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U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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FILE: WAC 03 212 50337 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: OCT 06 2006

IN RE: Petitioner: [Redacted]
Beneficiary: [Redacted]

PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The service center director denied the nonimmigrant visa petition and the matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. The petition will be denied.

The petitioner is a computer software design and integration firm that seeks to employ the beneficiary as a computer programmer. The petitioner endeavors to classify the beneficiary as a nonimmigrant worker in a specialty occupation pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).

The director denied the petition and determined that the petitioner had failed to provide evidence of an approved Labor Condition Application (LCA) for the beneficiary's work location. The director also found that without contracts, the petitioner had not established that it would employ the beneficiary in a specialty occupation.

Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), provides, in part, for the classification of qualified nonimmigrant aliens who are coming temporarily to the United States to perform services in a specialty occupation.

Section 101(a)(15)(H) of the Act defines an H-1B nonimmigrant as:

[A]n alien who is coming temporarily to the United States to perform services . . . in a specialty occupation . . . and with respect to whom the Secretary of Labor determines and certifies to the Attorney General that the intending employer has filed with the Secretary of Labor an application under section 1182(n)(1)

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(B)(1) provides that the petitioner shall submit with an H-1B petition "a certification from the Secretary of Labor that the petitioner has filed a labor condition application with the Secretary." The regulations further provide:

Before filing a petition for H-1B classification in a specialty occupation the petitioner shall obtain a certification from the Department of Labor that it has filed a labor condition application in the occupational specialty in which the alien(s) will be employed.

8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(i)(B)(1).

Section 214(i)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1), defines the term "specialty occupation" as an occupation that requires:

- (A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and
- (B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

The term "specialty occupation" is further defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) as:

[A]n occupation which requires theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge in fields of human endeavor including, but not limited to, architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology, and the arts, and which requires the attainment of

a bachelor's degree or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), to qualify as a specialty occupation, the position must meet one of the following criteria:

- (1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position;
- (2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree;
- (3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or
- (4) The nature of the specific duties are so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree.

Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) interprets the term "degree" in the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered position.

The LCA submitted by the petitioner in conjunction with the Form I-129 indicates that the beneficiary's work location will be in Santa Clara, CA. In response to the director's request for a contract for the work location in Santa Clara, CA, the petitioner submitted a second LCA certified on July 15, 2002 for Lansing, MI. The petitioner also submitted a work order from [REDACTED] which indicates that the beneficiary will work at [REDACTED] in Little Rock, AR. On appeal the petitioner states that although the corporate office of [REDACTED] is in Little Rock, AR, the project to which the beneficiary is being assigned is in Lansing, MI and covered by the aforementioned LCA. The petitioner did not submit a statement from [REDACTED] stating that while its corporate offices are located in Little Rock, AR, the beneficiary will actually work in Lansing, MI. Nor did the petitioner submit a statement from [REDACTED] explaining why the work order specifically states that the beneficiary will work in Little Rock, AR when he was really to work in Lansing, MI. The petitioner's uncorroborated statement is insufficient to explain this discrepancy. Simply going on the record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). The director's decision in this regard will not be disturbed.

The director also found that the petitioner had failed to submit contracts establishing that it would employ the beneficiary in a specialty occupation. The AAO agrees. The petitioner is an employment contractor, in that it will place the beneficiary in multiple work locations pursuant to third party contracts. The petitioner bears the burden of establishing that the beneficiary will be coming to the United States to perform services in a specialty occupation. The court in *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2000) held that for the purpose of determining whether a proffered position is a specialty occupation, the petitioner acting as an employment contractor is merely a "token employer," while the entity for which the services are to be

performed is the “more relevant employer.” The *Defensor* court recognized that evidence of the client companies’ job requirements is critical where the work is to be performed for entities other than the petitioner. The court held that the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service had reasonably interpreted the statute and regulations as requiring the petitioner to produce evidence that a proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation on the basis of the requirements imposed by the entities using the beneficiary’s services.

The petitioner provided a statement detailing the duties to be performed by the beneficiary. The petitioner did not, however, provide evidence from its client [REDACTED] for whom the beneficiary would actually perform services, detailing the specific duties to be performed by the beneficiary. As the record does not contain any documentation that establishes the specific duties the beneficiary would perform under contract for the petitioner’s client, the AAO cannot analyze whether these duties would require at least a baccalaureate degree or the equivalent in a specific specialty, as required for classification as a specialty occupation. Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the proposed position qualifies as specialty occupation under any of the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) or that the beneficiary would be coming temporarily to the United States to perform the duties of a specialty occupation pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1)(B)(I). For this additional reason, the petition may not be approved.

The petitioner has not established that it will employ the beneficiary in a specialty occupation or that it has an LCA valid for the place of employment. Thus the director’s decision will not be disturbed.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has failed to sustain that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The petition is denied.