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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
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U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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FILE:

[REDACTED]
SRC 06 192 52331

Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER

Date:

AUG 1 8 2008

IN RE:

Petitioner:

Beneficiary:

PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Loi B" with a flourish underneath.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The nature of the petitioner's business is custom tailor/dry cleaning. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a custom tailor. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 9089 Application for Permanent Employment Certification approved by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record demonstrated that the appeal was properly filed, timely and made a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's denial dated October 10, 2006, the single issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 9089 Application for Permanent Employment Certification was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of DOL. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 9089 Application for Permanent Employment Certification as certified by DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 9089 was accepted on October 4, 2005. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 9089 is \$17.50 per hour¹ (\$36,400.00 per year). The Form ETA 9089 states that the position requires 60 months (five years) of experience in the proffered position.

¹ According to ETA Form 9089 the offered wage is \$18.00 per hour

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a de novo basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's de novo authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.²

Evidence in the record includes copies of the following documents: the Form ETA 9089 Application for Permanent Employment Certification approved by DOL; the petitioner's U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 1120 tax returns for 2001, 2002 and 2003;³ the beneficiary's CIS Form I-94 Departure Record; and copies of the beneficiary's biographic page from her passport from Germany and her United States visa as well as other documents.

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as a C corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1981 and to currently employ 15 workers. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year begins on August 1, 2001 to July 31, 2002. The net annual income and gross annual income stated on the petition were undetermined and \$311,751.00 respectively. On the ETA 9089 signed by the beneficiary on April 12, 2006, the beneficiary did not claim to have worked for the petitioner.

The director issued a request for evidence dated June 19, 2006, to the petitioner. The director requested the petitioner's income tax return for the tax year ending July 31, 2005 and W-2 Wage and Tax Statements by the petitioner to the beneficiary.

In response counsel submitted three of the petitioner's checking account statements for the period June 1, 2006 to August 31, 2006.

Counsel's reliance on the balances in the petitioner's business checking account and its magnitude of business is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax return, such as the petitioner's taxable income (income minus deductions) or the cash specified on Schedule L that can be considered in determining the petitioner's net current assets.

The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the CIS Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

³ Tax returns submitted for years prior to the priority date have little probative value in the determination of the ability to pay from the priority date.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the director erroneously concluded that the employer did not have the ability to pay based upon the evidence presented and that new evidence submitted will show that the employer can pay the proffered wage. Accompanying the appeal, counsel submits a legal brief and additional evidence which is a personal asset report of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] property.

Counsel states that the "Petitioner" has valuable real estate which could be used to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner pays substantial rental as stated on its tax returns and carries no mortgage. Counsel is referring to real estate belonging to the petitioner's owners, not the petitioner, found on an asset report submitted into evidence. There is nothing in the record of proceeding to show that the petitioner owns realty. Further, because a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders, the assets of its shareholders or of other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm. 1980). In a similar case, the court in *Sitar v. Ashcroft*, 2003 WL 22203713 (D.Mass. Sept. 18, 2003) stated, "nothing in the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5, permits [CIS] to consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage."

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an Form ETA 9089 Application for Permanent Employment Certification establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977). *See also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2)*. In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonegawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, CIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner has not established that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage from the priority date. No wage information was submitted.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, CIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *See Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F.Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F.Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F.Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F.Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Further counsel states on appeal that the petitioner's sales (gross receipts) of over \$230,000.00 are evidence of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Reliance on the petitioner's gross sales and profits that exceeded the proffered wage is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross sales and profits exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during the period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, CIS will review the petitioner's assets. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, CIS will consider net current assets as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.⁴ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6 and include cash-on-hand. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets.

The petitioner's tax returns for tax years 2001, 2002 and 2003 were for tax years prior to the priority date of October 4, 2005 and have little probative value in the determination of the ability to pay from the priority date. As already stated, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part that the petitioner must demonstrate this ability *at the time the priority date is established* and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.⁵

The director specifically requested the petitioner's income tax return for the tax year ending July 31, 2005 and W-2 Wage and Tax Statements issued by the petitioner to the beneficiary. Despite ample time passing since that request, and despite a fax transmittal by the AAO for additional evidence dated June 13, 2008, no additional evidence was submitted.

Although specifically and clearly requested by the director, the petitioner declined to provide copies of its tax return for the tax year ending July 31, 2005 or thereafter. The tax returns would have demonstrated the amount of taxable income the petitioner reported to the IRS and further reveal its ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner's failure to submit these documents cannot be excused. The failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(14).

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the U.S. Department of Labor, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of its net income or net current assets.

⁴ According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such as accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

⁵ Assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioner's net income and net current assets for periods before the priority should be considered, in 2001, 2002 and 2003 the petitioner stated net incomes of <\$5,201.00>, <\$55,253.00> and \$4,840.00 as well as net current assets of \$6,936.00, <\$372.00>, and \$4,351.00 respectively for those years. All of these figures are below the proffered wage of \$36,400.00. The symbols <a number> indicate a negative number, or in the context of a tax return or other financial statement, a loss.

The evidence submitted fails to establish that the petitioner has the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.