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FILE: WAC 07 131 53167 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: **MAR 17 2008**

IN RE: Petitioner: [Redacted]
Beneficiary: [Redacted]

PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Robert P. Wiemann".

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The director of the service center denied the nonimmigrant visa petition and the matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. The petition will be denied.

The petitioner is a hair salon that seeks to employ the beneficiary as a hair stylist. The petitioner, therefore, endeavors to classify the beneficiary as a nonimmigrant worker in a specialty occupation pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). The director denied the petition because the proffered position is not a specialty occupation.

The record of proceeding before the AAO contains: (1) the Form I-129 and supporting documentation; (2) the director's denial letter; and (3) the Form I-290B, with counsel's brief. The AAO reviewed the record in its entirety before reaching its decision.

The issue before the AAO is whether the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation. To meet its burden of proof in this regard, the petitioner must establish that the job it is offering to the beneficiary meets the following statutory and regulatory requirements.

Section 214(i)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1), defines the term "specialty occupation" as an occupation that requires:

- (A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and
- (B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

The term "specialty occupation" is further defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) as:

An occupation which requires theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge in fields of human endeavor including, but not limited to, architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology, and the arts, and which requires the attainment of a bachelor's degree or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), to qualify as a specialty occupation, the position must meet one of the following criteria:

- (1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position;
- (2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular

position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree;

- (3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or
- (4) The nature of the specific duties is so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree.

Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) consistently interprets the term “degree” in the above criteria to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered position.

To determine whether a particular job qualifies as a specialty occupation, CIS does not simply rely on a position’s title. The specific duties of the proffered position, combined with the nature of the petitioning entity’s business operations, are factors to be considered. CIS must examine the ultimate employment of the alien, and determine whether the position qualifies as a specialty occupation. *Cf. Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F. 3d 384 (5th Cir. 2000). The critical element is not the title of the position nor an employer’s self-imposed standards, but whether the position actually requires the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in the specific specialty as the minimum for entry into the occupation, as required by the Act.

The petitioner seeks the beneficiary’s services as a hair stylist. Evidence of the beneficiary’s duties includes: counsel and the petitioner’s March 31, 2007 letters in support of the petition. As stated by the petitioner, the proposed duties are as follows:

Use his expertise in the “mekwa” technique. Style customers. Exercise good communication skills for the purpose of good customer service. Oversee the tasks of blow dryers, colorists, and washers to ensure quality control. Maintain the cleanliness and general hygiene of his work area and tools in compliance with industry standards.

The director found that the proposed hair stylist duties do not require a bachelor’s degree. Citing the Department of Labor’s (DOL) *Occupational Outlook Handbook (Handbook)*, the director noted that the minimum requirement for entry into the position was not a baccalaureate degree or its equivalent in a specific specialty. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to establish any of the criteria found at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A).

On appeal, counsel states, in part, that the proffered “specialist ‘mekwa’ stylist” position qualifies as a specialty occupation, as the State of Illinois requires its hair stylists to complete a two-year associate’s degree, 1500 hours of training, and a score of 75% or better on the licensure exam. Counsel asserts that this requirement is the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree. Counsel also asserts that the proposed duties are so complex and unique as to require a degree. Counsel cites the *O*Net* to state that the position of barber

requires on-the-job experience and an associate's degree, and some positions require a bachelor's degree. As supporting documentation, counsel submits an affidavit from a similar business specializing in "mekwa" hairstyling.

Preliminarily, counsel's interpretation of the *O*Net* is not persuasive that the proffered position is a specialty occupation. The *O*Net* does not indicate that a particular occupation requires the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree, or its equivalent, in a specific specialty as a minimum for entry into the occupation. The *O*Net* provides only general information regarding the tasks and work activities associated with a particular occupation, as well as the education, training, and experience required to perform the duties of that occupation. The SVP rating does not describe how those years are to be divided among training, formal education, and experience, nor specifies the particular type of degree, if any, that a position would require.

Upon review of the record, the petitioner has established none of the four criteria outlined in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). Therefore, the proffered position is not a specialty occupation.

The AAO turns first to the criteria at 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(1) and (2): a baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is the normal minimum requirement for entry into the particular position; a degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations; or a particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree. Factors often considered by CIS when determining these criteria include: whether the *Handbook* reports that the industry requires a degree; whether the industry's professional association has made a degree a minimum entry requirement; and whether letters or affidavits from firms or individuals in the industry attest that such firms "routinely employ and recruit only degreed individuals." See *Shanti, Inc. v. Reno*, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1165 (D. Minn. 1999)(quoting *Hird/Blaker Corp. v. Sava*, 712 F. Supp. 1095, 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)).

The AAO routinely consults the *Handbook* for its information about the duties and educational requirements of particular occupations. The AAO does not find that the proffered position is a specialty occupation. A review of the Barbers, Cosmetologists, and Other Personal Appearance Workers occupation category in the *Handbook*, 2006-07 edition, finds a discussion of hairstylist positions. No evidence in the *Handbook* indicates that a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, is required for hairstylist positions. Counsel's assertion that the hair stylist requirements in the State of Illinois, which include the completion of a two-year associate's degree, 1500 hours of training, and a score of 75% or better on the licensure exam, are the equivalent of a bachelor's degree, is noted. Without documentary evidence to support the claim, however, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Laureano*, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). Accordingly, the petitioner has not established the proffered position as a specialty occupation under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(iii)(A)(1).

Regarding parallel positions in the petitioner's industry, counsel submits an affidavit from the owner of a similar business, who states, in part, that the qualifications of a "mekwa" hair stylist is graduation from an

Egyptian beauty school and 1500 hours of hands-on service. The writer does not state that the position requires a bachelor's degree, thereby confirming the position of the DOL in its *Handbook*, namely that there is no requirement of a baccalaureate degree in a specific specialty for a hairstylist position. Further, although the writer additionally states that he has filed many H-1B petitions for this position, he does not submit any evidence in support of his assertion. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

The record does not include any evidence from firms, individuals, or professional associations regarding an industry standard. In the alternative, the petitioner may show that the proffered position is so complex or unique that only an individual with a degree can perform the work associated with the position. In the instant petition, the petitioner has not identified any complex or unique tasks pertinent to the petitioner's business that would elevate the position to one that requires the knowledge associated with a bachelor's degree in a specific discipline. The petitioner has failed to establish the proffered position as a specialty occupation under either prong of the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2).

The AAO now turns to the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(3) – the employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position. Counsel submits an affidavit from the petitioner's president stating that she hires only hairstylists with a degree from an Egyptian beauty school and many hours of related experience. Again, she does not state that the position requires a bachelor's degree, thereby confirming the position of the DOL in its *Handbook*, namely that there is no requirement of a baccalaureate degree in a specific specialty for a hairstylist position. Moreover, even if the petitioner's president had asserted that the proffered position requires a related bachelor's degree or an equivalent thereof, the petitioner's creation of a position with a perfunctory bachelor's degree requirement will not mask the fact that the position is not a specialty occupation. CIS must examine the ultimate employment of the alien, and determine whether the position qualifies as a specialty occupation. *Cf. Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F. 3d 384 (5th Cir. 2000). The critical element is not the title of the position or an employer's self-imposed standards, but whether the position actually requires the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in the specific specialty as the minimum for entry into the occupation as required by the Act. To interpret the regulations any other way would lead to absurd results: if CIS were limited to reviewing a petitioner's self-imposed employment requirements, then any alien with a bachelor's degree could be brought into the United States to perform a menial, non-professional, or an otherwise non-specialty occupation, so long as the employer required all such employees to have baccalaureate or higher degrees. *See id.* at 388. Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish the referenced criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(3) based on its normal hiring practices.

Finally, the AAO turns to the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(4) – the nature of the specific duties is so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree.

Counsel states, on appeal, that the proposed duties are so complex and unique as to require a degree. The petitioner, however, has not established that they exceed in scope, specialization, or complexity those usually performed by hairstylists, an occupational category that does not require a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty. To the extent that they are depicted in the record, the duties do not appear so specialized and complex as to require the highly specialized knowledge associated with a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty. Therefore, the evidence does not establish that the proffered position is a specialty occupation under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(4).

As related in the discussion above, the petitioner has failed to establish that the proffered position is a specialty occupation.

Beyond the decision of the director, the beneficiary does not appear to be qualified to perform the duties of a specialty occupation. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D), the AAO does not accept the conclusion, reached by counsel and the petitioner, that the beneficiary has attained the equivalent of a bachelor's degree. There is no evaluation of the beneficiary's education in the record of proceeding and therefore, the petitioner cannot equate the beneficiary's credentials to a United States bachelor's degree under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(C)(4). Thus, the beneficiary does not qualify to perform the duties of a specialty occupation. For this additional reason, the petition may not be approved.

An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a *de novo* basis).

The petition will be denied and the appeal dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not sustained that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The petition is denied.