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Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE
425 Eye Street N.W.
BCIS, AAO, 20 Mass, 3/F
Washington, D.C. 20536

JUL 16 2003

File: Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER

Date:

IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:

Petition: Immigrant Petition for Special Immigrant Religious Worker Pursuant to Section 203(b)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4), as described at Section 101(a)(27)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(C)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (Bureau) where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. *Id.*

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.7.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The employment-based immigrant visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a church. It seeks to classify the beneficiary as a special immigrant religious worker pursuant to section 203(b)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4), to perform services as a musical director. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that the beneficiary had the requisite two years of continuous work experience as a musical director immediately preceding the filing date of the petition.

On appeal, counsel maintains that the petitioner has met its burden of proof.

Section 203(b)(4) of the Act provides classification to qualified special immigrant religious workers as described in section 101(a)(27)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(C), which pertains to an immigrant who:

(i) for at least 2 years immediately preceding the time of application for admission, has been a member of a religious denomination having a bona fide nonprofit, religious organization in the United States;

(ii) seeks to enter the United States--

(I) solely for the purpose of carrying on the vocation of a minister of that religious denomination,

(II) before October 1, 2003, in order to work for the organization at the request of the organization in a professional capacity in a religious vocation or occupation, or

(III) before October 1, 2003, in order to work for the organization (or for a bona fide organization which is affiliated with the religious denomination and is exempt from taxation as an organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Code of 1986) at the request of the organization in a religious vocation or occupation; and

(iii) has been carrying on such vocation, professional work, or other work continuously for at least the 2-year period described in clause (i).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(m)(1) echoes the above statutory language, and states, in pertinent part, that “[a]n alien, or any person in behalf of the alien, may file an I-360 visa petition for classification under section 203(b)(4) of the Act as a section 101(a)(27)(C) special immigrant religious worker. Such a petition may be filed by or for an alien, who (either abroad or in the United States) for at least the two years immediately preceding the filing of the petition has been a member of a religious denomination which has a bona fide nonprofit religious organization in the United States.” The

regulation indicates that the "religious workers must have been performing the vocation, professional work, or other work continuously (either abroad or in the United States) for at least the two-year period immediately preceding the filing of the petition."

8 C.F.R. § 204.5(m)(3) states, in pertinent part, that each petition for a religious worker must be accompanied by:

(ii) A letter from an authorized official of the religious organization in the United States which (as applicable to the particular alien) establishes:

(A) That, immediately prior to the filing of the petition, the alien has the required two years of membership in the denomination and the required two years of experience in the religious vocation, professional religious work, or other religious work.

The petition was filed on April 30, 2001. Therefore, the petitioner must establish that the beneficiary was continuously working as a musical director from May 1, 1999 to April 30, 2001. The petition indicated that the beneficiary last entered the United States on October 2, 1999 as a visitor, under a now-expired B-1 visa.

A letter from the petitioning church (the signer's name is illegible) states that the beneficiary "was appointed in October 1999 and has up to date dutifully performed his assigned roles with distinction." The petitioner submitted no evidence to support this claim. The petitioner has submitted a claimed breakdown of the beneficiary's duties, covering only Sundays and Saturdays plus a Friday night service. The breakdown does not show sufficient hours to represent full-time employment. The petitioner offers the general statement that the beneficiary performs other duties to make up the remaining hours per week.

Reverend [REDACTED] of Bethel Prayer Ministries International, Accra North, Ghana, states that the beneficiary "joined this Assembly in September, 1997 and became an active participant in most church programs." Rev. [REDACTED] attests to the beneficiary's membership in the denomination, and indicates that the beneficiary's "talent as a versatile musician was placed at the disposal of the church," but he does not state that the church in Ghana employed him as director of music or in any other capacity.

The record contains a copy of a card identifying the beneficiary as a "Microsoft Certified Professional," "certified since 2001." The card indicates that the beneficiary has very recently engaged in secular vocational training with no apparent relevance to his duties as musical director of a church.

The director denied the petition, citing a lack of evidence that the beneficiary had been continuously employed in a religious occupation for at least two years immediately prior to the filing date. In denying the petition, the director stated "[t]he beneficiary has a Social Security Number, however,

without W-2's and copies of the beneficiary's tax returns, there is no evidence that the beneficiary ever worked for the petitioner."

On appeal, counsel states that the beneficiary's "religious work done while in Ghana was in excess of the forty hour estimate for full time employment and that it is not the normal practice in that culture to pay wages for religious work performed for the Church, although workers may be afforded some remuneration in kind." If the beneficiary, as claimed, worked over forty hours per week in Ghana without compensation, it is not clear how the beneficiary supported himself during that time. It remains that a church official in Ghana has attested only to the beneficiary's membership in the church, with the vague assertion that the beneficiary made his services available.

Counsel asserts that, while the beneficiary does have a Social Security number, he has no lawful status in the United States and therefore the petitioner cannot legally employ him. Counsel maintains, nevertheless, that the beneficiary has worked for the petitioner since October 1999, receiving only room and board. Combined with the above assertions regarding church employment in Ghana, counsel appears to claim that the petitioner has worked full-time for churches for several years but has never been paid except for subsistence-level in-kind compensation. In this light, the beneficiary's recent Microsoft Professional Certification becomes a very relevant piece of evidence, as it strongly implies that the beneficiary has, while working for the church, actively explored alternative sources of income.

The petitioner submits several exhibits on appeal, consisting entirely of copies of previously submitted documents. The record contains no first-hand documentary evidence to support counsel's material claims on appeal. The assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Laureano*, 19 I&N Dec. 1, 3 (BIA 1983); *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980).

The legislative history of the religious worker provision of the Immigration Act of 1990 states that a substantial amount of case law had developed on religious organizations and occupations, the implication being that Congress intended that this body of case law be employed in implementing the provision, with the addition of "a number of safeguards . . . to prevent abuse." See H.R. Rep. No. 101-723, at 75 (1990).

The statute states at section 101(a)(27)(C)(iii) that the religious worker must have been carrying on the religious vocation, professional work, or other work continuously for the immediately preceding two years. Under former Schedule A (prior to the Immigration Act of 1990), a person seeking entry to perform duties for a religious organization was required to be engaged "principally" in such duties. "Principally" was defined as more than 50 percent of the person's working time. Under prior law a minister of religion was required to demonstrate that he/she had been "continuously" carrying on the vocation of minister for the two years immediately preceding the time of application. The term "continuously" was interpreted to mean that one did not take up any other occupation or vocation. *Matter of B*, 3 I&N Dec. 162 (CO 1948).

Later decisions on religious workers conclude that, if the worker is to receive no salary for church work, the assumption is that he/she would be required to earn a living by obtaining other

employment. *Matter of Bisulca*, 10 I&N Dec. 712 (Reg. Com. 1963) and *Matter of Sinha*, 10 I&N Dec. 758 (Reg. Com 1963).

The term “continuously” also is discussed in a 1980 decision where the Board of Immigration Appeals determined that a minister of religion was not continuously carrying on the vocation of minister when he was a full-time student who was devoting only nine hours a week to religious duties. *Matter of Varughese*, 17 I&N Dec. 399 (BIA 1980).

In line with these past decisions and the intent of Congress, it is clear, therefore that to be continuously carrying on the religious work means to do so on a full-time basis. That the qualifying work should be paid employment, not volunteering, is inherent in those past decisions which hold that, if the religious worker is not paid, the assumption is that he/she is engaged in other, secular employment. The idea that a religious undertaking would be unsalaried is applicable only to those in a religious vocation who in accordance with their vocation live in a clearly unsalaried environment, the primary examples in the regulations being nuns, monks, and religious brothers and sisters. Clearly, therefore, the qualifying two years of religious work must be full-time and salaried. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the intent of Congress.

The petitioner has provided no contemporaneous documentary evidence to establish that the beneficiary was continuously employed as a church musical director throughout the two years immediately preceding the filing of the petition. The record contains no indication that the beneficiary has ever been employed as a church musical director.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not sustained that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.