

Identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. A3042
Washington, DC 20529

PUBLIC COPY



**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**

DG

FILE:

[REDACTED]
EAC 04 021 53855

Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER

Date: **MAY 16 2005**

IN RE:

Petitioner: [REDACTED]

Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Petition for Alien Fiancé(e) Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The nonimmigrant visa petition was denied by the Acting Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now on appeal before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a naturalized citizen of the United States who seeks to classify the beneficiary, a native and citizen of Nigeria, as the fiancé of a United States citizen pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K).

The acting director denied the petition after determining that the petitioner and the beneficiary had not personally met within the two years immediately preceding the date of filing of the petition, as required by section 214(d) of the Act. *Decision of the Director*, dated April 21, 2004.

Section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K), provides nonimmigrant classification to an alien who:

- (i) is the fiancé(e) of a U.S. citizen and who seeks to enter the United States solely to conclude a valid marriage with that citizen within 90 days after admission;
- (ii) has concluded a valid marriage with a citizen of the United States who is the petitioner, is the beneficiary of a petition to accord a status under section 201(b)(2)(A)(i) that was filed under section 204 by the petitioner, and seeks to enter the United States to await the approval of such petition and the availability to the alien of an immigrant visa; or
- (iii) is the minor child of an alien described in clause (i) or (ii) and is accompanying, or following to join, the alien.

Section 214(d) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(d), states, in pertinent part, that a fiancé(e) petition:

. . . shall be approved only after satisfactory evidence is submitted by the petitioner to establish that the parties have previously met in person within two years before the date of filing the petition, have a bona fide intention to marry, and are legally able and actually willing to conclude a valid marriage in the United States within a period of ninety days after the alien's arrival. . . .

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(2), the petitioner may be exempted from this requirement for a meeting if it is established that compliance would:

- (1) result in extreme hardship to the petitioner; or
- (2) that compliance would violate strict and long-established customs of the beneficiary's foreign culture or social practice, as where marriages are traditionally arranged by the parents of the contracting parties and the prospective bride and groom are prohibited from meeting subsequent to the arrangement and prior to the wedding day. In addition to establishing that the required meeting would be a violation of custom or practice, the petitioner must also establish that any and all other aspects of the traditional arrangements have been or will be met in accordance with the custom or practice.

The regulation does not define what may constitute extreme hardship to the petitioner. Therefore, each claim of extreme hardship must be judged on a case-by-case basis taking into account the totality of the petitioner's circumstances. Generally, a director looks at whether the petitioner can demonstrate the existence of circumstances that are (1) not within the power of the petitioner to control or change, and (2) likely to last for a considerable duration or the duration cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.

The petitioner filed the Petition for Alien Fiancé(e) (Form I-129F) with Citizenship and Immigration Services on November 5, 2003. Therefore, the petitioner and the beneficiary were required to have met during the period that began on November 5, 2001 and ended on November 5, 2003.

At the time of filing, the petitioner indicated that she had not seen her fiancé during the preceding two years as she was a single parent and the sole source of income for her minor children, and could not travel to Nigeria. Therefore, the evidence of record does not establish that the petitioner has complied with the meeting requirement found at section 214(d) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(d).

On appeal, the petitioner asks that she be exempted from the meeting requirement. She submits a personal statement asserting that a former husband who has returned to Nigeria has threatened to harm her if she travels there. A letter from the petitioner's 18 year-old daughter also states that her father has told her he will harm the petitioner if she returns to Nigeria.

The record fails to establish the petitioner's eligibility for an exemption under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(2). Although the petitioner, at the time of filing, stated that she was unable to travel to Nigeria between 2000-April 2003 because of her parental obligations, such obligations cannot exempt her from the meeting requirement under section 214(d) of the Act. While the statute requires the petitioner and the beneficiary to meet, it does not require that meeting to occur in the beneficiary's home country. The record, however, does not demonstrate that the petitioner and the beneficiary explored options for a meeting beyond the petitioner traveling to Nigeria, including, but not limited to the beneficiary traveling to meet the petitioner in the United States or a country bordering the United States

Subsequent to April 2003, the petitioner states she has been afraid to travel to Nigeria because of threats made against her by her former husband. Again, like the parental obligations discussed above, these threats do not support an exemption from the meeting requirement. As already noted, the language of section 214(d) of the Act does not require the petitioner to have traveled to Nigeria between November 5, 2001 and November 5, 2003 to meet the beneficiary, only to have met him at some location.

Taking into account the totality of the circumstances, as presented by the petitioner, the AAO does not find that compliance with the meeting requirement would have resulted in extreme hardship to the petitioner or would have violated any strict and long-established customs of the beneficiary's foreign culture or social practice, as required for an exemption from the meeting requirement at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(2). Therefore, the appeal will be dismissed.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(2), the denial of the petition is without prejudice. The petitioner may file a new I-129F petition in the beneficiary's behalf so that a new two-year period in which the parties are required to have met will apply.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.