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U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536



Public Copy

FILE: [Redacted]
EAC 99 150 52140

Office: Vermont Service Center

Date: JUL 5 2001

IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:



APPLICATION: Petition for Special Immigrant Battered Spouse Pursuant to Section 204(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)

IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



Identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

Robert P. Wiemann, Acting Director
Administrative Appeals Office



DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic who is seeking classification as a special immigrant pursuant to section 204(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii), as the battered spouse of a United States citizen.

The director determined that the petitioner failed to submit additional evidence as had been requested to establish that he: (1) has been battered by, or has been the subject of extreme cruelty perpetrated by, the citizen or lawful permanent resident during the marriage; or is the parent of a child who has been battered by, or has been the subject of extreme cruelty perpetrated by, the citizen or lawful permanent resident during the marriage; (2) is a person of good moral character; and (3) is a person whose deportation (removal) would result in extreme hardship to himself, or to his child. The director, therefore, denied the petition.

On appeal, the petitioner submits a self-affidavit stating that his wife had subjected him to emotional cruelty, that he will suffer extreme hardship if he were forced to return to the Dominican Republic, and that he has never been arrested either in the United States or in the Dominican Republic.

8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(1) states, in pertinent part, that:

(i) A spouse may file a self-petition under section 204(a)(1)(A)(iii) or 204(a)(1)(B)(ii) of the Act for his or her classification as an immigrant relative or as a preference immigrant if he or she:

(A) Is the spouse of a citizen or lawful permanent resident of the United States;

(B) Is eligible for immigrant classification under section 201(b)(2)(A)(i) or 203(a)(2)(A) of the Act based on that relationship;

(C) Is residing in the United States;

(D) Has resided in the United States with the citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse;

(E) Has been battered by, or has been the subject of extreme cruelty perpetrated by, the citizen or lawful permanent resident during the marriage; or is the parent of a child who

has been battered by, or has been the subject of extreme cruelty perpetrated by, the citizen or lawful permanent resident during the marriage;

(F) Is a person of good moral character;

(G) Is a person whose deportation (removal) would result in extreme hardship to himself, herself, or his or her child; and

(H) Entered into the marriage to the citizen or lawful permanent resident in good faith.

The petition, Form I-360, shows that the petitioner arrived in the United States on January 14, 1994. However, his current immigration status or how he entered the United States was not shown. The petitioner married his United States citizen spouse on April 12, 1995 at Queens, New York. On April 9, 1999, a self-petition was filed by the petitioner claiming eligibility as a special immigrant alien who has been battered by, or has been the subject of extreme cruelty perpetrated by, his U.S. citizen spouse during their marriage.

PART I

8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(1)(i)(E) requires the petitioner to establish that he has been battered by, or has been the subject of extreme cruelty perpetrated by, the citizen or lawful permanent resident during the marriage; or is the parent of a child who has been battered by, or has been the subject of extreme cruelty perpetrated by, the citizen or lawful permanent resident during the marriage.

The qualifying abuse must have been sufficiently aggravated to have reached the level of "battery or extreme cruelty." 8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(1)(vi) provides:

[T]he phrase, "was battered by or was the subject of extreme cruelty" includes, but is not limited to, being the victim of any act or threatened act of violence, including any forceful detention, which results or threatens to result in physical or mental injury. Psychological or sexual abuse or exploitation, including rape, molestation, incest (if the victim is a minor), or forced prostitution shall be considered acts of violence. Other abusive actions may also be acts of violence under certain circumstances, including acts that, in and of themselves, may not initially appear violent but that are a part of an overall pattern of violence. The qualifying



abuse must have been committed by the citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse, must have been perpetrated against the self-petitioner or the self-petitioner's child, and must have taken place during the self-petitioner's marriage to the abuser.

8 C.F.R. 204.2(c) (2) provides, in part:

(i) Self-petitioners are encouraged to submit primary evidence whenever possible. The Service will consider, however, any credible evidence relevant to the petition. The determination of what evidence is credible and the weight to be given that evidence shall be within the sole discretion of the Service.

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(iv) Evidence of abuse may include, but is not limited to, reports and affidavits from police, judges and other court officials, medical personnel, school officials, clergy, social workers, and other social service agency personnel. Persons who have obtained an order of protection against the abuser or have taken other legal steps to end the abuse are strongly encouraged to submit copies of the relating legal documents. Evidence that the abuse victim sought safe-haven in a battered women's shelter or similar refuge may be relevant, as may a combination of documents such as a photograph of the visibly injured self-petitioner supported by affidavits. Other forms of credible relevant evidence will also be considered. Documentary proof of non-qualifying abuse may only be used to establish a pattern of abuse and violence and to support a claim that qualifying abuse also occurred.

Because the petitioner furnished insufficient evidence to establish that he has met this requirement, he was requested on January 14, 1998 to submit additional evidence. He was advised that although a Confidentiality Statement from [REDACTED] C.S.W., indicates that the petitioner stated he had been battered by, or had been the subject of extreme cruelty perpetrated by his spouse, the record did not contain evidence to support this statement. The petitioner was, therefore, requested to submit additional evidence, including the credentials of [REDACTED], as well as a statement addressing how [REDACTED] arrived at her conclusion. Although the petitioner was granted an extension of 60 days in which to submit additional evidence, no response was received.

On appeal, the petitioner requests that his petition be approved because his wife subjected him to emotional cruelty. He states:

During our marriage, she always cursed at me and threatened to leave me unless I did what she wanted. She always asked money from me and did not explain and when I did not give it to her, she threatened to withdraw my petition. I was almost completely under her control and what hurts even more is that I truly loved her. There were times in which my wife physically hit me and threatened to leave me and inform immigration that she wanted them to deport me. Whenever she said this I felt completely helpless and powerless. And there was very little I could do.

....During my marriage my wife would often leave home and not return for several days. When I rebuked her, she would always state that she was independent and could do as she pleased. Unfortunately, my wife also drank excessive alcohol. I resided with my wife from the date of our marriage until February 1997, the date in which [I/she] left our household. On that date I felt completely alone and desperate. As a result I have had to seek counseling. My marriage to my wife has completely traumatized me. Since that time I could not be with another woman both emotionally and sexually.

The self-affidavit, without supporting evidence, is insufficient to establish extreme cruelty. Nor does it suggest that the marital difficulties claimed by the petitioner were beyond those encountered in many marriages. Further, the record contains no evidence that the marital difficulties were compounded by any effort on the part of the citizen spouse to control the petitioner with threats regarding his immigration status. While the record is not clear whether the citizen spouse or the petitioner abandoned the marital relationship, "abandonment" is not included in, nor does it meet, the definition of qualifying abuse as provided in 8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(1)(vi).

The record of proceeding contains affidavits from three individuals each alleging that the petitioner and his spouse seem to be a very happy couple and a perfect match, but that things drastically changed between them after the petitioner passed the National Dental Board Examination and his spouse did not pass the examination. The affiants, however, failed to establish that they knew sufficient details regarding any incidents of abuse or extreme cruelty. Nor did the affiants establish that they are eye-witnesses to the claimed abuse and knew sufficient details regarding any incidents of abuse or extreme cruelty. The relationship described by the affiants reflects what would be considered a troubled or deteriorating marital relationship but does not constitute qualifying abuse.

The psychological assessment by Irene Torres was undated, and the evaluator failed to indicate the date she interviewed the petitioner. As noted by the director, the record did not contain evidence to support the statement of [REDACTED], she failed to list her credentials, and she did not indicate how she arrived at her conclusions. Although the petitioner was requested on January 14, 1998 to submit this information, the petitioner neither addressed nor submitted this information on appeal. Nor did the petitioner submit additional evidence as had been requested by the director to establish that he has been battered by, or has been the subject of extreme cruelty perpetrated by, the citizen during the marriage.

As provided in 8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(1)(vi), the qualifying abuse must have been sufficiently aggravated to have reached the level of "battery or extreme cruelty." The evidence contained in the record is insufficient to establish that the claimed abuse perpetrated toward the petitioner by his spouse was "extreme." The petitioner has failed to establish that he was battered by or was the subject of "extreme cruelty" as contemplated by Congress, and to overcome the director's finding pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(1)(i)(E).

PART II

8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(1)(i)(F) requires the petitioner to establish that he is a person of good moral character. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(2)(v), primary evidence of the self-petitioner's good moral character is the self-petitioner's affidavit. The affidavit should be accompanied by a local police clearance or a state-issued criminal background check for each locality or state in the United States in which the self-petitioner has resided for six or more months during the three-year period immediately preceding the filing of the petition. Self-petitioners who lived outside the United States during this time should submit a police clearance, criminal background check, or similar report issued by the appropriate authority in each foreign country in which he or she resided for six or more months during the 3-year period immediately preceding the filing of the self petition.

The director determined that the petitioner failed to submit evidence of good moral character although he was requested on May 11, 1999 to submit additional evidence. Examples of evidence the petitioner may submit to establish good moral character under 8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(2)(v) were listed by the director in his request for additional evidence. While the petitioner states on appeal that he has never been arrested either in the United States or in the Dominican Republic, the petitioner has failed to submit a local police clearance or a state-issued criminal background check for each locality or state in the United States in which he has resided

for six or more months during the three-year period immediately preceding the filing of the petition.

The petitioner has failed to overcome the director's finding pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(1)(i)(F).

PART III

The director determined that the petitioner failed to establish that his removal from the United States would result in extreme hardship to himself or to his child pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(1)(i)(G).

At the time of the director's decision, 8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(1)(i)(G) required the petitioner to establish that her removal would result in extreme hardship to herself or to her child. On October 28, 2000, the President approved enactment of the Violence Against Women Act, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, Division B, 114 Stat. 1464, 1491 (2000). Section 1503(b) amends section 204(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the Act so that an alien self-petitioner claiming to qualify for immigration as the battered spouse or child of a resident alien is no longer required to show that the self-petitioner's removal would impose extreme hardship on the self-petitioner or the self-petitioner's child. Id. section 1503(c), 114 Stat. at 1520-21. Pub. L. 106-386 does not specify an effective date for the amendments made by section 1503. This lack of an effective date strongly suggests that the amendments entered into force on the date of enactment. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 702 (2000); Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404 (1991).

As a general rule, an administrative agency must decide a case according to the law as it exists on the date of the decision. Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 710-11 (1974); United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, 110 (1801); Matter of Soriano, 21 I & N Dec. 516 (BIA 1996, AG 1997); Matter of Alarcon, 20 I & N Dec. 557 (BIA 1992). For immigrant visa petitions, however, the Board has held that, to establish a priority date, the beneficiary must have been fully qualified for the visa classification on the date of filing. Matter of Atembe, 19 I & N Dec. 427 (BIA 1986); Matter of Drigo, 18 I & N Dec. 223 (BIA 1982); Matter of Bardouille, 18 I & N Dec. 114 (BIA 1981). Even if the law changes in a way that may benefit the beneficiary, the appeal must be denied, without prejudice to the filing of a new petition, to ensure that the beneficiary does not gain an advantage over the beneficiaries of other petitions. Id.

Atembe, Drigo, and Bardouille each involved petitions under the family-based preference categories in section 203(a) of the Act. In this case, however, the beneficiary seeks classification as the

spouse of a citizen. INA section 204(a)(1)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. section 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii), as amended by Pub. L. No. 106-386, section 1503, supra. As immediate relatives, the spouses and children of citizens are not subject to the numerical limits on immigration, and do not need priority dates. INA section 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. section 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). The purpose of the Atembe, Drigo and Bardouille decisions would not be served by affirming the director's decision on this particular basis of the director's denial. For this reason, the director's objections have been overcome on this one issue (8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(1)(i)(G)).

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.