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U.S. Citizenship
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FILE:



Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER


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IN RE:

Petitioner:

Beneficiary:



PETITION: Petition for Alien Fiancé(e) Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The nonimmigrant visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center, and is now on appeal before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a citizen of the United States who seeks to classify the beneficiary, a native and citizen of Algeria, as the fiancé of a United States citizen pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K).

The director denied the petition after determining that the petitioner had not offered documentation evidencing that she and the beneficiary had personally met within two years before the date of filing the petition, as required by section 214(d) of the Act, and that the petitioner had not established that compliance with the meeting requirement would result in extreme hardship to the petitioner. *Decision of the Director*, dated June 21, 2004.

Section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K), provides nonimmigrant classification to an alien who:

- (i) is the fiancé(e) of a U.S. citizen and who seeks to enter the United States solely to conclude a valid marriage with that citizen within 90 days after admission;
- (ii) has concluded a valid marriage with a citizen of the United States who is the petitioner, is the beneficiary of a petition to accord a status under section 201(b)(2)(A)(i) that was filed under section 204 by the petitioner, and seeks to enter the United States to await the approval of such petition and the availability to the alien of an immigrant visa; or
- (iii) is the minor child of an alien described in clause (i) or (ii) and is accompanying, or following to join, the alien.

Section 214(d) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(d), states, in pertinent part, that a fiancé(e) petition:

. . . shall be approved only after satisfactory evidence is submitted by the petitioner to establish that the parties have previously met in person within two years before the date of filing the petition, have a bona fide intention to marry, and are legally able and actually willing to conclude a valid marriage in the United States within a period of ninety days after the alien's arrival. . . .

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(2), the petitioner may be exempted from this requirement for a meeting if it is established that compliance would:

- (1) result in extreme hardship to the petitioner; or
- (2) that compliance would violate strict and long-established customs of the beneficiary's foreign culture or social practice, as where marriages are traditionally arranged by the parents of the contracting parties and the prospective bride and groom are prohibited from meeting subsequent to the arrangement and prior to the wedding day. In addition to establishing that the required meeting would be a violation of custom or practice, the petitioner must also establish that any and all other aspects of the traditional arrangements have been or will be met in accordance with the custom or practice.

The regulation at section 214.2 does not define what may constitute extreme hardship to the petitioner. Therefore, each claim of extreme hardship must be judged on a case-by-case basis taking into account the totality of the petitioner's circumstances. Generally, a director looks at whether the petitioner can demonstrate the existence of circumstances that are (1) not within the power of the petitioner to control or change, and (2) likely to last for a considerable duration or the duration cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.

The petitioner filed the Petition for Alien Fiancé(e) (Form I-129F) with Citizenship and Immigration Services on April 6, 2004. Therefore, the petitioner and the beneficiary were required to have met during the period that began on April 6, 2002 and ended on April 6, 2004.

On the Form I-129F petition, the petitioner indicated that she and the beneficiary had not met. The petitioner submitted a letter stating that she has a chronically ill child with a blood disorder and explained that it is family custom not to allow a female to travel alone for long distances.

On appeal, the petitioner submits a letter stating that it would impose difficulties on her to travel outside of the country owing to her son's illness and her inability to find sufficient child care. The petitioner states that it would be difficult for a babysitter to recognize the onset of complications in her child and thereby compromise the ability to seek medical care quickly in case of an emergency. *Letter from Karen Jensen Mordecai RN, BSN*, dated June 29, 2004. The petitioner also submits a letter from a physician treating the petitioner's child. The letter from the physician states that the petitioner's son suffers from hereditary spherocytosis. The letter indicates that the disorder has rapid onsets of complications and requires vigilant assessments of symptoms which the petitioner is capable of performing owing to her training as a nurse. *Letter from Terry E. Pick, MD*, dated June 30, 2004.

The AAO notes that although section 214(d) of the Act requires the petitioner and the beneficiary to meet, it does not require the petitioner to travel to the beneficiary's home country. The record on appeal does not demonstrate that the petitioner and the beneficiary explored options for a meeting beyond the petitioner traveling to Algeria or France, including, but not limited to the beneficiary traveling to meet the petitioner in the United States or a bordering country. The inability of the petitioner to travel to the home country of the beneficiary standing alone does not warrant a finding of extreme hardship to the petitioner.

The AAO acknowledges that the petitioner's child suffers from a hereditary blood disorder and is known to suffer complications, which require immediate medical attention. *See Letter from Terry E. Pick, MD*. The AAO notes that the record fails to establish that the petitioner is the only person able to provide adequate care to her child. The record demonstrates that the petitioner is a nurse and therefore more qualified than the average person to detect complications experienced by her son, however the record also reflects that the petitioner maintains employment and therefore, is separated from her child on a daily basis. The record fails to establish that the petitioner's son is unable to receive care from another adult in the absence of the petitioner. Therefore, the record fails to demonstrate that the temporary absence of the petitioner would impose hardship on the petitioner by compromising the health of her child.

The evidence of record does not establish that the petitioner and the beneficiary met as required. Taking into account the totality of the circumstances as the petitioner has presented them, the AAO does not find that compliance with the meeting requirement would result in extreme hardship to the petitioner or would violate

strict and long-established customs of the beneficiary's foreign culture or social practice. Therefore, the appeal will be dismissed.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(2), the denial of the petition is without prejudice. The petitioner may file a new Form I-129F petition on the beneficiary's behalf when sufficient evidence is available.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. *See* Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.