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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. A3042
Washington, DC 20529



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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FILE: [REDACTED]
WAC 01 151 51757

Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER

Date: MAR 16 2005

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Special Immigrant Religious Worker Pursuant to Section 203(b)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4), as described at Section 101(a)(27)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(C)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, initially approved the employment-based immigrant visa petition. Upon further review, the director determined that the petition had been approved in error. The director properly served the petitioner with a notice of intent to revoke, and subsequently revoked the approval of the petition. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The decision of the director will be withdrawn and the petition will be remanded for further action and consideration.

The petitioner is a mission organization. It seeks to classify the beneficiary as a special immigrant religious worker pursuant to section 203(b)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4), to perform services as an instructor and assistant director of religious education. The director determined that the petitioner is not a qualifying tax-exempt religious organization.

Section 205 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1155, states: "The Secretary of Homeland Security may, at any time, for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause, revoke the approval of any petition approved by him under section 204."

Regarding the revocation on notice of an immigrant petition under section 205 of the Act, the Board of Immigration Appeals has stated:

In *Matter of Estime*, . . . this Board stated that a notice of intention to revoke a visa petition is properly issued for "good and sufficient cause" where the evidence of record at the time the notice is issued, if unexplained and un rebutted, would warrant a denial of the visa petition based upon the petitioner's failure to meet his burden of proof. The decision to revoke will be sustained where the evidence of record at the time the decision is rendered, including any evidence or explanation submitted by the petitioner in rebuttal to the notice of intention to revoke, would warrant such denial.

Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 590 (BIA 1988) (citing *Matter of Estime*, 19 I&N 450 (BIA 1987)).

By itself, the director's realization that a petition was incorrectly approved is good and sufficient cause for the issuance of a notice of intent to revoke an immigrant petition. *Matter of Ho*. The approval of a visa petition vests no rights in the beneficiary of the petition, as approval of a visa petition is but a preliminary step in the visa application process. The beneficiary is not, by mere approval of the petition, entitled to an immigrant visa. *Id.* at 582.

8 C.F.R. § 204.5(m)(3)(i) requires the petitioner to submit evidence that the organization qualifies as a non-profit organization in the form of either:

(A) Documentation showing that it is exempt from taxation in accordance with section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as it relates to religious organizations (in appropriate cases, evidence of the organization's assets and methods of operation and the organization's papers of incorporation under applicable state law may be requested); or

(B) Such documentation as is required by the Internal Revenue Service to establish eligibility for exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as it relates to religious organizations.

According to documentation from the Internal Revenue Service, the petitioner's tax-exempt status derives from classification not under section 170(b)(1)(A)(i) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the Code), which pertains to churches, but rather under section 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) of the Code, which pertains to publicly-

supported organizations as described in section 170(c)(2) of the Code, "organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes," or for other specified purposes. This section refers in part to religious organizations, but to many types of secular organization as well.

Clearly, an organization that qualifies for tax exemption as a publicly supported organization under section 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) of the Code can be either religious or non-religious. The burden of proof is on the petitioner to establish that its classification under section 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) of the Code derives primarily from its religious character, rather than from its status as a publicly-supported charitable and/or educational institution.

The Code and its implementing regulations do not specifically define "religious organization," but IRS regulations indicate that the terms "religious organization" and "church" are not synonymous; for instance, 26 C.F.R. § 1.511-2(a)(3)(i) acknowledges the existence of "religious organizations" that are "not themselves churches." IRS Publication 1828, *Tax Guide for Churches and Religious Organizations*, also specifically states that the term "religious organizations" is *not* strictly limited to churches: "Religious organizations that are not churches typically include nondenominational ministries, interdenominational and ecumenical organizations, and other entities whose principal purpose is the study or advancement of religion." *Id.* at 2. The proper test, therefore, is not whether the intending employer is a church *per se*, but rather an entity whose principal purpose is the study or advancement of religion.

The organization can establish this by submitting documentation which establishes the religious nature and purpose of the organization, such as brochures or other literature describing the religious purpose and nature of the activities of the organization. The necessary documentation is described in a memorandum from William R. Yates, Associate Director of Operations, *Extension of the Special Immigrant Religious Worker Program and Clarification of Tax Exempt Status Requirements for Religious Organizations* (December 17, 2003):

- (1) A properly completed IRS Form 1023;
- (2) A properly completed Schedule A supplement, if applicable;
- (3) A copy of the organizing instrument of the organization that contains the appropriate dissolution clause required by the IRS and that specifies the purposes of the organization;
- (4) Brochures, calendars, flyers and other literature describing the religious purpose and nature of the activities of the organization.

The above list is consistent with the regulatory requirement at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(m)(3)(i)(B), cited above. The memorandum specifically states that the above materials are, collectively, the "minimum" documentation that can establish "the religious nature and purpose of the organization." Thus, for example, a petitioner cannot meet this burden by submitting only its articles of incorporation. That being said, it is important to note that item (2), Schedule A of Form 1023, is only required "if applicable." If Schedule A is not applicable in a given instance, then the petitioner's failure to submit Schedule A is not grounds for revocation.

Also, obviously, it is not enough merely for the petitioner to *submit* the documents listed above. The *content* of those documents must establish the religious purpose of the organization.

The director, prior to revoking the approval of the petition, made no effort to ascertain whether the petitioner's federal tax exemption derives from its religious character. The director simply revoked the approval of petition because the Internal Revenue Service classified the petitioner under section 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) rather than section 170(b)(1)(A)(i) of the Internal Revenue Code. This finding, the sole stated ground for revocation, relies on a flawed and impermissible interpretation of the regulations. The

director must, therefore, provide the petitioner with an opportunity to submit the materials outlined in that memorandum, and thereby demonstrate that its tax-exempt status derives primarily from its religious character.

With regard to counsel's arguments on appeal, we note that any comments by *state* authorities regarding the petitioner's tax-exempt status are irrelevant, as the proper standard is the petitioner's *federal* tax-exempt status.

Therefore, this matter will be remanded. The director may request any additional evidence deemed warranted and should allow the petitioner to submit additional evidence in support of its position within a reasonable period of time. As always in these proceedings, the burden of proof rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361.

ORDER: The director's decision is withdrawn. The petition is remanded to the director for further action in accordance with the foregoing and entry of a new decision which, if adverse to the petitioner, is to be certified to the Administrative Appeals Office for review.