

identifying data deleted to  
prevent clearly unwarranted  
invasion of personal privacy

U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000  
Washington, DC 20529



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

B6

**PUBLIC COPY**



FILE: [Redacted] Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER Date: JUL 30 2007  
LIN 06 138 50162

IN RE: Petitioner: [Redacted]  
Beneficiary: [Redacted]

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Other Worker Pursuant to § 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is an auto and truck repair business. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as an automotive body and related repairer. As required by statute, a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification approved by the Department of Labor, accompanied the petition. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition and denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into this decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's original March 7, 2007, decision, the single issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(iii), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states, in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements. In a case where the prospective United States employer employs 100 or more workers, the director may accept a statement from a financial officer of the organization which establishes the prospective employer's ability to pay the proffered wage. In appropriate cases, additional evidence, such as profit/loss statements, bank account records, or personnel records, may be submitted by the petitioner or requested by [Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)].

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor. See 8 CFR § 204.5(d). The priority date in the instant petition is April 16, 2006. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 9089 is \$18.32 per hour or \$38,105.60 annually.

The AAO takes a *de novo* look at issues raised in the denial of this petition. See *Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a *de novo* basis). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal<sup>1</sup>. Relevant evidence submitted on

---

<sup>1</sup> The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case

appeal includes counsel's statement, a copy of the petitioner's 2006 Form 1120-A, U.S. Corporation Short Form Income Tax Return, a copy of an unaudited balance sheet for the year 2006 up to November 30, 2006, a listing of the petitioner's inventory of major equipment, and a copy of the beneficiary's 2006 Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, including Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business. Other relevant evidence includes a copy of the petitioner's bank statement for the period of May 31, 2005 through June 30, 2005 and copies of the petitioner's 2001 through 2005 Forms 1120-A. The record does not contain any other evidence relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

The petitioner's 2001 through 2006 Forms 1120-A reflect taxable incomes before net operating loss deduction and special deductions or net incomes of -\$6,640, -\$9,240, -\$6,883, \$2,392, \$0, and \$0, respectively. The petitioner's 2001 through 2006 Forms 1120-A also reflect net current assets of -\$18,403, \$0, \$0, \$0, \$0, and \$0, respectively.

The unaudited<sup>2</sup> balance sheet reflects net current assets of -\$904, and the inventory of major equipment reflects the total cost of the equipment at \$177,900.

The petitioner's bank statement<sup>3</sup> for the period of May 31, 2005 through June 30, 2005 reflects a beginning balance of \$3,979.49 and an ending balance of \$3,957.80.

The beneficiary's 2006 Form 1040 reflects an adjusted gross income of \$12,864 and a business income of \$13,842. It is noted that the beneficiary's Schedule C reflects his business address as [REDACTED], the same as the petitioner's. It also reflects gross receipts as \$22,094, gross profit as \$22,094, and net profit of \$13,842.

On appeal, counsel states:

We respectfully request reconsideration and/or appeal from the above decision and submit additional evidence to show the petitioner's ability to pay the wage offered. In 2006, petitioner earned a total income of \$311,875. A copy of petitioner's corporate tax return is

---

provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

<sup>2</sup> Counsel's reliance on unaudited financial records is misplaced. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) makes clear that where a petitioner relies on financial statements to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage, those financial statements must be audited. As there is no accountant's report accompanying these statements, the AAO cannot conclude that they are audited statements. Unaudited financial statements are the representations of management. The unsupported representations of management are not reliable evidence and are insufficient to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage.

<sup>3</sup> Counsel's reliance on the balances in the petitioner's bank account is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax return, such as the petitioner's taxable income (income minus deductions) or the cash specified on Schedule L that will be considered in determining the petitioner's net current assets.

enclosed and offered in evidence. While it appears that petitioner had no taxable income, this resulted from deductions due to compensation of officers in addition to salaries and wages. Like any other closed corporation filing as a cash basis service corporation, the purpose is to avoid double taxation by timing net loss from the preceding year to offset current income. Additionally, the petitioner has a net total asset worth \$67,587, which is available to pay the wage offered. Also enclosed and being offered in evidence is the petitioner's inventory of major equipment. Its total value is \$177,900.

In 2006, the beneficiary earned a total of \$35,936 for the duration following the issuance of his employment authorization in June 2006.

We request that the above evidence be considered and the I-140 immigrant visa petition approved.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, CIS requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, CIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed the beneficiary at the time the priority date was established. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, this evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, on the Form ETA 750, signed by the beneficiary on April 10, 2003 (Rider to ETA 750B), the beneficiary claims to have been employed by the petitioner from October 2000 to February 2003. However, counsel has not submitted any Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statements, or Forms 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income, that corroborates the beneficiary's claim. The petitioner did submit a letter, dated August 11, 2006, that states that it employed the beneficiary and that the beneficiary is being paid \$18.32 per hour based upon the approved labor certification.<sup>4</sup> In addition, counsel states on appeal that in 2006, the beneficiary earned a

---

<sup>4</sup> The declaration that has been provided is not an affidavit as it was not sworn to or affirmed by the declarant before an officer authorized to administer oaths or affirmations who has, having confirmed the declarant's identity, administered the requisite oath or affirmation. *See Black's Law Dictionary* 58 (7th Ed., West 1999). Nor, in lieu of having been signed before an officer authorized to administer oaths or affirmations, does it contain the requisite statement, permitted by Federal law, that the signer, in signing the statement, certifies the truth of the statement, under penalty of perjury. 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Such an unsworn statement made in support of an appeal is not evidence and thus, as is the case with the arguments of counsel, is not entitled to any evidentiary weight. *See INS v. Phinpathya*, 464 U.S. 183, 188-89 n.6 (1984); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1980). In addition, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

total of \$35,936 following the issuance of his employment authorization in June 2006,<sup>5</sup> and the beneficiary's 2006 Form 1040, Schedule C shows the beneficiary's business address to be the same as the petitioner.

As an alternative means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, CIS will next examine the petitioner's net income figure as reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Tex. 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F.Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd.*, 703 F.2d 571 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1983). In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc.*, the court held that CIS had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. 623 F.Supp at 1084. The court specifically rejected the argument that CIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. Finally, there is no precedent that would allow the petitioner to "add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year." *See also Elatos Restaurant Corp.*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. *Chi-Feng Chang* further noted:

Plaintiffs also contend the depreciation amounts on the 1985 and 1986 returns are non-cash deductions. Plaintiffs thus request that the court *sua sponte* add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year. Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for this proposition. This argument has likewise been presented before and rejected. *See Elatos*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. [CIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.

(Emphasis in original.) *Chi-Feng* at 537.

For a "C" corporation, CIS considers net income to be the figure shown on line 28 of the petitioner's Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return or line 24 of the petitioner's Form 1120-A, U.S. Corporation Short-Form Income Tax Return. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate that its net incomes in 2001 through 2006 were -\$6,640, -\$9,240, -\$6,883, \$2,392, \$0, and \$0, respectively. The petitioner could not have paid the proffered wage of \$38,105.60 in 2001 through 2006 from its net income.

Nevertheless, the petitioner's net income is not the only statistic that can be used to demonstrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, CIS will review the petitioner's assets. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the

---

<sup>5</sup> The assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

proffered wage. Rather, CIS will consider *net current assets* as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.<sup>6</sup> A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If a corporation's end-of-year net current assets are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage out of those net current assets. The petitioner's net current assets in 2001 through 2006 were -\$18,403, \$0, \$0, \$0, \$0, and \$0, respectively. The petitioner could not have paid the proffered wage of \$38,105.60 in 2001 through 2006 from its net current assets.

On appeal, counsel contends that the petitioner's compensation of officers would have been available to pay the proffered wage of \$38,105.60. The petitioner's compensation of officers for 2001 through 2006 was \$0, \$12,250, \$28,200, \$0, \$14,683, and \$50,356, respectively. The sole shareholder of a corporation has the authority to allocate expenses of the corporation for various legitimate business purposes, including for the purpose of reducing the corporation's taxable income. Compensation of officers is an expense category explicitly stated on the Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return. For this reason, the petitioner's figures for compensation of officers may be considered as additional financial resources of the petitioner, in addition to its figures for ordinary income. However, in the instant case, the petitioner has not provided any evidence of how many owners it has or who those owners are. In addition, counsel has provided no verifiable evidence or notarized affidavit from the owners of the petitioner confirming that they would be willing or able to forego their compensation in order to pay the proffered wages to the beneficiary. Furthermore, without concrete evidence of the wages paid to the beneficiary in 2001 through 2006, the petitioner's compensation of officers would only be sufficient to pay the proffered wage of \$38,105.60 in one year, 2006.

On appeal, counsel claims that the petitioner has a net total asset worth of \$67,587 that is available to pay the wage offered. Counsel submits a copy of an unaudited balance sheet in support of his claims. However, as noted earlier, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) makes clear that where a petitioner relies on financial statements to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage, those financial statements must be audited. As there is no accountant's report accompanying these statements, the AAO cannot conclude that they are audited statements. Unaudited financial statements are the representations of management. The unsupported representations of management are not reliable evidence and are insufficient to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage. The unaudited balance sheet will not be considered in determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage of \$38,105.60. In addition, total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, CIS will consider *net current assets* as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage. *See* the discussion of net current assets above.

On appeal, the petitioner submits an inventory of major equipment valued at \$177,900. However, neither counsel nor the petitioner explains the significance of the major equipment or how it might be used to pay the

---

<sup>6</sup> According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

proffered wage of \$38,105.60. In addition, counsel has not provided a reason supported by pertinent precedent decisions indicating that major equipment may be considered when determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. While 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) provides that precedent decisions of CIS are binding on all its employees in the administration of the Act, unpublished decisions are not similarly binding. Precedent decisions must be designated and published in bound volumes or as interim decisions. 8 C.F.R. § 103.9(a).

Finally, if the petitioner does not have sufficient net income or net current assets to pay the proffered salary, CIS may consider the overall magnitude of the entity's business activities. Even when the petitioner shows insufficient net income or net current assets, CIS may consider the totality of the circumstances concerning a petitioner's financial performance. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967). In *Matter of Sonogawa*, the Regional Commissioner considered an immigrant visa petition, which had been filed by a small "custom dress and boutique shop" on behalf of a clothes designer. The district director denied the petition after determining that the beneficiary's annual wage of \$6,240 was considerably in excess of the employer's net profit of \$280 for the year of filing. On appeal, the Regional Commissioner considered an array of factors beyond the petitioner's simple net profit, including news articles, financial data, the petitioner's reputation and clientele, the number of employees, future business plans, and explanations of the petitioner's temporary financial difficulties. Despite the petitioner's obviously inadequate net income, the Regional Commissioner looked beyond the petitioner's uncharacteristic business loss and found that the petitioner's expectations of continued business growth and increasing profits were reasonable. *Id.* at 615. Based on an evaluation of the totality of the petitioner's circumstances, the Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner had established the ability to pay the beneficiary the stipulated wages.

As in *Matter of Sonogawa*, CIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to a petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. CIS may consider such factors as the number of years that the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that CIS deems to be relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In this case, however, the petitioner has not provided any evidence that unusual circumstances have been shown to exist that parallel those in *Sonogawa*, nor has it been established that 2001 through 2006 were uncharacteristically unprofitable years for the petitioner. In addition, there is no evidence of the petitioner's reputation in the industry. Furthermore, although the petitioner has submitted six tax returns, 2001 through 2006, none of those tax returns show that the petitioner had sufficient funds to pay the proffered wage of \$38,105.60 without the supplementation of the beneficiary's Forms W-2 or Forms 1099-MISC which were not submitted.

After a review of the record, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established its ability to pay the salary offered as of the priority date of the petition and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Beyond the decision of the director, the record in this case also lacks conclusive evidence as to whether the petition is based on a bona fide job offer or whether a pre-existing family or business relationship may have influenced the labor certification.

From the information provided on the beneficiary's 2006 Schedule C, it appears that the beneficiary may be part owner of the petitioner. At any rate, there is no explanation as to why the beneficiary's tax return would show that he had gross receipts, etc. that relate to the petitioner's business and show no wages earned during that year. In addition, there is no evidence in the record that shows that the beneficiary was employed as a regular

worker by the petitioner in 2006. Instead, according to the beneficiary's 2006 tax return, it seems that the beneficiary may be, in fact, part owner of the petitioner.

Under 20 C.F.R. §§ 626.20(c)(8) and 656.3, the petitioner has the burden when asked to show that a valid employment relationship exists, that a *bona fide* job opportunity is available to U.S. workers. *See Matter of Amger Corp.*, 87-INA-545 (BALCA 1987). A relationship invalidating a *bona fide* job offer may arise where the beneficiary is related to the petitioner by "blood" or it may "be financial, by marriage, or through friendship." *See Matter of Summart 374*, 00-INA-93 (BALCA May 15, 2000). Where the person applying for a position owns the petitioner, it is not a *bona fide* offer. *See Bulk Farms, Inc. v. Martin*, 963 F.2d 1286 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992) (denied labor certification application for president, sole shareholder and chief cheese maker even where no person qualified for position applied). In *Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401 (Comm. 1986), the commissioner noted that while it is not an automatic disqualification for an alien beneficiary to have an interest in a petitioning business, if the alien beneficiary's true relationship to the petitioning business is not apparent in the labor certification proceedings, it causes the certifying officer to fail to examine more carefully whether the position was clearly open to qualified U.S. workers and whether U.S. workers were rejected solely for lawful job-related reasons. That case relied upon a Department of Labor advisory opinion in invalidating the labor certification. The regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 656.30(d) provides that [CIS], the Department of State or a court may invalidate a labor certification upon a determination of fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact involving the application for labor certification.

In *Hall v. McLaughlin*, 864 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the alien's appeal from the Secretary of Labor's denial of his labor certification application. The court found that where the alien was the founder and corporate president of the petitioning corporation, absent a genuine employment relationship, the alien's ownership in the corporation was the functional equivalent of self-employment.

Given that the beneficiary may be part owner of the petitioner (*see* beneficiary's 2006 Form 1040), the facts of the instant case suggest that this too is the functional equivalent of self-employment. The observations noted above suggest that further investigation, including consultation with the Department of Labor may be warranted, in order to determine whether any family or business relationship between the petitioner and the beneficiary represents an impediment to the approval of any employment-based visa petition filed by this petitioner on behalf of the this beneficiary.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.