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U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services

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ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE
CIS, AAO, 20 Mass, 3/F
425 I Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20536

[REDACTED]

File: [REDACTED] Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER

Date: NOV 19 2003

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

Petition: Petition for Special Immigrant Religious Worker Pursuant to Section 203(b)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the "Act"), 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(4), as described at Section 101(a)(27)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(C)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: [REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. *Id.*

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.7.

Cindy M. Honey for
Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The immigrant visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now on appeal before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner seeks classification of the beneficiary as a special immigrant religious worker pursuant to section 203(b)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4), in order to perform services as a Sunday school teacher and translator at an unspecified salary.

The director determined that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary had been engaged continuously in a qualifying religious vocation or occupation for the two-year period immediately preceding the filing date of the petition.

On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary has been working for the petitioner on a volunteer basis for at least the two years preceding the filing date of the petition. Counsel further asserts that the petitioner is willing to employ the beneficiary as a full-time worker and is capable of paying him a salary.

Section 203(b)(4) of the Act provides classification to qualified special immigrant religious workers as described in section 101(a)(27)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(C), which pertains to an immigrant who:

(i) for at least 2 years immediately preceding the time of application for admission, has been a member of a religious denomination having a bona fide nonprofit, religious organization in the United States;

(ii) seeks to enter the United States--

(I) solely for the purpose of carrying on the vocation of a minister of that religious denomination,

(II) before October 1, 2008, in order to work for the organization at the request of the organization in a professional capacity in a religious vocation or occupation, or

(III) before October 1, 2008, in order to work for the organization (or for a bona fide organization which is affiliated with the religious denomination and is exempt from taxation as an organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Code of 1986) at the request of the organization in a religious vocation or occupation; and

(iii) has been carrying on such vocation, professional work, or other work continuously for at least the 2-year

period described in clause (i).

The petitioner in this matter is described as a Pentacostal church. It is a branch of the Cherubim & Seraphim Church, originally founded by St. Moses Orimolade Tunolase in 1926, with headquarters in Kaduna, Nigeria.

The petitioner is a native and citizen of Nigeria who was last admitted to the United States on December 2, 1998. On January 1, 1999, the beneficiary was granted permission to be employed as a nonimmigrant professional worker (P-1) by New Genesis International Promotion, with authorization valid through April 20, 1999. The record indicates that the beneficiary has remained in the United States longer than authorized and is currently residing in the United States in unlawful status.

The issue to be examined in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary had been engaged continuously in a qualifying religious vocation or occupation for the two-year period immediately preceding the filing date of the petition.

The regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(m)(1) state, in pertinent part, that:

All three types of religious workers must have been performing the vocation, professional work, or other work continuously (either abroad or in the United States) for at least the two-year period immediately preceding the filing of the petition.

The petition was filed on May 31, 2001. Therefore, the petitioner must establish that the beneficiary has been continuously engaged in a religious occupation for the two-year period beginning on May 31, 1999.

The legislative history of the religious worker provision of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990), states that a substantial amount of case law had developed on religious organizations and occupations, the implication being that Congress intended that this body of case law be employed in implementing the provision. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-723, at 75 (1990).

The statute states at Section 101(a)(27)(C)(iii) that the religious worker must have been carrying on the religious vocation, professional work, or other work continuously for the immediately preceding two years. Under Schedule A (prior to the Immigration Act of 1990), a person seeking entry to perform duties for a religious organization was required to be engaged "principally" in such duties. "Principally" was defined as more than 50 percent of the person's working time. Under prior law a minister of religion was required to demonstrate that he or she

had been "continuously" carrying on the vocation of minister for the two years immediately preceding the time of application. The term "continuously" was interpreted to mean that one did not take up any other occupation or vocation. *Matter of B*, 3 I&N Dec. 162 (CO 1948).

The term "continuously" is also discussed in a 1980 decision where the Board of Immigration Appeals determined that a minister of religion was not continuously carrying on the vocation of minister when he was a full-time student who was devoting only nine hours a week to religious studies. *Matter of Varughese*, 17 I&N Dec. 399 (BIA 1980).

Later decisions on religious workers conclude that, if the worker is to receive no salary for church work, the assumption is that he or she would be required to earn a living by obtaining other employment. *Matter of Bisulca*, 10 I&N Dec. 712 (Reg. Comm. 1963) and *Matter of Sinha*, 10 I&N Dec. 758 (Reg. Comm. 1963).

In line with these past decisions and the intent of Congress, it is clear, therefore, that to be continuously carrying on the religious work means to do so on a full-time basis. That the qualifying work should be paid employment, not volunteering, is inherent in those past decisions which hold that, if the religious worker is not paid, the assumption is that he or she is engaged in other, secular employment. The idea that a religious undertaking would be unsalaried is applicable only to those in a religious vocation who, in accordance with their vocation, live in a clearly unsalaried environment, the primary examples in the regulations being nuns, monks, and religious brothers and sisters. Clearly, therefore, the qualifying two years of religious work must be full-time and salaried. To be otherwise would be outside the intent of Congress.

In this case, the beneficiary has served the petitioner as an unpaid volunteer since joining the church in December 1998. For the reasons discussed above, the beneficiary's voluntary service for the petitioner does not constitute continuous qualifying experience in a religious occupation. Furthermore, the record reflects that during the two year period prior to the filing date of the petition, the beneficiary was employed, from January 9, 1999 through April 20, 1999, as a P-1 nonimmigrant by New Genesis International Promotion. The AAO is, therefore, unable to conclude that the beneficiary had been engaged in a full-time religious occupation during the two-year qualifying period. For this reason, the petition may not be approved.

Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has failed to sufficiently establish that: the petitioner has extended a qualifying job offer to the beneficiary; the petitioner has had the ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage since the filing date of the petition; the beneficiary is qualified to engage in a religious vocation or occupation; the beneficiary's activities for

the petitioning organization require any religious training or qualifications; or, that the position offered by the petitioner is a qualifying religious vocation or occupation. Since the appeal will be dismissed for the reason stated above, these issues need not be examined further.

In reviewing an immigrant visa petition, the AAO must consider the extent of the documentation furnished and the credibility of that documentation as a whole. The petitioner bears the burden of proof in an employment-based visa petition to establish that it will employ the beneficiary in the manner stated. See *Matter of Izdebska*, 12 I&N Dec. 54 (Reg. Comm. 1966); *Matter of B. Semerjian*, 11 I&N Dec. 751 (Reg. Comm. 1966).

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.