




BEI

U.S. Department of Justice
Immigration and Naturalization Service

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536




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FILE 
EAC 98 080 50715

Office: Vermont Service Center


Date: **OCT 18 2001**

IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:



APPLICATION: Petition for Special Immigrant Battered Spouse Pursuant to Section 204(a)(1)(B)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(B)(ii)

IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



Identifying data deleted to prevent clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

Robert P. Wiemann, Acting Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a native and citizen of Poland who is seeking classification as a special immigrant pursuant to section 204(a)(1)(B)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(B)(ii), as the battered spouse of a lawful permanent resident of the United States.

The director determined that the petitioner failed to establish eligibility for the benefit sought because she was divorced from her allegedly abusive lawful permanent resident spouse prior to the filing of the self-petition. The director, therefore, denied the petition.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner believes that the self-petition was wrongfully denied since she has an approved petition (Form I-130 Immigrant Petition for Relative) from the Service, and that she divorced her husband in 1997 after the filing of the I-130 petition in 1994.

There is no provision in the statute, however, that the Form I-360 self-petition may be "back-dated" to enable the petitioner to qualify for this benefit. The petitioner filed a self-petition, Form I-360, for benefits under section 204(a)(1)(B)(ii) of the Act as a battered spouse. This self-petition will, therefore, be adjudicated accordingly.

8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(1), in effect at the time the self-petition was filed, states, in pertinent part, that:

(i) A spouse may file a self-petition under section 204(a)(1)(A)(iii) or 204(a)(1)(B)(ii) of the Act for his or her classification as an immigrant relative or as a preference immigrant if he or she:

(A) Is the spouse of a citizen or lawful permanent resident of the United States;

(B) Is eligible for immigrant classification under section 201(b)(2)(A)(i) or 203(a)(2)(A) of the Act based on that relationship;

(C) Is residing in the United States;

(D) Has resided in the United States with the citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse;

(E) Has been battered by, or has been the subject of extreme cruelty perpetrated by, the

citizen or lawful permanent resident during the marriage; or is the parent of a child who has been battered by, or has been the subject of extreme cruelty perpetrated by, the citizen or lawful permanent resident during the marriage;

(F) Is a person of good moral character;

(G) Is a person whose deportation (removal) would result in extreme hardship to himself, herself, or his or her child; and

(H) Entered into the marriage to the citizen or lawful permanent resident in good faith.

The petition, Form I-360, shows that the petitioner entered the United States as a visitor on February 26, 1989. The petitioner married her lawful permanent resident spouse on November 17, 1994 at Brooklyn, New York. The petitioner subsequently petitioned for dissolution of the marriage, and the judgment of divorce became effective on August 11, 1997. On January 14, 1998, a self-petition was filed by the petitioner claiming eligibility as a special immigrant alien who has been battered by, or has been the subject of extreme cruelty perpetrated by, her United States citizen spouse during their marriage.

8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(1)(ii) states, in pertinent part:

The self-petitioning spouse must be legally married to the abuser when the petition is properly filed with the Service. A spousal self-petition must be denied if the marriage to the abuser legally ended through annulment, death, or divorce before that time. After the self-petition has been properly filed, the legal termination of the marriage will have no effect on the decision made on the self-petition.

The petitioner furnished with her self-petition a copy of a Judgment of Divorce entered by the court on August 11, 1997. The court, in this case, adjudged that the marriage between the plaintiff (petitioner) and the defendant "is dissolved by reason of the cruel and inhuman treatment of the Plaintiff by the Defendant." Because the petitioner was divorced from her permanent resident spouse prior to the filing of the self-petition on January 14, 1998, the director determined that the petitioner failed to establish eligibility for the benefit sought and denied the petition.

On October 28, 2000, the President approved enactment of the Violence Against Women Act, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, Division B, 114 Stat. 1464, 1491 (2000). Section 1503(c) amends section

204(a)(1)(B)(ii) of the Act so that an alien self-petitioner claiming to qualify for immigration as the battered spouse or child of a lawful permanent resident is no longer required to be married to the alleged abuser at the time the petition is filed as long as the petitioner can show a connection between the legal termination of the marriage within the past 2 years and battering or extreme cruelty by the permanent resident spouse. Id. section 1503(c), 114 Stat. at 1520-21. Pub. L. 106-386 does not specify an effective date for the amendments made by section 1503. This lack of an effective date strongly suggests that the amendments entered into force on the date of enactment. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 702 (2000); Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404 (1991).

As a general rule, an administrative agency must decide a case according to the law as it exists on the date of the decision. Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 710-11 (1974); United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, 110 (1801); Matter of Soriano, 21 I & N Dec. 516 (BIA 1996, AG 1997); Matter of Alarcon, 20 I & N Dec. 557 (BIA 1992). For immigrant visa petitions, however, the Board has held that, to establish a priority date, the beneficiary must have been fully qualified for the visa classification on the date of filing. Matter of Atembe, 19 I & N Dec. 427 (BIA 1986); Matter of Drigo, 18 I & N Dec. 223 (BIA 1982); Matter of Bardouille, 18 I & N Dec. 114 (BIA 1981). Even if the law changes in a way that may benefit the beneficiary, the appeal must be denied, without prejudice to the filing of a new petition, to ensure that the beneficiary does not gain an advantage over the beneficiaries of other petitions. Id. These decisions bind the Service. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g).

Although the divorce of the two parties prior to the filing of the petition is no longer a bar, and it appears that there may be a connection between the legal termination of the petitioner's marriage within the past two years and battering or extreme cruelty by her spouse, as required by Atembe, Drigo, and Bardouille, the appeal must be dismissed. This dismissal is without prejudice, however, to the filing of a new visa petition under section 204 of the Act, as amended by section 1503(c) of Pub. L. No. 106-386.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.