




U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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FILE: SRC 05 199 51757 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: **JAN 22 2007**

IN RE: Petitioner: [Redacted]
Beneficiary: [Redacted]

PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The director of the service center denied the nonimmigrant visa petition and the matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. The petition will be denied.

The petitioner is an e-commerce and business consulting company that seeks to employ the beneficiary as a systems analyst. The petitioner, therefore, endeavors to classify the beneficiary as a nonimmigrant worker in a specialty occupation pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).

The director denied the petition on the basis of her determination that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and the beneficiary as of the filing date and failed to establish that it would employ the beneficiary in a specialty occupation.

The record of proceeding before the AAO contains (1) the Form I-129 and supporting documentation; (2) the director's request for additional evidence; (3) the petitioner's response to the director's request; (4) the director's denial letter; and (5) the Form I-290B and supporting documentation, including the appellate brief. The AAO reviewed the record in its entirety before issuing its decision.

Section 214(i)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1), defines the term "specialty occupation" as an occupation that requires:

- (A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and
- (B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

The term "specialty occupation" is further defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) as:

[A]n occupation which requires theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge in fields of human endeavor including, but not limited to, architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology, and the arts, and which requires the attainment of a bachelor's degree or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), to qualify as a specialty occupation, the position must meet one of the following criteria:

- (1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position;
- (2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree;
- (3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or

- (4) The nature of the specific duties is so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree.

Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) interprets the term "degree" in the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proposed position.

The term "employer" is defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii):

United States employer means a person, firm, corporation, contractor, or other association, or organization in the United States which:

- (1) Engages a person to work within the United States;
- (2) Has an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of any such employee; and
- (3) Has an Internal Revenue Service Tax identification number.

The director found that the petitioner had not established an employment relationship with the beneficiary as of the filing date of the petition. The record contains an employment agreement entered into between the petitioner and the beneficiary dated after the petition's filing date. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iv)(B) provides that an employment contract between the petitioner and the beneficiary shall be provided, or a summary of the terms of oral agreement under which the beneficiary will be employed if there is no written contract. The petition and letter of support generally outline the terms of the proposed employment to pay the beneficiary the rate of \$40.00 annually for a three-year period. Thus, as of the filing date, the petitioner has established a proposed employment agreement with the beneficiary. The evidence of record establishes that the petitioner will act as the beneficiary's employer in that it will hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of the beneficiary.¹ See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii).

The evidence of record includes an employment agreement between the petitioner and the beneficiary, which indicates that the petitioner would act as the beneficiary's employer. The petitioner's August 24, 2005 response to the director's request for additional evidence stated that the beneficiary would be hired as an employee, not an independent contractor; the petitioner emphasized that it would be the beneficiary's actual employer. The record also contains copies of Forms W-2 for several of the petitioner's employees, submitted as evidence that the petitioner pays its other employees and would therefore pay the beneficiary as well. In view of this evidence, the AAO finds that the petitioner will be the employer of the beneficiary and withdraws the director's decision to the contrary.

The director found that the petitioner had not established that as of the filing date it had sufficient work to employ the beneficiary in a specialty occupation.

¹ See also Memorandum from Michael L. Aytes, Assistant Commissioner, INS Office of Adjudications, *Interpretation of the Term "Itinerary" Found in 8 C.F.R. 214.2(h)(2)(i)(B) as it Relates to the H-1B Nonimmigrant Classification*, HQ 70/6.2.8 (December 29, 1995).

In its June 6, 2005 letter of support, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary would work in Houston, Texas and Nashville, Tennessee. According to the August 15, 2005 Employment Agreement between the petitioner and the beneficiary, the beneficiary would work at the petitioner's business premises or any other places required by the petitioner.

The evidence of record establishes that the petitioner is an employment contractor in that the petitioner will place the beneficiary at work locations to perform services established by contractual agreements with third-party organizations. Pursuant to the language at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(B), employers must submit an itinerary with the dates and locations of employment if the beneficiary's duties will be performed in more than one location.

While the Aytes memorandum cited at footnote 1 broadly interprets the term "itinerary," it provides CIS the discretion to require that the petitioner submit the dates and locations of the proposed employment. In her request for additional evidence, the director requested a copy of the contract(s) under which the beneficiary would provide services, identifying the place of employment, supervision, conditions of employment, and duties. Upon review, the director properly exercised her discretion to request contracts establishing an itinerary of employment. In response, the petitioner submitted an award/contract to the petitioner from the U.S.D.O.T./RITA/VOLPE Center, effective August 9, 2005, and a "Request for Quote" for the order dated July 15, 2005 for a one-year project, if all options were exercised. As the "Request for Quote" does not extend beyond one year, the record does not contain an itinerary of employment for the three-year period of requested employment.² Absent such information, the petitioner has not established that it has three years' worth of H-1B-level work for the beneficiary to perform. The evidence contained in the record does not satisfy 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(B) as it does not cover the entire period of the beneficiary's employment by the petitioner. Thus, the petitioner has not complied with the requirements at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(B) and the petition cannot be approved.

The record also does not establish that the proposed position is a specialty occupation. The court in *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F. 3d 384 (5th Cir. 2000) held that for the purpose of determining whether a proposed position is a specialty occupation, the petitioner acting as an employment contractor is merely a "token employer," while the entity for which the services are to be performed is the "more relevant employer." The *Defensor* court recognized that evidence of the client companies' job requirements is critical where the work is to be performed for entities other than the petitioner. The court held that the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service had reasonably interpreted the statute and regulations as requiring the petitioner to produce evidence that a proposed position qualifies as a specialty occupation on the basis of the requirements imposed by the entities using the beneficiary's services.

The description/statement attached to the Request for Quote contains 23 pages of proposed IT services that the petitioner will provide to the U.S.D.O.T./RITA/VOLPE Center for the one-year period. The record does not contain any documentation that establishes the specific duties the beneficiary would perform under contract for the petitioner's clients beyond the one-year period. Thus, the AAO cannot analyze whether the duties to be performed in years two and three would require at least a baccalaureate degree or the equivalent in a specific specialty, as required for classification as a specialty occupation. Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the proposed position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation under any of the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(A) or that the beneficiary would

² As noted by Assistant Commissioner Aytes in the cited 1995 memorandum, "[t]he purpose of this particular regulation is to [e]nsure that alien beneficiaries accorded H status have an actual job offer and are not coming to the United States for speculative employment."

be coming temporarily to the United States to perform the duties of a specialty occupation pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1)(B)(I). The petition, therefore, may not be approved.

Beyond the decision of the director, the certified labor condition application (LCA) is not valid for the location of employment. The LCA lists Houston, Texas and Nashville, Tennessee as the proposed work locations. The USDOT project that the petitioner states the beneficiary will work on is located in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The description of work indicates that the services are to be provided on site. The petitioner does not establish any other proposed work locations. Thus, the LCA is not valid for the location of intended employment. For this additional reason, the petition may not be approved.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not sustained that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The petition is denied.