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U.S. Citizenship
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Services

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FILE:

WAC 06 110 50896

Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER

Date: SEP 09 2008

IN RE:

Petitioner:

Beneficiary:

PETITION: Petition for Alien Fiancé(e) Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert P. Wiemann".

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The nonimmigrant visa petition was denied by the Director, California Service Center, and is now on appeal before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a citizen of the United States who seeks to classify the beneficiary, a native and citizen of Cuba, as the fiancé of a United States citizen pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K).

The Director denied the petition after determining that the record did not establish that the petitioner and beneficiary had personally met within the two-year period immediately preceding the filing of the petition, as required by section 214(d) of the Act. *Decision of the Director*, dated August 10, 2006.

Section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K), provides nonimmigrant classification to an alien who:

- (i) is the fiancé(e) of a U.S. citizen and who seeks to enter the United States solely to conclude a valid marriage with that citizen within 90 days after admission;
- (ii) has concluded a valid marriage with a citizen of the United States who is the petitioner, is the beneficiary of a petition to accord a status under section 201(b)(2)(A)(i) that was filed under section 204 by the petitioner, and seeks to enter the United States to await the approval of such petition and the availability to the alien of an immigrant visa; or
- (iii) is the minor child of an alien described in clause (i) or (ii) and is accompanying, or following to join, the alien.

Section 214(d) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(d), states, in pertinent part, that a fiancé(e) petition:

. . . shall be approved only after satisfactory evidence is submitted by the petitioner to establish that the parties have previously met in person within two years before the date of filing the petition, have a bona fide intention to marry, and are legally able and actually willing to conclude a valid marriage in the United States within a period of ninety days after the alien's arrival. . . .

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(2), the petitioner may be exempted from this requirement for a meeting if it is established that compliance would:

- (1) result in extreme hardship to the petitioner; or
- (2) that compliance would violate strict and long-established customs of the beneficiary's foreign culture or social practice, as where marriages are traditionally arranged by the parents of the contracting parties and the prospective bride and groom are prohibited from meeting subsequent to the arrangement and prior to the wedding day. In addition to establishing that the required meeting would be a violation of custom or practice, the petitioner must also establish that any and all other aspects of the traditional arrangements have been or will be met in accordance with the custom or practice.

The regulation does not define what may constitute extreme hardship to the petitioner. Therefore, each claim of extreme hardship must be judged on a case-by-case basis taking into account the totality of the petitioner's

circumstances. Generally, a director looks at whether the petitioner can demonstrate the existence of circumstances that are (1) not within the power of the petitioner to control or change, and (2) likely to last for a considerable duration or the duration cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.

The petitioner filed the Petition for Alien Fiancé(e) (Form I-129F) with Citizenship and Immigration Services on February 15, 2006. Therefore, the petitioner and the beneficiary were required to have met during the period that began on February 15, 2004 and ended on February 15, 2006.

At the time of filing, the petitioner indicated that she had visited the beneficiary in 2003. *See attached statement to Form I-129F.* In support of her statement, the record includes boarding passes for the petitioner and photographs of the petitioner with the beneficiary dated November 2003. The petitioner also noted that due to travel restrictions, she is unable to visit Cuba more than once every three years. *Statement from the petitioner,* dated July 19, 2006.

On appeal, the petitioner states that all of the information that was solicited as additional evidence is in the file and was sent with the Form I-129F.

The petitioner's most recent trip to meet the beneficiary occurred in November 2003. Therefore, although she has established that she has met the beneficiary, this meeting did not occur within the two-year time period specified above – February 15, 2004 to February 15, 2006 – and does not satisfy section 214(d) of the Act. While the AAO recognizes that the petitioner was unable to travel to Cuba within the two-year period immediately preceding the filing of the petition due to the travel regulations established by the United States Government (*see* 31 C.F.R. § 515.561), section 214(d) of the Act does not require that the petitioner meet her fiancé in Cuba. The AAO notes that the record fails to include any evidence indicating that the petitioner and the beneficiary explored meeting in another country, including evidence of the beneficiary's attempts to obtain permission to leave the country for travel and the Cuban government's response to his requests. Accordingly, the AAO does not find that the petitioner has offered evidence to establish that compliance with the meeting requirement during the specified period would have constituted an extreme hardship for her or that such a meeting would have violated the customs of the beneficiary's culture or social practice. Therefore, the appeal will be dismissed.

The denial of the petition is without prejudice. Once the petitioner and beneficiary meet, she may file a new Form I-129F petition on the beneficiary's behalf so that a new two-year meeting period will apply.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.