

C1


PUBLIC COPY

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

**identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy**

Citizenship and Immigration Services

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE
CIS, AAO, 20 Mass, 3/F
425 I Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20536




File:

Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER


Date: DEC 16 2003

IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:



Petition: Petition for Special Immigrant Religious Worker Pursuant to Section 203(b)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4), as described at Section 101(a)(27)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(C)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. *Id.*

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.7.

Cindy M. Gomez for
Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The immigrant visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is seeking classification of the beneficiary as a special immigrant religious worker pursuant to section 203(b)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4), in order to employ him as a minister at a weekly salary of \$450.

The director determined that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary had been continuously engaged in a qualifying vocation or occupation for the two-year period immediately preceding the filing date of the petition.

On appeal, counsel for the petitioner submits a brief asserting that the petitioner has provided evidence that the beneficiary has special training and experience as a minister and evidence of the beneficiary's work experience in the United States and Brazil. Counsel also asserts that the statute and regulations do not require that the beneficiary's prior work experience must have been paid employment.

Section 203(b)(4) of the Act provides classification to qualified special immigrant religious workers as described in section 101(a)(27)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(C), which pertains to an immigrant who:

(i) for at least 2 years immediately preceding the time of application for admission, has been a member of a religious denomination having a bona fide nonprofit, religious organization in the United States;

(ii) seeks to enter the United States--

(I) solely for the purpose of carrying on the vocation of a minister of that religious denomination,

(II) before October 1, 2008, in order to work for the organization at the request of the organization in a professional capacity in a religious vocation or occupation, or

(III) before October 1, 2008, in order to work for the organization (or for a bona fide organization which is affiliated with the religious denomination and is exempt from taxation as an organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) at the request of the organization in a religious vocation or occupation; and

(iii) has been carrying on such vocation, professional work, or other work continuously for at least the 2-year period described in clause (i).

The petitioner is described as a church having 80 members in its congregation and one salaried employee, a minister. The Form I-360, Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er) or Special Immigrant, reflects that the beneficiary is a native and citizen of Brazil who was last admitted to the United States on October 8, 1993 as a nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure. The petitioner failed to indicate the date the beneficiary's authorized period of admission expired, and whether he has ever worked in the United States without permission.

At issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner established that the beneficiary had been continuously engaged in a qualifying vocation or occupation for the two-year period immediately preceding the filing date of the petition.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(m)(1) states, in pertinent part, that:

All three types of religious workers must have been performing the vocation, professional work, or other work continuously (either abroad or in the United States) for at least the two-year period immediately preceding the filing of the petition.

In the case of special immigrant ministers, the alien must have been engaged solely as a minister of the religious denomination for the two-year period in order to qualify for the benefit sought and must intend to be engaged solely in the work of a minister of religion in the United States. *Matter of Faith Assembly Church*, 19 I&N 391 (Comm. 1986).

The petition was filed on April 16, 2001. Therefore, the petitioner must establish that the beneficiary had been continuously and solely carrying on the vocation of a minister of religion since at least April 16, 1999.

The legislative history of the religious worker provision of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990), states that a substantial amount of case law had developed on religious organizations and occupations, the implication being that Congress intended that this body of case law be employed in implementing the provision. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-723, at 75 (1990).

The statute states at Section 101(a)(27)(C)(iii) that the religious worker must have been carrying on the religious vocation, professional work, or other work continuously for the immediately preceding two years. Under Schedule A (prior to the

Immigration Act of 1990), a person seeking entry to perform duties for a religious organization was required to be engaged "principally" in such duties. "Principally" was defined as more than 50 percent of the person's working time. Under prior law a minister of religion was required to demonstrate that he or she had been "continuously" carrying on the vocation of minister for the two years immediately preceding the time of application. The term "continuously" was interpreted to mean that one did not take up any other occupation or vocation. *Matter of B*, 3 I&N Dec. 162 (CO 1948).

The term "continuously" is also discussed in a 1980 decision where the Board of Immigration Appeals determined that a minister of religion was not continuously carrying on the vocation of minister when he was a full-time student who was devoting only nine hours a week to religious studies. *Matter of Varughese*, 17 I&N Dec. 399 (BIA 1980).

Later decisions on religious workers conclude that, if the worker is to receive no salary for church work, the assumption is that he or she would be required to earn a living by obtaining other employment. *Matter of Bisulca*, 10 I&N Dec. 712 (Reg. Comm. 1963) and *Matter of Sinha*, 10 I&N Dec. 758 (Reg. Comm. 1963).

In line with these past decisions and the intent of Congress, it is clear, therefore, that to be continuously carrying on the religious work means to do so on a full-time basis. That the qualifying work should be paid employment, not volunteering, is inherent in those past decisions which hold that, if the religious worker is not paid, the assumption is that he or she is engaged in other, secular employment. The idea that a religious undertaking would be unsalaried is applicable only to those in a religious vocation who in accordance with their vocation live in a clearly unsalaried environment, the primary examples in the regulations being nuns, monks, and religious brothers and sisters. Clearly, therefore, the qualifying two years of religious work must be full-time and salaried. To be otherwise would be outside the intent of Congress.

After a thorough review of the record, it is concluded that the evidence submitted is insufficient to establish that the beneficiary was solely and continuously employed as a minister during the required two-year period. The petitioner failed to submit the beneficiary's 1999 and 2000 IRS Forms W-2 and corroborating evidence such as time sheets, weekly work schedules, payroll receipts, etc., detailing the beneficiary's work history during the entire two-year period. Therefore, the appeal will be dismissed.

Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has also failed to establish that: it qualifies as a bona fide non-profit religious organization; it has had the ability to pay the

beneficiary the proffered wage since the filing date of the petition; and, the beneficiary qualifies as an ordained minister.

In reviewing an immigrant visa petition, the AAO must consider the extent of the documentation furnished and the credibility of that documentation as a whole. The petitioner bears the burden of proof in an employment-based visa petition to establish that it will employ the beneficiary in the manner stated. See *Matter of Izdebska*, 12 I&N Dec. 54 (Reg. Comm. 1966); *Matter of B. Semerjian*, 11 I&N Dec. 751 (Reg. Comm. 1966).

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the petitioner has not sustained that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.