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
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000
Washington, DC 20529



U.S. Citizenship
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
Petitioner:

Beneficiary:



PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional Pursuant to Section 203(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center, a subsequent motion to reopen was granted, and the visa petition remained denied. The visa petition is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is an auto and truck service business. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a diesel mechanic. As required by statute, a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification approved by the Department of Labor, accompanied the petition. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into this decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's September 13, 2007 denial, the issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has established that it has the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date of March 13, 2001.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states, in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements. In a case where the prospective United States employer employs 100 or more workers, the director may accept a statement from a financial officer of the organization which establishes the prospective employer's ability to pay the proffered wage. In appropriate cases, additional evidence, such as profit/loss statements, bank account records, or personnel records, may be submitted by the petitioner or requested by [Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)].

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor. *See* 8 CFR § 204.5(d). The priority date in the instant petition is April 13, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$14.50 per hour or \$30,160 annually.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a de novo basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's de novo authority has been long recognized by the

federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal¹. Relevant evidence submitted on appeal includes counsel's statement, copies of the petitioner's previously submitted 2001 and 2003 Forms 1120-A, U.S. Corporation Short-Form Income Tax Returns, copies of the petitioner's 2002, 2004 and 2005 Forms 1120-A, and a copy of the petitioner's 2006 Form 1120S, U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation. Other relevant evidence includes a copy of the petitioner's owner's 2002 Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, copies of the petitioner's 2001 and the first quarter of 2002 Forms 941, Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Return, a copy of a planning guide from Zimmers Associates, and pictures of the petitioner's business facilities. The record does not contain any other evidence relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

The petitioner's 2001 through 2005 Forms 1120-A reflect taxable incomes before net operating loss deduction and special deductions or net incomes of -\$6,168, -\$2,009, \$33,628, \$13,881, and -\$24,440, respectively. The petitioner's 2001 through 2005 Forms 1120-A also reflect net current assets of \$10,284, \$0, \$19,908, \$33,789, and \$30,482, respectively.

The petitioner's 2006 Form 1120S reflects an ordinary income or net income of -\$3,436 from Schedule K and net current assets of \$25,314.

The 2002 Form 1040 for the petitioner's owner reflects an adjusted gross income of \$23,285.

The petitioner's 2001 and first quarter of 2002 Forms 941 reflect that the petitioner paid wages during those quarters, but there is no evidence that any of the wages paid were paid to the beneficiary.

On appeal, counsel asserts:

The visa petition focuses on the fact that an employer cannot find a qualified American worker and is therefore limited in ability to function effectively and to grow. If the company had additional qualified mechanics, its gross and net income would go up immediately and significantly. However, qualified mechanics were not available, as determined by the Department of Labor in issuing a Labor Certification.

The Service requested tax returns of the Petitioner. At that time, the Petitioner did not make the tax returns available and the petition was denied.² We attach at this time the Petitioner's

¹ The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1).

² The purpose of the request for evidence is to elicit further information that clarifies whether eligibility for the benefit sought has been established, as of the time the petition is filed. *See* 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.2(b)(8) and (12). The failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(14). As in the present matter, where a petitioner has been put on notice of a deficiency in the evidence and has been given an opportunity to respond to that deficiency, the AAO is not obligated to accept evidence offered for the first time on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Obaighena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533 (BIA 1988). If the petitioner had wanted the submitted evidence to be considered, it should have submitted the documents in response to the director's request for evidence. *Id.* Under the circumstances, the AAO need not consider the sufficiency of the evidence submitted on appeal. However, in the instant case, the AAO has decided to exercise favorable discretion and review the case on its merits to include the previously requested evidence submitted now on appeal.

federal Income Tax Returns for 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. It is noted that *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967), holds “that even though the Petitioner’s Net Profit is not commensurate with salary specifications of the labor certification, a denied petition should be granted where the facts demonstrate that with appropriate additional staff the Petitioner would be in the position of paying the offered wage.” Specifically, that case held that “the fact that the Petitioner was able to show only a Net Profit of \$280 for the calendar year of 1966 does not in itself preclude the beneficiary [sic. – Petitioner] from establishing that she would be able to meet the conditions of the certification in the “Job Offer.” That case has been the law for forty [sic] (40) years and should be followed in the instant case.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, CIS requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary’s proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage, CIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed the beneficiary at the time the priority date was established. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, this evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, on the Form ETA 750, signed by the beneficiary on April 10, 2001, the beneficiary does not claim the petitioner as a past or present employer. In addition, counsel has not submitted any Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statements, or Forms 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income, issued by the petitioner on behalf of the beneficiary to show that the petitioner employed the beneficiary in the pertinent years, 2001 through 2006.

As an alternative means of determining the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage, CIS will next examine the petitioner’s net income figure as reflected on the petitioner’s federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Tex. 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F.Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff’d.*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc.*, the court held that CIS had properly relied on the petitioner’s net income figure, as stated on the petitioner’s corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner’s gross income. 623 F.Supp at 1084. The court specifically rejected the argument that CIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. Finally, there is no precedent that would allow the petitioner to “add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year.” *See also Elatos Restaurant Corp.*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. The court in *Chi-Feng Chang* further noted:

Plaintiffs also contend the depreciation amounts on the 1985 and 1986 returns are non-cash deductions. Plaintiffs thus request that the court *sua sponte* add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year. Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for this

proposition. This argument has likewise been presented before and rejected. *See Elatos*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. [CIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.

(Emphasis in original.) *Chi-Feng* at 537.

In 2001 through 2005, the petitioner was organized as a "C" corporation. For a "C" corporation, CIS considers net income to be the figure shown on line 28 of the petitioner's Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return or line 24 of the petitioner's Form 1120-A. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate that its net incomes in 2001 through 2005 were -\$6,168, -\$2,009, \$33,628, \$13,881, and -\$24,440, respectively. The petitioner could have paid the proffered wage of \$30,160 from its net income in 2003, but not in 2001, 2002, 2004, or 2005.

In 2006 the petitioner was organized as an S corporation. Where an S corporation's income is exclusively from a trade or business, CIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner's Form 1120S. The instructions on the Form 1120S, U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation, state on page one, "Caution, Include only trade or business income and expenses on lines 1a through 21."

Where an S corporation has income from sources other than from a trade or business, net income is found on Schedule K. The Schedule K form related to the Form 1120 states that an S corporation's total income from its various sources are to be shown not on page one of the Form 1120S, but on lines 1 through 6 of the Schedule K, Shareholders' Shares of Income, Credits, Deductions, etc. *See* Internal Revenue Service, Instructions for Form 1120S, 2003, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-03/i1120s.pdf>, Instructions for Form 1120S, 2002, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-02/i1120s.pdf>, (accessed February 15, 2005).

In the instant case, the petitioner's net income from Schedule K in 2006 was -\$3,436. The petitioner could not have paid the proffered wage of \$30,160 from its net income in 2006.

Nevertheless, the petitioner's net income is not the only statistic that can be used to demonstrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, CIS will review the petitioner's assets. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, CIS will consider *net current assets* as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.³ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current

³ According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such as accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If a corporation's end-of-year net current assets are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage out of those net current assets. The petitioner's net current assets in 2001 through 2006 were \$10,284, \$0, \$19,908, \$33,789, \$30,482, and \$25,314, respectively. The petitioner could have paid the proffered wage of \$30,160 from its net current assets in 2004 and 2005, but not in 2001, 2002, 2003 (could have paid the proffered wage from its net income), or 2006. Therefore, the petitioner has established its ability to pay the proffered wage of \$30,160 in 2003, 2004, and 2005.

On appeal, counsel asserts that if the petitioner "had additional qualified mechanics, its gross and net income would go up immediately and significantly." However, against the projection of future earnings, *Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 144-145 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977) states:

I do not feel, nor do I believe the Congress intended, that the petitioner, who admittedly could not pay the offered wage at the time the petition was filed, should subsequently become eligible to have the petition approved under a new set of facts hinged upon probability and projections, even beyond the information presented on appeal.

On appeal, counsel also cites *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967) and claims that as in *Sonogawa* the petition should be granted "where the facts demonstrate that with appropriate additional staff the Petitioner would be in the position of paying the offered wage."

Matter of Sonogawa, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967), relates to petitions filed during uncharacteristically unprofitable or difficult years but only in a framework of profitable or successful years. The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere.

No unusual circumstances have been shown to exist in this case to parallel those in *Sonogawa*, nor has it been established that 2001, 2002, and 2006 were uncharacteristically unprofitable years for the petitioner.

Counsel argues that consideration of the beneficiary's potential to increase the petitioner's revenues is appropriate, and establishes with even greater certainty that the petitioner has more than adequate ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner has not, however, provided any standard or criterion for the evaluation of such earnings. For example, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary will replace less productive workers, or has a reputation that would increase the number of customers. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

For the reasons stated above, the petitioner has not established its ability to pay the proffered wage of \$30,160 from the priority date of April 13, 2001 and continuing to the present.

Beyond the decision of the director, there is another issue that must be addressed before the visa petition can be approved. An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 299 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis). That issue is whether or not the petitioner has established that the beneficiary met the experience requirements of the labor certification before the priority date of April 13, 2001.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3) states, in pertinent part:

(ii) *Other documentation* – (A) *General*. Any requirements of training or experience for skilled workers, professionals, or other workers must be supported by letters from trainers or employers giving the name, address, and title of the trainer or employer, and a description of the training received or the experience of the alien.

(B) *Skilled workers*. If the petition is for a skilled worker, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the alien meets the educational, training or experience, and any other requirements of the individual labor certification, meets the requirements for Schedule A designation, or meets the requirements for the Labor Market Information Pilot Program occupational designation. The minimum requirements for this classification are at least two years of training or experience.

To be eligible for approval, a beneficiary must have the education and experience specified on the labor certification as of the petition's filing date. The filing date of the petition is the initial receipt in the Department of Labor's employment service system. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977). In this case, that date is April 13, 2001.

CIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. CIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986). *See also, Mandany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008, (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

The approved alien labor certification, "Offer of Employment," (Form ETA-750 Part A) describes the terms and conditions of the job offered. Block 14 and Block 15, which should be read as a whole, set forth the educational, training, and experience requirements for applicants. In this case, Block 14 requires that the beneficiary must possess two years of experience in the job offered of diesel mechanic. Block 15 does not state any additional requirements.

Based on the information set forth above, it can be concluded that an applicant for the petitioner's position of diesel mechanic must have two years of experience in the job offered.

In the instant case, counsel submitted an undated letter from [REDACTED], signed by a manager (not legible), that states that the beneficiary was employed with [REDACTED] as a diesel mechanic from May 1, 1994 to March 31, 1997. However, the Form ETA 750 signed by the beneficiary under penalty of perjury

on April 10, 2001, states that the beneficiary was employed by JACNI as a diesel mechanic from March 1994 to March 1998.

In order to clarify the discrepancy, the beneficiary must submit verifiable evidence that supports the entire record. He has not done so. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591 (BIA 1988) states: "Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition." *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-592 also states: "It is incumbent on the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice."

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The director's decision is upheld, and the visa petition remains denied.