled worker, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the alien meets the educational, training or experience, and any other requirements of the individual labor certification, meets the requirements for Schedule A designation, or meets the requirements for the Labor Market Information Pilot Program occupational designation. The minimum requirements for this classification are at least two years of training or experience.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner has established that the beneficiary meets the experience requirement of the labor certification, and provides a confirmation letter, issued by the previous employer in support of her assertion.

To be eligible for approval, a beneficiary must have the education and experience specified on the labor certification as of the petition's filing date. The filing date of the petition is the initial receipt in the Department of Labor's (DOL'S) employment service system. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977). In this case, that date is March 12, 2001.

As noted above, the ETA 750 in this matter is certified by DOL. Thus, at the outset, it is useful to discuss DOL's role in this process. Section 212(a)(5)(A)(i) provides:

In general.-Any alien who seeks to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor is inadmissible, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that-

(I) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified (or equally qualified in the case of an alien described in clause (ii)) and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and

(II) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.

According to the regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 656.20(c), as in effect at the time of filing,<sup>1</sup> an employer applying for a labor certification must "clearly show" that:

- (1) The employer has enough funds available to pay the wage or salary offered the alien;
- (2) The wage offered equals or exceeds the prevailing wage determined pursuant to § 656.40, and the wage the employer will pay to the alien when the alien begins work will equal or exceed the prevailing wage which is applicable at the time the alien begins work;
- (3) The wage offered is not based on commissions, bonuses or other incentives, unless the employer guarantees a wage paid on a weekly, bi-weekly, or monthly basis;
- (4) The employer will be able to place the alien on the payroll on or before the date of the alien's proposed entrance into the United States;
- (5) The job opportunity does not involve unlawful discrimination by race, creed, color, national origin, age, sex, religion, handicap, or citizenship;
- (6) The employer's job opportunity is not:
  - (i) Vacant because the former occupant is on strike or is being locked out in the course of a labor dispute involving a work stoppage; or
  - (ii) At issue in a labor dispute involving a work stoppage;
- (7) The employer's job opportunity's terms, conditions and occupational environment are not contrary to Federal, State or local law; and

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<sup>1</sup> Recently the Department of Labor has promulgated new regulations regarding the labor certification process. These new regulations only apply to applications filed on or after the effective date of the regulations, March 28, 2005. Applications filed before March 28, 2005, such as the one before us, are to be processed and governed by the regulations quoted in this decision. 69 Fed. Reg. 77326-01 (Dec. 27, 2004).

(8) The job opportunity has been and is clearly open to any qualified U.S. worker.

(9) The conditions of employment listed in paragraphs (c) (1) through (8) of this section shall be sworn (or affirmed) to, under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746, on the Application for Alien Employment Certification form.

The regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 656.21(a) requires the ETA 750 to include:

(1) A statement of the qualifications of the alien, signed by the alien; [and]

(2) A description of the job offer for the alien employment, including the items required by paragraph (b) of this section.

Finally, the regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 656.24(b) provides that the DOL Certifying Officer shall make a determination to grant the labor certification based on whether or not:

(1) The employer has met the requirements of this part. However, where the Certifying Officer determines that the employer has committed harmless error, the Certifying Officer nevertheless may grant the labor certification, Provided, That the labor market has been tested sufficiently to warrant a finding of unavailability of and lack of adverse effect on U.S. workers. Where the Certifying Officer makes such a determination, the Certifying Officer shall document it in the application file.

(2) There is in the United States a worker who is able, willing, qualified and available for and at the place of the job opportunity according to the following standards:

(i) The Certifying Officer, in judging whether a U.S. worker is willing to take the job opportunity, shall look at the documented results of the employer's and the Local (and State) Employment Service office's recruitment efforts, and shall determine if there are other appropriate sources of workers where the employer should have recruited or might be able to recruit U.S. workers.

(ii) The Certifying Officer shall consider a U.S. worker able and qualified for the job opportunity if the worker, by education, training, experience, or a combination thereof, is able to perform in the normally accepted manner the duties involved in the occupation as customarily performed by other U.S. workers similarly employed, except that, if the application involves a job opportunity as a college or university teacher, or for an alien whom the Certifying Officer determines to be currently of exceptional ability in the performing arts, the U.S. worker must be at least as qualified as the alien.

(iii) In determining whether U.S. workers are available, the Certifying Officer shall consider as many sources as are appropriate and shall look to the nationwide system of public employment offices (the "Employment Service") as one source.

(iv) In determining whether a U.S. worker is available at the place of the job opportunity, the Certifying Officer shall consider U.S. workers living or working in

the area of intended employment, and may also consider U.S. workers who are willing to move from elsewhere to take the job at their own expenses, or, if the prevailing practice among employers employing workers in the occupation in the area of intended employment is to pay such relocation expenses, at the employer's expense.

(3) The employment of the alien will have an adverse effect upon the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers similarly employed. In making this determination the Certifying Officer shall consider such things as labor market information, the special circumstances of the industry, organization, and/or occupation, the prevailing wage in the area of intended employment, and the prevailing working conditions, such as hours, in the occupation.

It is significant that none of the above inquiries assigned to DOL involve a determination as to whether or not the alien is qualified for the job offered. This fact has not gone unnoticed by the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals:

There is no doubt that the authority to make preference classification decisions rests with INS. The language of section 204 cannot be read otherwise. *See Castaneda-Gonzalez v. INS*, 564 F.2d 417, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In turn, DOL has the authority to make the two determinations listed in section 212(a)(14) [currently found at 212(a)(5)(A)(i)]. *Id.* at 423. The necessary result of these two grants of authority is that section 212(a)(14) determinations are not subject to review by INS absent fraud or willful misrepresentation, but all matters relating to preference classification eligibility not expressly delegated to DOL remain within INS' authority.

\* \* \*

Given the language of the Act, the totality of the legislative history, and the agencies' own interpretations of their duties under the Act, we must conclude that Congress did not intend DOL to have primary authority to make any determinations other than the two stated in section 212(a)(14). If DOL is to analyze alien qualifications, it is for the purpose of "matching" them with those of corresponding United States workers so that it will then be "in a position to meet the requirement of the law," namely the section 212(a)(14) determinations.

*Madany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008, 1012-1013 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Relying in part on this decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has jurisdiction over this matter, stated:

[I]t appears that the DOL is responsible only for determining the availability of suitable American workers for a job and the impact of alien employment upon the domestic labor market. It does not appear that the DOL's role extends to determining if the alien is qualified for the job for which he seeks sixth preference status. That determination appears to be delegated to the INS under section 204(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b), as one of the determinations incident to the INS's decision whether the alien is entitled to sixth preference status.

*K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1983). The court relied on an amicus brief from the DOL that stated the following:

The labor certification made by the Secretary of Labor ... pursuant to section 212(a)(14) of the ... [Act] ... is binding as to the findings of whether there are able, willing, qualified, and

available United States workers for the job offered to the alien, and whether employment of the alien under the terms set by the employer would adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed United States workers. *The labor certification in no way indicates that the alien offered the certified job opportunity is qualified (or not qualified) to perform the duties of that job.*

*Id.* at 1009 (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit reached a similar decision one year later in *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*:

The Department of Labor (“DOL”) must certify that insufficient domestic workers are available to perform the job and that the alien’s performance of the job will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed domestic workers. *Id.* § 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14). The INS then makes its own determination of the alien’s entitlement to sixth preference status. *Id.* § 204(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b). See generally *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir.1983).

The INS, therefore, may make a de novo determination of whether the alien is in fact qualified to fill the certified job offer.

736 F. 2d 1305, 1309 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1984). See also *Black Const. Corp. v. I.N.S.*, 746 F.2d 503 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. (Guam) 1984) (rejecting argument that once employer’s labor certifications had been approved by DOL it was error for INS to deny related immigrant petitions for failure to meet preference status requirements).

The key to determining the job qualifications specified in the labor certification is found on Form ETA-750 Part A. This section of the application for alien labor certification, “Offer of Employment,” describes the terms and conditions of the job offered. It is important that the ETA-750 be read as a whole. The instructions for the Form ETA 750A, item 14, provide:

***Minimum Education, Training, and Experience Required to Perform the Job Duties.*** Do not duplicate the time requirements. For example, time required in training should not also be listed in education or experience. Indicate whether months or years are required. Do not include restrictive requirements which are not actual business necessities for performance on the job and which would limit consideration of otherwise qualified U.S. workers.

Regarding the minimum level of education and experience required for the proffered position in this matter, Part A of the labor certification, as filled in by the petitioner, reflects the following requirements:

Block 14:

Experience: Two years in the job offered.

Block 15 (“Other Special Requirements”) contains no information. To determine whether a beneficiary is eligible for a preference immigrant visa, CIS must ascertain whether the alien is, in fact, qualified for the certified job. In evaluating the beneficiary’s qualifications, CIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. CIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. See *Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986). See also, *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1008; *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc.*, 699 F.2d at 1006; *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

As discussed above, the role of the DOL in the employment-based immigration process is to make two determinations: (i) that there are not sufficient U.S. workers who are able, willing, qualified and available to do the job in question at the time of application for labor certification and in the place where the alien is to perform the job, and (ii) that the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers. Section 212(a)(5)(A)(i) of the Act. Beyond this, Congress did not intend DOL to have primary authority to make any other determinations in the immigrant petition process. *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1013. As discussed above, CIS, not DOL, has final authority with regard to determining an alien's qualifications for an immigrant preference status. *K.R.K Irvine*, 699 F.2d at 1009 FN5 (citing *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1011-13). This authority encompasses the evaluation of the alien's credentials in relation to the minimum requirements for the job, even though a labor certification has been issued by DOL. *Id.*

Additionally, where the job requirements in a labor certification are not otherwise unambiguously prescribed, e.g., by professional regulation, CIS must examine "the language of the labor certification job requirements" in order to determine what the petition beneficiary must demonstrate to be found qualified for the position. *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1015. The only rational manner by which CIS can be expected to interpret the meaning of terms used to describe the requirements of a job in a labor certification is to "examine the certified job offer *exactly* as it is completed by the prospective employer." *Rosedale Linden Park Company v. Smith*, 595 F. Supp. 829, 833 (D.D.C. 1984) (emphasis added). CIS's interpretation of the job's requirements, as stated on the labor certification must involve "reading and applying *the plain language* of the [labor certification application form]." *Id.* at 834 (emphasis added). CIS cannot and should not reasonably be expected to look beyond the plain language of the labor certification that DOL has formally issued or otherwise attempt to divine the employer's intentions through some sort of reverse-engineering of the labor certification.

The petitioner initially provided a letter from the beneficiary's prior employer, Ghulam Hussain's Jewelers, maintaining that it employed the beneficiary as a diamond assorter-grader from January 1997 to May 1999. Then, in response to a request for evidence, the petitioner submitted a certification on Pakistan government paper and attested to by a local lawyer from the beneficiary's prior employer indicating that it employed the beneficiary as a diamond assorter-grader from January 1997 to January 1999. At that time, the petitioner also submitted a copy of the beneficiary's work identification card. The identification card does not give the beneficiary's dates of employment, but does show that she was employed by Ghulam Hussain's Jewelers.

On appeal, the petitioner submits another verification letter from the beneficiary's prior employer, reconfirming the beneficiary's employment from January 1997 to May 1999. Counsel states that when the beneficiary requested another certification in response to an RFE, the employer made a clerical error indicating employment from January 1997 to January 1999. Counsel points out that, with the exception of the letter with the clerical error, the Form ETA 750B, the Form G-325, Biographic Information, and all other letters contain the correct information – the beneficiary worked for her prior employer from January 1997 to May 1999. Therefore, based on the initial evidence and the evidence presented on appeal, the AAO finds that the petitioner has established that the beneficiary met the experience requirements of the labor certification at the time of the priority date of March 12, 2001. However, there are additional issues that must be addressed before the AAO can consider the beneficiary as having met the requirements of the labor certification. These issues form the rationale behind the AAO's decision to remand.

The first issue that must be clarified is whether the beneficiary is a family member of the owner of the petitioner. It appears that the beneficiary has been living at the same address as the petitioner's owner since 2000. In addition, it appears that the beneficiary is the spouse of another employee of the petitioner, earning the same salary as the owner of the petitioner.

Under 20 C.F.R. §§ 626.20(c)(8) and 656.3, the petitioner has the burden when asked to show that a valid employment relationship exists, that a *bona fide* job opportunity is available to U.S. workers. See *Matter of Amger Corp.*, 87-INA-545 (BALCA 1987). A relationship invalidating a *bona fide* job offer may arise where the beneficiary is related to the petitioner by "blood" or it may "be financial, by marriage, or through friendship." See *Matter of Summart 374*, 00-INA-93 (BALCA May 15, 2000). Where the person applying for a position owns the petitioner, it is not a *bona fide* offer. See *Bulk Farms, Inc. v. Martin*, 963 F.2d 1286 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992) (denied labor certification application for president, sole shareholder and chief cheese maker even where no person qualified for position applied). In *Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401 (Comm. 1986), the commissioner noted that while it is not an automatic disqualification for an alien beneficiary to have an interest in a petitioning business, if the alien beneficiary's true relationship to the petitioning business is not apparent in the labor certification proceedings, it causes the certifying officer to fail to examine more carefully whether the position was clearly open to qualified U.S. workers and whether U.S. workers were rejected solely for lawful job-related reasons. That case relied upon a Department of Labor advisory opinion in invalidating the labor certification. The regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 656.30(d) provides that [CIS], the Department of State or a court may invalidate a labor certification upon a determination of fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact involving the application for labor certification.

Given that the beneficiary is living at the same address as the owner and that she is married to another employee earning the same salary as the owner, the facts of the instant case suggest that she too is a family member. The observations noted above suggest that further investigation, including consultation with the Department of Labor may be warranted, in order to determine whether any family or business relationship between the petitioner and the beneficiary represents an impediment to the approval of any employment-based visa petition filed by this petitioner on behalf of the this beneficiary.

The second issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner is a bona fide business allowed to legally operate under the laws of California. A review of the California Business Portal (<http://kepler.ss.ca.gov/corpdata>) indicates that Classic Jewelers is dissolved, and the Portal has no record of Abdul Jewelers. The record does not contain any evidence that either Classic Jewelers or Abdul Jewelers is allowed to legally operate under the laws of California.

A third issue in this proceeding is the conflicting employer identification numbers (EIN) given by the petitioner on Form I-140 and its tax returns. The EIN shown on the Form I-140 shows the petitioner's tax number as 95-4597643, and the petitioner's 2001 tax return shows the EIN as 95-4847473. If the entity petitioning for the beneficiary (Form I-140) and the entity shown on the tax return are one and the same, there would be no reason for the EIN to be different.

The director must afford the petitioner reasonable time to provide evidence pertinent to the issue of the familial relationship between the beneficiary and the petitioner's owner, proof that the petitioner is allowed to

operate under the laws of California, the reason for the conflicting EIN's, and any other evidence the director may deem necessary. The director shall then render a new decision based on the evidence of record as it relates to the regulatory requirements for eligibility. As always, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361.

**ORDER:** The director's November 30, 2004 decision is withdrawn. The petition is remanded to the director for entry of a new decision, which if adverse to the petitioner, is to be certified to the AAO for review.