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U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

DL



FILE: [Redacted]  
EAC 04 192 50196

Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER

Date: **SEP 06 2005**

IN RE: Petitioner: [Redacted]  
Beneficiary: [Redacted]

PETITION: Petition for Alien Fiancé(e) Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The nonimmigrant visa petition was denied by the Acting Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now on appeal before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a naturalized citizen of the United States who seeks to classify the beneficiary, a native and citizen of Laos, as the fiancée of a United States citizen pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K).

The acting director denied the petition after determining that the petitioner had failed to establish that he and the beneficiary had personally met within the two-year period preceding the filing of the petition, as required by section 214(d) of the Act. She also determined that the petitioner had not established eligibility for an exemption from the meeting requirement under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(2). *Decision of the Acting Director*, dated October 4, 2004.

Section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K), provides nonimmigrant classification to an alien who:

- (i) is the fiancé(e) of a U.S. citizen and who seeks to enter the United States solely to conclude a valid marriage with that citizen within 90 days after admission;
- (ii) has concluded a valid marriage with a citizen of the United States who is the petitioner, is the beneficiary of a petition to accord a status under section 201(b)(2)(A)(i) that was filed under section 204 by the petitioner, and seeks to enter the United States to await the approval of such petition and the availability to the alien of an immigrant visa; or
- (iii) is the minor child of an alien described in clause (i) or (ii) and is accompanying, or following to join, the alien.

Section 214(d) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(d), states, in pertinent part, that a fiancé(e) petition:

. . . shall be approved only after satisfactory evidence is submitted by the petitioner to establish that the parties have previously met in person within two years before the date of filing the petition, have a bona fide intention to marry, and are legally able and actually willing to conclude a valid marriage in the United States within a period of ninety days after the alien's arrival. . . .

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(2), the petitioner may be exempted from this requirement for a meeting if it is established that compliance would:

- (1) result in extreme hardship to the petitioner; or
- (2) that compliance would violate strict and long-established customs of the beneficiary's foreign culture or social practice, as where marriages are traditionally arranged by the parents of the contracting parties and the prospective bride and groom are prohibited from meeting subsequent to the arrangement and prior to the wedding day. In addition to establishing that the required meeting would be a violation of custom or practice, the petitioner must also establish that any and all other aspects of the traditional arrangements have been or will be met in accordance with the custom or practice.

The regulation at section 214.2 does not define what may constitute extreme hardship to the petitioner. Therefore, each claim of extreme hardship must be judged on a case-by-case basis taking into account the totality of the petitioner's circumstances. Generally, a director looks at whether the petitioner can demonstrate the existence of circumstances that are (1) not within the power of the petitioner to control or change, and (2) likely to last for a considerable duration or the duration cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.

The petitioner filed the Petition for Alien Fiancé(e) (Form I-129F) with Citizenship and Immigration Services on June 15, 2004. Therefore, the petitioner and the beneficiary were required, by law, to have met during the period that began on June 15, 2002 and ended June 15, 2004.

At the time of filing, the petitioner indicated that he had not seen the beneficiary since 2001. In response to the director's request for evidence either that a meeting with the beneficiary had occurred during the specified two-year period or that such a meeting would have constituted extreme hardship for him or would have violated the customs of the beneficiary's culture or social practice, the petitioner again stated that his last meeting with the beneficiary occurred in 2001. He also provided several original letters from the beneficiary. Therefore, the evidence of record does not establish that the petitioner has complied with the meeting requirement of section 214(d) of the Act.

On appeal, the petitioner states that his employment obligations prevented him from traveling to Laos to meet the beneficiary during the specified two-year period, that his company would not allow him to take more than three weeks vacation. He requests an additional 45 days within which to visit the beneficiary.

While the petitioner may well have faced difficulties in arranging time off from work during the specified two-year period, the challenge of coordinating overseas travel with work responsibilities is faced by many individuals who wish to file Form I-129Fs. As a result, the petitioner's employment obligations do not constitute extreme hardship and exempt him from the meeting requirement. Further, while section 214(d) of the Act requires a meeting between the petitioner and the beneficiary during the two-year period immediately preceding the filing of the Form I-129F, it does not require that the petitioner travel to the beneficiary's home country. The record on appeal does not, however, demonstrate that the petitioner and the beneficiary explored options for a meeting beyond the petitioner traveling to Laos, including the beneficiary traveling to meet the petitioner in the United States. Taking into account the totality of the circumstances, as presented by the petitioner, the AAO does not find that compliance with the meeting requirement would have resulted in extreme hardship to him or would have violated any strict and long-established customs of the beneficiary's foreign culture or social practice, the circumstances that exempt a petitioner from the meeting requirement of section 214(d) of the Act. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(2). Therefore, the appeal will be dismissed.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(2), the denial of the petition is without prejudice. The AAO notes that the petitioner's appeal indicates that he was planning to travel to Laos in October 2004. While this trip does not satisfy the meeting requirement for the instant Form I-129F, the petitioner may file a new Form I-129F on the beneficiary's behalf so that a new two-year period in which the parties are required to have met will apply.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.