

U.S. Citizenship  
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Services



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FILE: [REDACTED] Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: SEP 07 2007  
WAC 07 063 50163

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]  
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Petition for Alien Fiancé(e) Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Immigration and  
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your  
case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The nonimmigrant visa petition was denied by the Director, California Service Center, and is now on appeal before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a naturalized citizen of the United States who seeks to classify the beneficiary, a native and citizen of Cuba, as the fiancé of a United States citizen pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K).

The Director denied the petition after determining that the record did not establish that the petitioner and beneficiary had personally met within the two-year period immediately preceding the filing of the petition, as required by section 214(d) of the Act. She further determined that the record did not establish a basis on which to exempt the petitioner from this requirement. *Decision of the Director*, dated April 4, 2007.

Section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K), provides nonimmigrant classification to an alien who:

- (i) is the fiancé(e) of a U.S. citizen and who seeks to enter the United States solely to conclude a valid marriage with that citizen within 90 days after admission;
- (ii) has concluded a valid marriage with a citizen of the United States who is the petitioner, is the beneficiary of a petition to accord a status under section 201(b)(2)(A)(i) that was filed under section 204 by the petitioner, and seeks to enter the United States to await the approval of such petition and the availability to the alien of an immigrant visa; or
- (iii) is the minor child of an alien described in clause (i) or (ii) and is accompanying, or following to join, the alien.

Section 214(d) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(d), states, in pertinent part, that a fiancé(e) petition:

. . . shall be approved only after satisfactory evidence is submitted by the petitioner to establish that the parties have previously met in person within two years before the date of filing the petition, have a bona fide intention to marry, and are legally able and actually willing to conclude a valid marriage in the United States within a period of ninety days after the alien's arrival. . . .

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(2), the petitioner may be exempted from this requirement for a meeting if it is established that compliance would:

- (1) result in extreme hardship to the petitioner; or
- (2) that compliance would violate strict and long-established customs of the beneficiary's foreign culture or social practice, as where marriages are traditionally arranged by the parents of the contracting parties and the prospective bride and groom are prohibited from meeting subsequent to the arrangement and prior to the wedding day. In addition to establishing that the required meeting would be a violation of custom or practice, the petitioner must also establish that any and all other aspects of the traditional

arrangements have been or will be met in accordance with the custom or practice.

The regulation does not define what may constitute extreme hardship to the petitioner. Therefore, each claim of extreme hardship must be judged on a case-by-case basis taking into account the totality of the petitioner's circumstances. Generally, a director looks at whether the petitioner can demonstrate the existence of circumstances that are (1) not within the power of the petitioner to control or change, and (2) likely to last for a considerable duration or the duration cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.

The petitioner filed the Petition for Alien Fiancé(e) (Form I-129F) with Citizenship and Immigration Services on December 27, 2006. Therefore, the petitioner and the beneficiary were required to have met during the period that began on December 27, 2004 and ended on December 27, 2006.

At the time of filing, the petitioner indicated that she met the beneficiary when she visited Cuba in 2003. *Form I-129F*.

On appeal, the petitioner stated that she traveled to Cuba in 2004 and again on March 18, 2007. *Form I-290B*. In support of her assertions, the petitioner submitted photographs of herself and the beneficiary together, dated March 18, 2007; a copy of a passport page with Mexican entry and exit stamps dated March 8, 2007 and March 16, 2007; a copy of a Cuban airport receipt dated March 16, 2007; a Cubana baggage receipt dated March 16, 2007; and a copy of an airline ticket issued March 15, 2007 naming the petitioner and showing travel from Mexico to Cuba and back to Mexico on March 16, 2007 and March 18, 2007. The record also includes undated photographs of the petitioner with the beneficiary; a boarding pass with no name or date; and an airline receipt naming the petitioner showing travel from Miami, Florida to Havana, Cuba and back on June 27 and June 29. While the AAO finds the petitioner to have established that she traveled to Cuba in March 2007 and met with the beneficiary, she has not complied with the meeting requirement of section 214(d) of the Act, as it relates to the instant petition.

The petitioner's trip to meet the beneficiary occurred three months after the filing the Form I-129F. Therefore, this meeting did not occur within the two-year time period specified above – December 27, 2004 to December 27, 2006 – and does not satisfy section 214(d) of the Act. Further, the petitioner has offered no evidence to establish that compliance with the meeting requirement during the specified period would have constituted an extreme hardship for her or that such a meeting would have violated the customs of the beneficiary's culture or social practice. Therefore, the appeal will be dismissed.

The denial of the petition is without prejudice. As the petitioner and beneficiary have met, she may file a new Form I-129F petition on the beneficiary's behalf so that a new two-year meeting period will apply.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.