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
U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000  
Washington, DC 20529



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

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FILE: [REDACTED] Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER Date: **SEP 05 2007**  
LIN 06 221 51679

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]  
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Other Worker Pursuant to § 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a car repair business. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as an automotive mechanic. As required by statute, a Form ETA 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification approved by the Department of Labor, accompanied the petition. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition and denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into this decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's original April 3, 2007, decision, the single issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(iii), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states, in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements. In a case where the prospective United States employer employs 100 or more workers, the director may accept a statement from a financial officer of the organization which establishes the prospective employer's ability to pay the proffered wage. In appropriate cases, additional evidence, such as profit/loss statements, bank account records, or personnel records, may be submitted by the petitioner or requested by [Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)].

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 9089 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor. *See* 8 CFR § 204.5(d). The priority date in the instant petition is April 18, 2006. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 9089 is \$19.66 per hour or \$40,892.80 annually.

The AAO takes a *de novo* look at issues raised in the denial of this petition. *See Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a *de novo* basis). The AAO considers all pertinent

evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal<sup>1</sup>. Relevant evidence submitted on appeal includes counsel's statement, a letter from one of the petitioner's owners, dated April 30, 2007, and copies of the petitioner's bank statements for parts of 2006 and 2007. Other relevant evidence includes a copy of the petitioner's 2005 Form 1120S, U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation, a letter from one of the petitioner's owners, dated January 8, 2007, a copy of a mortgage statement, and a copy of a Premera 401(K) savings plan from Vanguard Participant Services. The record does not contain any other evidence relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

The petitioner's 2005 Form 1120S reflects an ordinary income of \$23,283 or net income from Schedule K of \$23,283 and net current assets of -\$457.

The letter, dated January 8, 2007, from [REDACTED] (one of the petitioner's owners) states that her assets are \$93,785.11 in home equity, and \$26,505.57 in a 401(K) savings plan from Vanguard.

The mortgage statement, dated December 12, 2006, from [REDACTED] (another owner of the petitioner) reflects a scheduled payment of \$2,525.57 due on January 1, 2007. On the statement, the owner notes that the market value of the home is \$405,000.00 with a mortgage of \$311,214.89 leaving an equity of \$93,785.11. The owner submits a home profile of the property mortgaged (private home) and comparisons of similar homes to corroborate the market value of the home.

As of March 31, 2006, the Premera 401(K) savings plan from Vanguard Participant Services reflects a closing balance of \$26,187.93 and a closing balance minus outstanding loans of \$18,841.44. The vested amount was \$26,187.93 at that time.

The letter, dated April 30, 2007, from one of the petitioner's owners states that the petitioner had a total of \$232,974.03 in deposits in 2006 and a total of \$59,448.03 in January through March 2007. The letter further states that as of April 30, 2007, the total account balance for the petitioner was \$29,847.77 which includes the petitioner's reserve funds of \$20,000. The petitioner's bank statements were submitted as corroboration of the owner's statement.

On appeal, counsel states:

The decision failed to consider not only the assets of petitioner but also the shareholders' share of the income. An S-Corporation is a tax-reporting rather than a taxpaying entity and the most important feature of the S-Corporation is that it generally pays no taxes as the profits and losses are declared in the personal or individual tax returns of the shareholders.

In *Osawa America*, 1988-INA-200 (BALCA) 1988, personal assets of the corporate owner were considered and found to be sufficient in determining ability to pay. In *Sitar Restaurant v. Ashcroft*, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16571. Finally, in *C&K v. Sava*, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28906, the court stated that evidence other than tax returns could be used to show ability to pay.

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<sup>1</sup> The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. See *Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

Enclosed are additional financial documents to prove that the petitioner has sufficient income to pay the offered wage. We also urge that as in *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Charles Sava*, 632 F. SUPP. 1049 (1986), evidence of future viability may be considered.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, CIS requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, CIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed the beneficiary at the time the priority date was established. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, this evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, on the Form ETA 9089, signed by the beneficiary on May 30, 2006, the beneficiary does not claim the petitioner as a past or present employer. In addition, counsel has not submitted any Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statements, or Forms 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income, issued by the petitioner on behalf of the beneficiary as proof that the beneficiary was employed by the petitioner in the pertinent year (2006).

As an alternative means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, CIS will next examine the petitioner's net income figure as reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Tex. 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F.Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1983). In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc.*, the court held that CIS had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. 623 F.Supp at 1084. The court specifically rejected the argument that CIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. Finally, there is no precedent that would allow the petitioner to "add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year." *See also Elatos Restaurant Corp.*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. *Chi-Feng Chang* further noted:

Plaintiffs also contend the depreciation amounts on the 1985 and 1986 returns are non-cash deductions. Plaintiffs thus request that the court *sua sponte* add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year. Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for this proposition. This argument has likewise been presented before and rejected. *See Elatos*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. [CIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.

(Emphasis in original.) *Chi-Feng* at 537.

Where an S corporation's income is exclusively from a trade or business, CIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner's Form 1120S. The instructions on the Form 1120S, U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation, state on page one, "Caution, Include only trade or business income and expenses on lines 1a through 21."

Where an S corporation has income from sources other than from a trade or business, net income is found on Schedule K. The Schedule K form related to the Form 1120 states that an S corporation's total income from its various sources are to be shown not on page one of the Form 1120S, but on lines 1 through 6 of the Schedule K, Shareholders' Shares of Income, Credits, Deductions, etc. See Internal Revenue Service, Instructions for Form 1120S, 2003, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-03/i1120s.pdf>, Instructions for Form 1120S, 2002, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-02/i1120s.pdf>, (accessed February 15, 2005).

In the instant case, the petitioner's net income from Schedule K for 2005 was \$23,283, the same as line 21. The petitioner could not have paid the proffered wage of \$40,892.80 from its net income of \$23,283 in 2005.

Nevertheless, the petitioner's net income is not the only statistic that can be used to demonstrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, CIS will review the petitioner's assets. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, CIS will consider *net current assets* as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.<sup>2</sup> A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If a corporation's end-of-year net current assets are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage out of those net current assets. The petitioner's net current assets in 2005 were -\$457. The petitioner could not have paid the proffered wage of \$40,892.80 from its net current assets of -\$457 in 2005.

On appeal, counsel contends that the petitioner has established its ability to pay the proffered wage of \$40,892.80 based on the assets of petitioner, the shareholders' share of the income, the future viability of the company, and on the company being organized as an "S" Corporation.

Contrary to counsel's assertion, CIS may not "pierce the corporate veil" and look to the assets of the corporation's owner to satisfy the corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. It is an elementary rule that a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders. See *Matter of M*, 8 I&N Dec. 24 (BIA 1958), *Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm. 1980), and *Matter of Tessel*, 17 I&N Dec. 631 (Act. Assoc. Comm. 1980). Consequently, assets of its shareholders or of other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the

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<sup>2</sup> According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

proffered wage. In a similar case, the court in *Sitar v. Ashcroft*, 2003 WL 22203713 (D.Mass. Sept. 18, 2003) stated, “nothing in the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5, permits [CIS] to consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage.” In addition, the shareholders in the instant case did not claim any compensation of officers in 2005, and, therefore, there is no shareholders’ share of the income other than the net income that can be used in determining the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage of \$40,892.80. See discussion on net income and Schedule K. Furthermore, citing to *Ohsawa America*, 1988-INA-240 (BALCA 1988), counsel states that the personal assets of the corporate owners were sufficient and should have been considered in determining the ability to pay the proffered wage in this case. However, counsel does not state how the Department of Labor’s (DOL’s) Board of Alien Labor Certification Appeals’ (BALCA) precedent is binding in these proceedings. While 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) provides that precedent decisions of CIS are binding on all its employees in the administration of the Act, BALCA decisions are not similarly binding. Precedent decisions must be designated and published in bound volumes or as interim decisions. 8 C.F.R. § 103.9(a).

On appeal, counsel requests that evidence of future viability be considered when determining the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage of \$40,892.80. However, against the projection of future earnings, *Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 144-145 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977) states:

I do not feel, nor do I believe the Congress intended, that the petitioner, who admittedly could not pay the offered wage at the time the petition was filed, should subsequently become eligible to have the petition approved under a new set of facts hinged upon probability and projections, even beyond the information presented on appeal.

Counsel claims that the petitioner, as an “S” Corporation, is a tax-reporting rather than a taxpaying entity and that the most important feature of the S-Corporation is that it generally pays no taxes as the profits and losses are declared in the personal or individual tax returns of the shareholders. Counsel is correct that the income from the “S” Corporation passes through to the individual tax returns of the shareholders of the corporation. However, the petitioner as a corporation is still held to the same principal as that of a regular corporation in that its shareholders are not liable for the debts of the corporation. Therefore, the assets of the individual shareholders may not be considered when determining the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage of \$40,892.80. See *Sitar v. Ashcroft*, 2003 WL 22203713 (D.Mass. Sept. 18, 2003). A petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing; a petition cannot be approved at a future date after the petitioner becomes eligible under a new set of facts. See *Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Comm. 1971).

Finally, if the petitioner does not have sufficient net income or net current assets to pay the proffered salary, CIS may consider the overall magnitude of the entity’s business activities. Even when the petitioner shows insufficient net income or net current assets, CIS may consider the totality of the circumstances concerning a petitioner’s financial performance. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967). In *Matter of Sonogawa*, the Regional Commissioner considered an immigrant visa petition, which had been filed by a small “custom dress and boutique shop” on behalf of a clothes designer. The district director denied the petition after determining that the beneficiary’s annual wage of \$6,240 was considerably in excess of the employer’s net profit of \$280 for the year of filing. On appeal, the Regional Commissioner considered an array of factors beyond the petitioner’s simple net profit, including news articles, financial data, the petitioner’s reputation and clientele, the number of employees, future business plans, and explanations of the petitioner’s temporary financial difficulties. Despite the petitioner’s obviously inadequate net income, the Regional Commissioner looked beyond the petitioner’s uncharacteristic business loss and found that the petitioner’s expectations of continued business growth and increasing profits were reasonable. *Id.* at 615.

Based on an evaluation of the totality of the petitioner's circumstances, the Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner had established the ability to pay the beneficiary the stipulated wages.

As in *Matter of Sonegawa*, CIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to a petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. CIS may consider such factors as the number of years that the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that CIS deems to be relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In this case, even in light of the petitioner's long and continuing business presence (more than 12 years), the petitioner's gross receipts are small, the amount of wages of only \$16,020 paid to six employees is meager, and there is no evidence that the petitioner has met all of its obligations in the past. Therefore, the AAO finds that the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage in 2006 and continuing to the present.

For the reasons discussed above, the assertions of counsel on appeal and the evidence submitted on appeal does not overcome the decision of the director.

In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.