


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FILE:



Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER

Date:

FEB 27 2008

WAC-05-200-52019

IN RE:

Petitioner:



Beneficiary:

PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

Cc: Shoshana B. Tancer
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DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, California Service Center, and now is before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a furniture, furnishings and interior design firm. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as an interior designer (interior designer/consultant). As required by statute, a Form ETA 750,¹ Application for Alien Employment Certification approved by the Department of Labor (DOL), accompanied the petition. Upon reviewing the petition, the director determined that the beneficiary did not satisfy the minimum level of education stated on the labor certification. Specifically, the director determined that the beneficiary did not possess a four-year bachelor's degree as required on the Form ETA 750. Accordingly, the director denied the petition on January 25, 2006.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

The instant petition and appeal were represented by [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] while the response to the AAO's October 11, 2007 request for evidence (RFE) was submitted by [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] with a new Form G-28, Entry of Appearance as Attorney or Representative which was signed by [REDACTED] and the beneficiary. Citizenship and Immigration Services' (CIS) regulations specifically prohibit a beneficiary of a visa petition, or a representative acting on a beneficiary's behalf, from filing an appeal. 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1)(iii)(B). Thus, the petitioner is considered self-represented in this matter. The record of proceeding contains a properly executed Form G-28 signed by the petitioner's representative and the original counsel. Since it is uncertain whether or not the petitioner obtained new counsel, a copy of this decision will be provided to the petitioner's last known counsel of record. A courtesy copy will also be provided to the beneficiary's counsel.

On appeal the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary has the equivalency of a U.S. bachelor's degree in design based on the evaluation report dated February 23, 2000 from Foundation for International Services, Inc. (FIS). However, the record does not contain any evidence showing that the beneficiary's one year of college studies at the City of London Polytechnic, Sir John Cass School of Art in London, England is the equivalent to a U.S. bachelor's degree, or that the petitioner specified on the Form ETA 750 that the minimum academic requirements of four years of college studies and a bachelor's degree in design/marketing management might be met through a combination of lesser degrees and/or quantifiable amount of work experience. The labor certification application, as certified, does not demonstrate that the petitioner would accept a combination of degrees that are individually all less than a four-year U.S. bachelor's degree or its foreign equivalent and/or quantifiable amount of work experience when it oversaw the petitioner's labor market test. In order to determine whether the instant petition could be considered under the skilled worker category, and whether the petitioner specified on the certified Form ETA 750 that the minimum academic requirements of a bachelor's degree or equivalent might be met through a combination of lesser degrees and/or quantifiable amount of work experience, the AAO issued a request for evidence (RFE) on October 11, 2007 granting the petitioner 12 weeks to submit additional evidence to support its assertions on appeal. The AAO received the response on December 27, 2007.

¹ After March 28, 2005, the correct form to apply for labor certification is the Form ETA 9089.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a de novo basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also*, *Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp.*, NTSB, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's de novo authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal and in response to the AAO's RFE.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States. Section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(ii), also provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who hold baccalaureate degrees and are members of the professions.

The Form ETA 750 was accepted on August 5, 2002 and approved on June 1, 2004. The approved labor certification in the instant case requires a Bachelor of Science degree in design or marketing management and five years of experience in the job offered or as a consultant for interior design company. Because of those requirements, the proffered position appears to be for a professional. DOL assigned the occupational code of 27-1025.00, interior designer, to interior designer/consultant, the same type of occupation as the proffered position. DOL's occupational codes are assigned based on normalized occupational standards. According to DOL's public online database at <http://online.onetcenter.org/find/result?s=27-1025.00&g=Go> (accessed January 24, 2008) and its extensive description of the position and requirements for the position most analogous to interior designer/consultant position, the position falls within Job Zone three requiring "medium preparation" for the occupation type closest to interior designer/consultant position. According to DOL, previous work-related skill, knowledge, or experience is needed for such an occupation. DOL assigns a standard vocational preparation (SVP) range of 6-7 to the occupation, which means "[m]ost occupations in this zone require training in vocational schools, related on-the-job experience, or an associate's degree. Some may require a bachelor's degree." *See* <http://online.onetcenter.org/link/summary/27-1025.00#JobZone> (accessed January 24, 2008). Additionally, DOL states the following concerning the training and overall experience required for these occupations:

Previous work-related skill, knowledge, or experience is required for these occupations. For example, an electrician must have completed three or four years of apprenticeship or several years of vocational training, and often must have passed a licensing exam, in order to perform the job. Employees in these occupations usually need one or two years of training involving both on-the-job experience and informal training with experienced workers.

See id.

Therefore, an interior designer position could also be properly analyzed as a skilled worker since the normal occupational requirements do not always require a bachelor's degree but training in vocational schools, related on-the-job experience, or an associate's degree.² In this case, the petitioner filed a Form I-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker, seeking classification pursuant to section 203(b)(3)(A) of the Act by checking box e in Part 2 of the I-140 form. The box e is for either a professional or a skilled worker. The California Service Center director evaluated the petition under the professional category and denied it on January 25, 2006. In response to the AAO's RFE, the beneficiary's counsel asserts that the petition should have been considered for both professional a skilled worker status.

While the AAO finds that the director properly evaluated the petition under the professional category since the position requires a bachelor's degree and five years of experience, which is required by 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(C), this office also concurs with the petitioner's argument on appeal that the instant petition should be also evaluated under the skilled worker category. Therefore, the AAO will review and examine the instant petition under both professional and skilled worker categories.

For the professional category, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(C) states the following:

If the petition is for a professional, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the alien holds a United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree and by evidence that the alien is a member of the professions. Evidence of a baccalaureate degree shall be in the form of an official college or university record showing the date the baccalaureate degree was awarded and the area of concentration of study. To show that the alien is a member of the professions, the petitioner must submit evidence that the minimum of a baccalaureate degree is required for entry into the occupation.

The above regulations use a singular description of foreign equivalent degree. Thus, the plain meaning of the regulatory language concerning the professional classification sets forth the requirement that a beneficiary must produce one degree that is determined to be the foreign equivalent of a U.S. baccalaureate degree in order to be qualified as a professional for third preference visa category purposes.

To be eligible for approval, a beneficiary must have the education and experience specified on the labor certification as of the petition's filing date, which as noted above, is August 5, 2002. *See Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

The beneficiary set forth his credentials on Form ETA-750B. On Part 11, eliciting information of the names and addresses of schools, colleges and universities attended (including trade or vocational training facilities), he indicated that he attended Studio One Artist Studio in Mexico City, Mexico in the field of "art/design" from January 1982 to December 1984; that he attended Sir John Cass School of Art/City of London Polytechnic in London, England in the field of "design" from August 1970 to April 1972; and that he attended Bamsbury Secondary Modern in London, England in the field of "technical and commercial" from August

² A professional occupation is statutorily defined at Section 101(a)(32) of the Act as including but not limited to "architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." It is noted that interior design positions are not included in this section.

1957 to August 1963. He did not indicate whether he received any degrees or certificates from these studies. He provides no further information concerning his educational background on this form, which is signed by the beneficiary under penalty of perjury that the information was true and correct.

In corroboration of the beneficiary's educational background, the petitioner provided a copy of a letter from City of London Polytechnic dated April 15, 1978 verifying that the beneficiary was a student at the Sir John Cass School of Art, City of London Polytechnic, Landon for a period of two academic years – 1971 and 1972 attending the evening school, a letter from Studio One in Mexico City dated February 18, 2000 stating that the beneficiary began the courses of study in January 1982 and continued until December 1984 and successfully completed the 12 courses at the Studio One, and an evaluation report from Foundation for International Services, Inc. dated February 23, 2000 concluding that the beneficiary has the equivalent of an individual with a bachelor's degree in marketing management with a specialization in design from an accredited college or university in the United States as a result of his professional training and employment experiences (3 years of experience = 1 year of university –level credit).

On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary has the equivalency of a U.S. bachelor's degree in design using 3 years of experience to equal one year of academic education with his one year of formal education and years of experience. CIS may, in its discretion, use as advisory opinions statements submitted as expert testimony. However, where an opinion is not in accord with other information or is in any way questionable, CIS is not required to accept or may give less weight to that evidence. *Matter of Caron International*, 19 I&N Dec. 791 (Comm. 1988). The evaluation in the record used the rule to equate three years of experience for one year of education, but that equivalence applies to non-immigrant H1B petitions, not to immigrant petitions. *See* 8 CFR § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D)(5).

The record does not contain any evidence that either City of London Polytechnic or Studio One is an accredited university or college in England or Mexico, and that the beneficiary was awarded any degrees, certificates or diplomas and thus the petitioner failed to provide any evidence showing that the beneficiary holds a single United States baccalaureate degree or a single foreign equivalent degree to be qualified as a professional for third preference visa category purposes. Because the beneficiary does not have a "United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree," the beneficiary does not qualify for preference visa classification under section 203(b)(3) of the Act as he does not have the minimum level of education required for the equivalent of a bachelor's degree. Thus, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary is qualified for the proffered professional position, and the director's ground denying the petition under professional category must be affirmed.

As previously noted, the AAO will also discuss whether the beneficiary would meet the educational requirements set forth on the Form ETA 750 and thus be qualified for the proffered position under the skilled worker category.

For the reasons discussed below, we find that decisions by federal circuit courts, which are binding on this office, have upheld our authority to evaluate whether the beneficiary is qualified for the job offered.

The certified Form ETA 750 requires a bachelor's degree in design or marketing management as the minimum educational requirement for the proffered position and the evidence submitted in the record shows

that the beneficiary's alleged education includes one year studies in fine art subjects at Sir John Cass School of Art, City of London Polytechnic,³ and 12 courses taken at Studio One in Mexico City during a period from January 1982 to December 1984.

While no single degree is required for the skilled worker classification, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(B) provides that a petition for an alien in this classification must be accompanied by evidence that the beneficiary "meets the education, training or experience, and any other requirements of the individual labor certification."

The beneficiary studied for one year at City London Polytechnic and took 12 courses at Studio One in Mexico City. Thus, the issues are whether the one-year study and 12-course completion is a foreign degree equivalent to a U.S. baccalaureate degree. We must also consider whether the beneficiary meets the job requirements of the proffered position as set forth on the labor certification.

Authority to Evaluate Whether the Alien is Eligible for the Classification Sought

As noted above, the ETA 750 in this matter is certified by DOL. Thus, at the outset, it is useful to discuss DOL's role in this process. Section 212(a)(5)(A)(i) of the Act provides:

In general.-Any alien who seeks to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor is inadmissible, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that-

(I) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified (or equally qualified in the case of an alien described in clause (ii)) and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and

(II) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.

According to 20 C.F.R. § 656.1(a), the purpose and scope of the regulations regarding labor certification are as follows:

Under § 212(a)(5)(A) of the Act certain aliens may not obtain a visa for entrance into the United States in order to engage in permanent employment unless the Secretary of Labor has first certified to the Secretary of State and to the Attorney General that:

(1) There are not sufficient United States workers, who are able, willing, qualified and available at the time of application for a visa and admission into the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform the work, and

(2) The employment of the alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of United States workers similarly employed.

³ It is noted that the petitioner did not submit sufficient evidence, such as transcripts, to verify the beneficiary's studies at City of London Polytechnic, but submits a letter from a lecturer only.

It is significant that none of the above inquiries assigned to DOL, or the remaining regulations implementing these duties under 20 C.F.R. § 656, involve a determination as to whether or not the alien is qualified for a specific immigrant classification or even the job offered. This fact has not gone unnoticed by Federal Circuit Courts.

There is no doubt that the authority to make preference classification decisions rests with INS. The language of section 204 cannot be read otherwise. *See Castaneda-Gonzalez v. INS*, 564 F.2d 417, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In turn, DOL has the authority to make the two determinations listed in section 212(a)(14). *Id.* at 423. The necessary result of these two grants of authority is that section 212(a)(14) determinations are not subject to review by INS absent fraud or willful misrepresentation, but all matters relating to preference classification eligibility not expressly delegated to DOL remain within INS' authority.

* * *

Given the language of the Act, the totality of the legislative history, and the agencies' own interpretations of their duties under the Act, we must conclude that Congress did not intend DOL to have primary authority to make any determinations other than the two stated in section 212(a)(14). If DOL is to analyze alien qualifications, it is for the purpose of "matching" them with those of corresponding United States workers so that it will then be "in a position to meet the requirement of the law," namely the section 212(a)(14) determinations.

Madany v. Smith, 696 F.2d 1008, 1012-1013 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

In 1991, when the final rule for 8 C.F.R. § 204.5 was published in the Federal Register, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now CIS), responded to criticism that the regulation required an alien to have a bachelor's degree as a minimum and that the regulation did not allow for the substitution of experience for education. After reviewing section 121 of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649 (1990), and the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, the Service specifically noted that both the Act and the legislative history indicate that an alien must have at least a bachelor's degree: "[B]oth the Act and its legislative history make clear that, in order to qualify as a professional under the third classification or to have experience equating to an advanced degree under the second, *an alien must have at least a bachelor's degree.*" 56 Fed. Reg. 60897, 60900 (November 29, 1991)(emphasis added).

There is no provision in the statute or the regulations that would allow a beneficiary to qualify under section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act with anything less than a full baccalaureate degree. A United States baccalaureate degree is generally found to require four years of education. *Matter of Shah*, 17 I&N Dec. 244 (Reg. Comm. 1977). Where the analysis of the beneficiary's credentials relies on work experience alone or a combination of multiple lesser degrees, the result is the "equivalent" of a bachelor's degree rather than a "foreign equivalent degree." In order to have experience and education equating to a bachelor's degree under section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act, the beneficiary must have a single degree that is the "foreign equivalent degree" to a United States baccalaureate degree.

Because the beneficiary does not have a "United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree," the beneficiary does not qualify for preference visa classification under section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act as he does not have the minimum level of education required for the equivalent of a bachelor's degree.

Authority to Evaluate Whether the Alien is Qualified for the Job Offered

Relying in part on *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1008, the Ninth circuit stated:

[I]t appears that the DOL is responsible only for determining the availability of suitable American workers for a job and the impact of alien employment upon the domestic labor market. It does not appear that the DOL's role extends to determining if the alien is qualified for the job for which he seeks sixth preference status. That determination appears to be delegated to the INS under section 204(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b), as one of the determinations incident to the INS's decision whether the alien is entitled to sixth preference status.

K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon, 699 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1983). The court relied on an amicus brief from DOL that stated the following:

The labor certification made by the Secretary of Labor ... pursuant to section 212(a)(14) of the ... [Act] ... is binding as to the findings of whether there are able, willing, qualified, and available United States workers for the job offered to the alien, and whether employment of the alien under the terms set by the employer would adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed United States workers. *The labor certification in no way indicates that the alien offered the certified job opportunity is qualified (or not qualified) to perform the duties of that job.*

(Emphasis added.) *Id.* at 1009. The Ninth Circuit, citing *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc.*, 699 F.2d at 1006, revisited this issue, stating:

The Department of Labor ("DOL") must certify that insufficient domestic workers are available to perform the job and that the alien's performance of the job will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed domestic workers. *Id.* § 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14). The INS then makes its own determination of the alien's entitlement to sixth preference status. *Id.* § 204(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b). *See generally K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006, 1008 9th Cir.1983).

The INS, therefore, may make a de novo determination of whether the alien is in fact qualified to fill the certified job offer.

Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman, 736 F. 2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1984).

We are cognizant of the recent decision in *Grace Korean United Methodist Church v. Michael Chertoff*, CV 04-1849-PK (D. Ore. November 3, 2005), which finds that CIS "does not have the authority or expertise to impose its strained definition of 'B.A. or equivalent' on that term as set forth in the labor certification." In contrast to the broad precedential authority of the case law of a United States circuit court, the AAO is not bound to follow the published decision of a United States district court in matters arising within the same district. *See Matter of K-S-*, 20 I&N Dec. 715 (BIA 1993). Although the reasoning underlying a district judge's decision will be given due consideration when it is properly before the AAO, the analysis does not have to be followed as a matter of law. *Id.* at 719. The court in *Grace Korean* makes no attempt to distinguish its holding from the Circuit Court decisions cited above. Instead, as legal support for its determination, the court cited to a case holding that the United States Postal Service has no expertise or special competence in immigration matters. *Grace Korean United Methodist Church* at *8 (citing *Tovar v.*

U.S. Postal Service, 3 F.3d 1271, 1276 (9th Cir. 1993)). On its face, *Tovar* is easily distinguishable from the present matter since CIS, through the authority delegated by the Secretary of Homeland Security, is charged by statute with the enforcement of the United States immigration laws and not with the delivery of mail. See section 103(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a).

Additionally, we also note the recent decision in *Snapnames.com, Inc. v. Michael Chertoff*, CV 06-65-MO (D. Ore. November 30, 2006). In that case, the labor certification application specified an educational requirement of four years of college and a 'B.S. or foreign equivalent.' The district court determined that 'B.S. or foreign equivalent' relates solely to the alien's educational background, precluding consideration of the alien's combined education and work experience. *Snapnames.com, Inc.* at 11-13. Additionally, the court determined that the word 'equivalent' in the employer's educational requirements was ambiguous and that in the context of skilled worker petitions (where there is no statutory educational requirement), deference must be given to the employer's intent. *Snapnames.com, Inc.* at 14. However, in professional and advanced degree professional cases, where the beneficiary is statutorily required to hold a baccalaureate degree, the court determined that CIS properly concluded that a single foreign degree or its equivalent is required. *Snapnames.com, Inc.* at 17, 19. In the instant case, unlike the labor certification in *Snapnames.com, Inc.*, the petitioner's intent regarding educational equivalence is clearly stated.

The key to determining the job qualifications specified in the labor certification is found on Form ETA-750 Part A. This section of the application for alien labor certification, "Offer of Employment," describes the terms and conditions of the job offered. It is important that the ETA-750 be read as a whole. The instructions for the Form ETA 750A, item 14, provide:

Minimum Education, Training, and Experience Required to Perform the Job Duties. Do not duplicate the time requirements. For example, time required in training should not also be listed in education or experience. Indicate whether months or years are required. Do not include restrictive requirements which are not actual business necessities for performance on the job and which would limit consideration of otherwise qualified U.S. workers.

Regarding the minimum level of education and experience required for the proffered position in this matter, Part A of the labor certification, as filled in by the petitioner, reflects the following requirements:

14.	EDUCATION	
	Grade School	8 years
	High School	4 years
	College	4 years
	College Degree Required	Bachelor of Science (B.S.)
	Major Field of Study	Design or Marketing Management

The applicant must also have five (5) years of employment experience in the job offered or in consultant for interior design company. Item 15 does not reflect any special requirements.

Moreover, to determine whether a beneficiary is eligible for a preference immigrant visa, CIS must ascertain whether the alien is, in fact, qualified for the certified job. CIS will not accept a degree equivalency or an unrelated degree when a labor certification plainly and expressly requires a candidate with a specific degree. In evaluating the beneficiary's qualifications, CIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification

to determine the required qualifications for the position. CIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. See *Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986). See also, *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1008; *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc.*, 699 F.2d at 1006; *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

Once again, we are cognizant of the recent holding in *Grace Korean*, which held that CIS is bound by the employer's definition of "bachelor or equivalent." In reaching this decision, the court concluded that the employer in that case tailored the job requirements to the employee and that DOL would have considered the beneficiary's credentials in evaluating the job requirements listed on the labor certification. As stated above, the reasoning underlying a district judge's decision will be given due consideration when it is properly before the AAO, but the analysis does not have to be followed as a matter of law. *K.S. 20 I&N Dec. at 719*. In this matter, the court's reasoning cannot be followed as it is inconsistent with the actual practice at DOL. The court in *Grace Korean* specifically noted that the skilled worker classification does not require an actual degree.

As discussed above, the role of the DOL in the employment-based immigration process is to make two determinations: (i) that there are not sufficient U.S. workers who are able, willing, qualified and available to do the job in question at the time of application for labor certification and in the place where the alien is to perform the job, and (ii) that the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers. Section 212(a)(5)(A)(i) of the Act. Beyond this, Congress did not intend DOL to have primary authority to make any other determinations in the immigrant petition process. *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1013. As discussed above, CIS, not DOL, has final authority with regard to determining an alien's qualifications for an immigrant preference status. *K.R.K Irvine*, 699 F.2d at 1009 FN5 (citing *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1011-13). This authority encompasses the evaluation of the alien's credentials in relation to the minimum requirements for the job, even though a labor certification has been issued by DOL. *Id.*

Specifically, as quoted above, the regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 656.21(b)(6) requires the employer to "clearly document . . . that all U.S. workers who applied for the position were rejected for lawful job related reasons." BALCA has held that an employer cannot simply reject a U.S. worker that meets the minimum requirements specified on the Form ETA-750. See *American Café*, 1990 INA 26 (BALCA 1991), *Fritz Garage*, 1988 INA 98 (BALCA 1988), and *Vanguard Jewelry Corp.* 1988 INA 273 (BALCA 1988). Thus, the court's suggestion in *Grace Korean* that the employer tailored the job requirements to the alien instead of the job offered actually implies that the recruitment was unlawful. If, in fact, DOL is looking at whether the job requirements are unduly restrictive and whether U.S. applicants met the job requirements on the Form ETA 750, instead of whether the alien meets them, it becomes immediately relevant whether DOL considers "B.A. or equivalent" to require a U.S. bachelor degree or a foreign degree that is equivalent to a U.S. bachelor's degree. We are satisfied that DOL's interpretation matches our own. In reaching this conclusion, we rely on the reasoning articulated in *Hong Video Technology*, 1998 INA 202 (BALCA 2001). That case involved a labor certification that required a "B.S. or equivalent." The Certifying Officer questioned this requirement as the correct minimum for the job as the alien did not possess a Bachelor of Science degree. In rebuttal, the employer's attorney asserted that the beneficiary had the equivalent of a Bachelor of Science degree as demonstrated through a combination of work experience and formal education. The Certifying Officer concluded that "a combination of education and experience to meet educational requirements is unacceptable as it is unfavorable to U.S. workers." BALCA concluded:

We have held in *Francis Kellogg, et als.*, 94-INA-465, 94 INA-544, 95-INA-68 (Feb. 2, 1998 (en banc) that where, as here, the alien does not meet the primary job requirements, but only

potentially qualifies for the job because the employer has chosen to list alternative job requirements, the employer's alternative requirements are unlawfully tailored to the alien's qualifications, in violation of [20 C.F.R.] § 656.21(b)(5), unless the employer has indicated that applicants with any suitable combination of education, training or experience are acceptable. Therefore, the employer's alternative requirements are unlawfully tailored to the alien's qualifications, in violation of [20 C.F.R.] § 65[6].21(b)(5).

In as much as Employer's stated minimum requirement was a "B.S. or equivalent" degree in Electronic Technology or Education Technology and the Alien did not meet that requirement, labor certification was properly denied.

Significantly, when DOL raises the issue of the alien's qualifications, it is to question whether the Form ETA-750 properly represents the job qualifications for the position offered. DOL is not reaching a decision as to whether the alien is qualified for the job specified on the Form ETA 750, a determination reserved to CIS for the reasons discussed above. Thus, DOL's certification of an application for labor certification does not bind us in determinations of whether the alien is qualified for the job specified. As quoted above, DOL has conceded as much in an amicus brief filed with a federal court.

Finally, where the job requirements in a labor certification are not otherwise unambiguously prescribed, e.g., by regulation, CIS must examine "the language of the labor certification job requirements" in order to determine what the beneficiary must demonstrate to be found qualified for the position. *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1015. The only rational manner by which CIS can be expected to interpret the meaning of terms used to describe the requirements of a job in a labor certification is to "examine the certified job offer *exactly* as it is completed by the prospective employer." *Rosedale Linden Park Company v. Smith*, 595 F. Supp. 829, 833 (D.D.C. 1984)(emphasis added). CIS's interpretation of the job's requirements, as stated on the labor certification must involve "reading and applying *the plain language* of the [labor certification application form]." *Id.* at 834 (emphasis added). CIS cannot and should not reasonably be expected to look beyond the plain language of the labor certification that DOL has formally issued or otherwise attempt to divine the employer's intentions through some sort of reverse engineering of the labor certification.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(B) provides that a petition for an alien in this classification "must be accompanied by evidence that the alien meets the educational, training or experience, and other requirements of the individual labor certification." As noted previously, the certified Form ETA 750 requires a Bachelor's degree and five years of experience in the job offered or in consultant for interior design company. The petitioner clearly required a bachelor's degree in design or marketing management, however, the labor certification does not further define the degree requirement or set forth an equivalency at all. Nor does the certified labor certification demonstrate that the petitioner would accept a combination of degrees, diplomas or certificates that are individually all less than a U.S. bachelor's degree or its foreign equivalent and/or quantifiable amount of work experience when it oversaw the petitioner's labor market test. The employer, now the petitioner, did not specify on the Form ETA 750 that the minimum academic requirements of a bachelor's degree might be met through a combination of lesser degrees, diplomas, certificates and/or quantifiable amount of work experience.

Furthermore, the AAO's RFE dated October 11, 2007 requested the petitioner to submit evidence showing that the petitioner specified that the minimum academic requirements of a bachelor's degree might be met through a combination of lesser degrees and/or quantifiable amount of work experience in the petitioner's

labor market test. The AAO specifically requested evidence demonstrating that the petitioner communicated its express intent about the actual minimum requirements of the proffered position to DOL during the labor certification process. The AAO received the response on December 27, 2007. However, the response to the AAO's RFE does not include any documentary evidence showing that the petitioner ever defined or specified that the minimum educational requirements of a bachelor's degree might be met through a combination of lesser degrees, diplomas, certificates and/or quantifiable amount of work experience during any stage of the labor certification application processing. Instead the petitioner consistently required a bachelor's degree in design or marketing management as the minimum educational requirements. If the petitioner had not required a bachelor's degree for the proffered position, it should have had its requirements reflected on the Form ETA 750. However, the Form ETA 750 was submitted and certified with a four-year bachelor's degree requirement and no stated equivalency. The petitioner even did not indicate that it would accept a foreign equivalent degree to meet the bachelor's degree requirement.

Therefore, the AAO finds that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary met the minimum educational requirements for the proffered position prior to the priority date even if the petition had been considered under the skilled worker category.

Beyond the director's decision and the petitioner's assertions on appeal, the AAO has identified an additional ground of ineligibility and will discuss whether or not the petitioner has established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 299 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis).

The regulation 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the U.S. DOL. *See* 8 CFR § 204.5(d). The priority date in this case is August 5, 2002. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$30,000 per year.

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, CIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered prima facie proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner submitted the beneficiary's W-2 forms for 2002 and 2003, the beneficiary's individual income tax return for 2004 with his W-2 form and 1099 form, the petitioner's payroll summary for the first six months in 2005, the beneficiary's paystubs, deposit slip and cancelled check in 2005. Because a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders, the assets of its shareholders or of other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm. 1980). In a similar case, the court in *Sitar v. Ashcroft*, 2003 WL 22203713 (D.Mass. Sept. 18, 2003) stated, "nothing in the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5, permits [CIS] to consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage." Similarly, because the petitioner is a corporation, the compensation paid to the beneficiary by another business entity cannot be considered in determining the petitioner's ability to pay in the instant case. The relevant evidence in the record shows that the petitioner paid the beneficiary \$26,656.37 in 2002, the year of the priority date in the instant case, \$29,226.52 in 2003, \$17,502.25 in 2004.⁴ Therefore, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that it paid the full proffered wage of \$30,000 per year to the beneficiary in 2002 through 2004. For 2005, the record contains the petitioner's payroll summary through United HR, Inc., which shows that the petitioner paid the beneficiary \$11,463.54 during the period from January 1, 2005 to June 30, 2005. The record also contains the beneficiary's paystubs for 2005, the most latest of which shows that the petitioner paid the beneficiary \$8,247.69 year to date as of December 10, 2005. Therefore, the petitioner documented its payment of \$19,711.23 to the beneficiary in 2005 only, and thus it failed to demonstrate that the petitioner paid the full proffered wage in 2005. The petitioner failed to establish its ability to pay through the examination of wages actually paid to the beneficiary beginning on the priority date in 2002 and onwards. The petitioner is obligated to demonstrate that it could pay the beneficiary the difference of \$3,343.63 in 2002, \$773.48 in 2003, \$12,497.75 in 2004 and \$10,288.77 in 2005 respectively between wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage with its net income or its net current assets.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, CIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's

⁴ The record also contains a copy of the beneficiary's 1099 form in \$22,265.34 for 2004. However, the Form 1099 was issued by a business entity named [REDACTED] which is not the petitioner in the instant case. In addition, the beneficiary did not report this amount on the Form 1099 as income on his Form 1040 tax return for 2004.

gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now CIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. The court in *Chi-Feng Chang* further noted:

Plaintiffs also contend the depreciation amounts on the 1985 and 1986 returns are non-cash deductions. Plaintiffs thus request that the court *sua sponte* add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year. Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for this proposition. This argument has likewise been presented before and rejected. *See Elatos*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. [CIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.

(Emphasis in original.) *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537.

As an alternative method to determine the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, CIS will review the petitioner's assets. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, CIS will consider net current assets as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.⁵ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets.

The regulation 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) specifically indicates evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements. However, the record does not contain any regulatory-prescribed evidence for 2002 through the present. In visa petition proceedings, the burden is on the petitioner to establish eligibility for the benefit sought. *See Matter of Brantigan*, 11 I&N Dec. 493 (BIA 1966). The petitioner must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the beneficiary is fully

⁵According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

qualified for the benefit sought. *Matter of Martinez*, 21 I&N Dec. 1035, 1036 (BIA 1997); *Matter of Patel*, 19 I&N Dec. 774 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Soo Hoo*, 11 I&N Dec. 151 (BIA 1965). The tax returns would have demonstrated the amount of taxable income the petitioner reported to the IRS and further reveal its ability to pay the proffered wage. Without the petitioner's tax return, annual report or audited financial statements for the relevant years, the AAO cannot determine whether the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date until the present. The petitioner failed to establish its continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage because it failed to submit any of these documents for 2002 through the present. The failure to submit initial evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(14). On appeal, the petitioner did not submit its tax returns, annual reports or audited financial statements for 2002 through the present.

Therefore, the petitioner had not established that it had the ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage for the year 2002 onwards through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or its net current assets.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.