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
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
APR 08 2004

FILE: EAC 02 158 53196 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date:

IN RE: Petitioner: [Redacted]  
Beneficiary: [Redacted]

PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

  
Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The nonimmigrant visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal.

The petitioner states that it is a computer software development firm. It seeks to employ the beneficiary temporarily in the United States as a systems analyst and consultant. The director denied the petition concluding that the beneficiary is not employed in a position that involves specialized knowledge. Specifically, the director stated that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate that the procedures used by the beneficiary are significantly different from the methods generally used in other computer software development firms, or that the beneficiary's understanding of the petitioning organization's processes constitutes specialized knowledge. The director also stated that the petitioner had not established that the position being offered to the beneficiary requires the services of an individual possessing specialized knowledge. The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal.

On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director improperly applied the relevant statute to the evidence previously submitted in support of the beneficiary's specialized knowledge capacity.

To establish L-1 eligibility, the petitioner must meet the criteria outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L). Specifically, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, a qualifying organization must have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one continuous year. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form I-129 shall be accompanied by:

- (i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (1)(1)(ii)(G) of this section.
- (ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed.
- (iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of the petition.
- (iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior education, training, and employment qualifies him/her to perform the intended services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the same work which the alien performed abroad.

According to the evidence submitted, the petitioner is a subsidiary of Hexaware Technologies Ltd., located in India. The petitioner was incorporated in 1993 and states that it is a computer software development firm. The petitioner claims 170 plus employees and \$32,000,000 in gross annual income. The petitioner seeks to

employ the beneficiary as a systems analyst and consultant for a period of three years, at a yearly salary of \$55,000.00.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge, has been employed and will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity.

Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(B), provides the following:

For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(D) defines “specialized knowledge” as:

[S]pecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization’s product, service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization’s processes and procedures.

In a letter dated, February 27, 2002, the director of APTECH Worldwide company stated that the beneficiary had been employed by its company from October 2000 to February 2002 as a “consultant.” The letter also stated that the beneficiary was involved in various banking projects that were predominantly developed in client-server and web-based environments. The letter stated that the beneficiary was involved in analysis, design and development, support and user training of various software applications. The letter lists the domain knowledge gained by the beneficiary as: payroll, leave and staff claim systems, banking and finance, and purchase and e-procurement systems. The letter stated that the technologies involved in the projects engaged in by the beneficiary included: Visual Basic, Power Builder, MS Access, Oracle Informix, Dream Weaver, Flash, Kawa, Win NT, ATX 4, Win 95, and Win 98. The letter concluded by stating that the beneficiary was effective in using such analysis methodologies as: 99M (Soft Systems Methodology), UML (Unified Modeling Language), OOAD (Object Oriented Analysis and Design), and RAD (Rapid Application Development).

In a letter, dated March 21, 2002, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary had been working for the foreign entity since February 24, 2002 as a systems analyst in the Enterprise Application Integration (EAI) group. The petitioner also stated that the beneficiary’s primary skill set included MS Access, Visual Basic, SQL Server, Oracle, Java, JDBC, HTML, DHTML, ASP, VB Script, JavaScript, JSP, Dreamweaver, Fireworks, Flash, Novell Netware, UNIX, AIX, and Win NT. The petitioner further stated in the letter that the beneficiary had been actively involved in the development of payroll related applications for a client within the banking industry.

In a support letter, dated April 8, 2002, the beneficiary’s proposed job duties are described as follows:

[The beneficiary] will fill the position of Consultant in the Banking Group at our Princeton, New Jersey office. This position requires specialized knowledge of [the U.S. entity’s] proprietary banking product line and, in particular, specialized knowledge of the customized banking software programs for our U.S. clients, which has been developed by our company.

This position requires that [the beneficiary]: (1) design, develop, and provide customized implementation for clients' systems; (2) obtain clients' sign off; (3) system testing; and (4) to provide user training to the clients.

[The beneficiary's] knowledge and expertise in the [foreign entity's] customized software system designed for the banking industry is not readily available in the United States. [The beneficiary] has gained in-depth knowledge and expertise in the [foreign entity's] customized banking products and has been intimately involved in the development of these customized software systems through his employment with Aptech Worldwide and the [foreign entity].

In that same letter, the petitioner stated the purpose for the transfer of the beneficiary to the United States as follows:

[The petitioner] maintains a regular rotational program for key personnel with unique and proprietary knowledge of the company's internal procedures, methods, and product lines. This rotation assures that all key personnel are in touch with the most current techniques and procedures of all of the various aspects of [the U.S. entity's] procedures and services and ensures that some level of uniformity is achieved throughout the various offices. . . .

The petitioner described the beneficiary's experience working for the foreign entity as follows:

[The beneficiary] has been employed by the [foreign entity] and its parent company, Aptech Worldwide in India and Singapore, respectively, since October 2000. In his position of Consultant, [the beneficiary] has been involved in several major banking projects for our company. Most significantly, he has been intimately involved in the analysis, design and development, support and user training of various customized banking related software applications. His primary skills include payroll, leave and staff claims systems, banking and finance, and purchase and e-procurement systems.

The petitioner submitted as evidence in support of the petition a copy of a Higher Secondary Course Certificate from the Department of Government Examinations, Madras, a Bachelor's degree of Science, dated March 1997, a Statement of Academic Record from Curtin University of Technology indicating a Master of Business, a Certificate of Intermediate Examination from the Institute of Cost and Works Accountants of India, a Certificate of Completion, dated July 2000, from SSI Limited for completion of Trilogy 2000, Oracle 8 and Visual Basic 6.0, and a Certificate of Completion from The Enfield India, Ltd. acknowledging the beneficiary's completion of his assignment as cost trainee.

In a request for evidence, the director noted that the record did not sufficiently establish that the beneficiary had truly specialized knowledge or that he had been and will be employed in a truly specialized knowledge capacity. The director requested that the petitioner submit evidence establishing that: (1) the beneficiary possessed specialized knowledge above that which is normally possessed by other technical consultants employed by the foreign entity; (2) the beneficiary is currently and will continue to be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity in the United States firm; (3) the beneficiary possessed specialized knowledge above that which is normally possessed by other technical consultants employed by the U.S. entity; and (4) a statement from clients commenting on the beneficiary's individual contribution to the project(s) to which he is assigned.

In response, counsel for the petitioner submitted a statement asserting that the beneficiary has an advanced level of knowledge of the petitioning company's processes and procedures relating to software interfaces. Counsel gave a detailed description of the beneficiary's work experience and job duties. Specifically, counsel claimed that the foreign entity has employed the beneficiary as a systems analyst in the company's EAI group since February 24, 2002. Counsel further asserted that the beneficiary has gained special knowledge of the foreign entity's interface and Connector technology. Counsel contends that the beneficiary gained in-depth knowledge and expertise in the foreign entity's interface products through his employment with the foreign entity in India. Counsel further stated that the beneficiary possessed specialized knowledge in that he, along with a handful of other employees, were trained by the foreign entity and possess a combination of skill sets, which include knowledge of Legacy platforms and Java experience. Counsel asserted that this combination of skill sets is not common in the IT industry at large and that the beneficiary's knowledge is different from that which is ordinarily encountered in the field. Counsel further stated that the beneficiary has received in-depth training in the Connector and Vitria Business Ware products at the foreign entity in India and has worked on projects requiring this knowledge for over one year. There was no additional evidence submitted to substantiate this claim.

Counsel continued by asserting that only a small percentage of Hexaware's technical consultants both in India and the United States possess specialized knowledge of the company's Connector technology and Vitria Business Ware products. Counsel further stated that 13 percent of the consultants (including the beneficiary) in India and 8 percent of the consultants in the United States possess specialized knowledge in this respect. Counsel concludes by contending that many of the ongoing projects have reached a point where the physical presence of technical consultants (including the beneficiary) who possess specialized knowledge of the entity's Connector interface technology and PeopleSoft Adapter is required on site in the United States.

In his decision, the director concluded that the record did not establish that the beneficiary has been or would be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity, as required for classification as an L-1B intracompany transferee. Upon reviewing the detailed description of the beneficiary's job responsibilities, the director determined that the job duties were not significantly different from those of other systems analyst in a computer software development firm, and does not "warrant the expertise of someone possessing a truly specialized knowledge." The director noted that the petitioner's explanation of the beneficiary's duties seemed to merely paraphrase the definition of specialized knowledge. The director also concluded that the petitioner had not demonstrated that the company's technology is significantly different from technology generally used in any computer software development company. The director stated that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate how an understanding of the technology constitutes specialized knowledge. The director further stated that an in-depth knowledge of the functions and systems of the organization does not appear to be unusual for an individual employed as a systems analyst to possess, and is not considered to be indicative of the beneficiary's claimed advanced expertise. The director concluded that the petitioner had failed to document how the beneficiary's knowledge of the processes and procedures, namely familiarity with the connector technology and Vitria Business Ware products, of the petitioning organization are advanced or substantially different from the knowledge possessed by other individuals similarly employed. The director also concluded that the petitioner had failed to sufficiently demonstrate that the knowledge the beneficiary possesses would be difficult to impart to another individual without significant economic inconvenience to the U.S. or foreign entities or that the knowledge is not generally known and is of some complexity. Consequently, the director denied the petition.

On appeal, counsel for the petitioner submits a brief in which he asserts that the director reached an erroneous conclusion based upon an improper reading of the relevant section of the Act. Counsel also contends that the

director reached an erroneous conclusion in that he mistakenly concludes that the beneficiary does not qualify for L-1B status in a specialized knowledge capacity because of the lack of evidence to establish that the beneficiary's knowledge of the processes and procedure of the U.S. and foreign entities are substantially different from, or advanced in relation to, any individual similarly employed. Counsel further reiterates a description of the beneficiary's knowledge, training, and expertise in the computer software applications field. Counsel asserts that the beneficiary received his specialty training regarding Connector technology and Vitria Business Ware products from the foreign entity and that within the company only a handful of consultants possess this specialized knowledge. Counsel further asserts that the beneficiary's combined knowledge of the company's proprietary products, Constellar Interfaces and Vitria Business Ware products, qualifies as "specialized knowledge." Counsel contends that during the offshore phase of major projects, the key technical staff gains crucial information and becomes intimately familiar with the software applications of various clients and the work flow of the project. Counsel further contends that this interrelation has led to the client requesting the same technical staff be transferred to the United States for the onsite phase of the project. Counsel resubmits on appeal a copy of the Constellar Corporation Software License and Services Interface Developer Agreement, a description of the U.S. and foreign entities software systems, and the petitioner's letter in support of the petition.

On review of the record, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that he will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity as required in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3)(ii). In the instant case, the petitioner has failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that the beneficiary has been employed by a foreign entity in a specialized knowledge capacity for one continuous year, within the three years prior to the filing of the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3)(iii) and (iv). It is noted that the current petition was filed on April 11, 2002. The evidence shows that the petitioner was employed by Aptech Worldwide company, located in Singapore from October 2000 to February 2002. A letter from the company's director in Singapore shows that the beneficiary was employed as a "Consultant" and was involved in projects predominantly developed in client-server and web-based environments. There is no mention by the Aptech Worldwide company director of any merger or affiliation with the foreign entity that its company or the beneficiary might have had. Nor is there any mention of any specialized knowledge training received or used by the beneficiary during his employment with that company. The petitioner contends that the beneficiary has been employed in a specialized knowledge capacity for over one year, in that he was employed by the Aptech Worldwide company which merged with the foreign entity. The petitioner specifically stated:

Since [the beneficiary] began his employment with Aptech Worldwide, now the parent company of Hexaware Technologies, Ltd. In October 2000, he has gained in-depth knowledge of the Company's proprietary client-server and web-based software banking related products. Before the company's former merger, Hexaware and Aptech operated in partnership with leading banks and financial companies to develop customized software programs.

The petitioner has not submitted any evidence to substantiate the claimed merger between the two entities. Although the petitioner submitted a copy of a "Plan of Merger of Aptech Worldwide Inc. USA into Hexaware Technologies Inc. USA," dated January 30, 2002, the plan was for the merger of two U.S. companies and is dated only one month prior to the commencement of the beneficiary's employment with the foreign entity. In addition, there has been no evidence submitted to show that the beneficiary had access or knowledge of the foreign entity's proprietary products prior to the commencement of his employment on February 24, 2002. Simply going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting

the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972). The evidence contained in the record fails to establish that the beneficiary has been employed in a specialized knowledge capacity by a foreign entity for one continuous year, within three years prior to the filing of the petition on April 11, 2002.

Furthermore, counsel contends that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge of the organizations products, processes, and procedures. Counsel asserts that the beneficiary acquired the specialized knowledge through the training programs offered to the beneficiary by the foreign entity at its training and production facilities in India. Contrary to counsel's contentions, there is no evidence of record to demonstrate that the beneficiary received the claimed training from either organization. The petitioner has not presented any evidence to substantiate the claim that the courses offered by the foreign entity equip the beneficiary with specialized knowledge not common to other system analysts in the industry. There has been no evidence submitted such as degrees, certification, course transcripts, or certificates of completion to establish that the beneficiary received specialty training regarding Constellar Interfaces and Vitria Business Ware products from the foreign entity. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Id.*

Contrary to counsel's assertions, mere familiarity with an organization's product, process, or service, such as knowledge of its Connector technology, Constellar Interface, EAI methodologies, or Vitria Business Ware products, does not constitute "special" knowledge under section 214 (c)(2)(B) of the Act. While the petitioner claims that the beneficiary's experience with the organization includes intimate familiarity with the foreign entity's offshore operations and proprietary products, including "connector technology," and intimate familiarity with client's software development projects gained while working on the projects during the offshore phase, this statement alone is not indicative of specialized knowledge capacity. In addition, although the petitioner contends that the beneficiary will be integral as an onsite staff member, and will continue to utilize the offshore project artifacts, tools and methodologies for providing the remaining project tasks, this claim is insufficient to establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or will be performing tasks that require specialized knowledge. The record does not demonstrate that the tasks described are not common to all technical systems analysts in the computer software application and development field. The petitioner has failed to establish that the described duties require advanced expertise or establish that the beneficiary possesses a special knowledge of the organizations functions and software application systems. Further, the petitioner states that the onsite tasks will consist of business requirement analysis, technical architecture requirements analysis, high-level design, and post delivery implementation and support services. There has been no evidence submitted to establish that the tasks are so intricate that they require the services of one who possesses specialized knowledge in the field.

In addition, the record does not establish that the beneficiary has advanced or special knowledge of the petitioning organization's product, procedures or its application in U.S. and international markets. Counsel contends that the beneficiary's combined knowledge of the organization's proprietary products, namely Constellar Interfaces and Vitria Business Ware products is significant and qualifies as "specialized knowledge." Contrary to counsel's contention, a mere knowledge of an organization's proprietary products does not connote "special" knowledge where the individual is one of many employees privy to such information. Furthermore, any systems analyst would necessarily have knowledge of its company's proprietary products in order to function efficiently in the field. There has been no evidence, such as training certificates or official class rosters, submitted to demonstrate that the beneficiary received the claimed training in the use of Constellar Interfaces or Vitria Business Ware products. Contrary to counsel's assertions, the beneficiary's knowledge of the company product or of the processes and procedures of the foreign company, has not been

shown to be substantially different from, or advanced in relation to that of any systems analyst of any software development firm. Simply going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Treasure Craft of California, supra*. Without supporting documentation, the assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980).

In accordance with the statutory definition of specialized knowledge, a beneficiary must possess "special" knowledge of the petitioner's product and its application in international markets, or an "advanced level" of knowledge of the petitioner's processes and procedures. See section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Here, the evidence demonstrates that the beneficiary possesses the skill required to work as a technical consultant/systems analyst dealing with various software interface applications, not a special knowledge of the petitioner's processes and procedures. Furthermore, although the petitioner's approach to software engineering processes may be unique or specialized, the beneficiary's application of the process will not necessarily qualify as advanced. In addition, the computer software application training appears to be readily available within the organization. There has been no independent documentary evidence submitted to establish that any computer technician within the United States cannot be trained to perform tasks performed by the beneficiary within a reasonable period of time so as not to negatively effect the overall operations of the U.S. and foreign entities.

Furthermore, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties fails to establish that an individual who possesses specialized knowledge is necessary for the proposed technical consultant/systems analyst position in the United States. The following job duties are common duty descriptions within the computer software application field and thus appear not to rise to the level of specialized knowledge: design, develop, and provide customized implementation for clients' systems; obtain clients' sign off; system testing; and provide user training to the clients. Additionally, the qualifications necessary for the beneficiary to successfully perform his job as a systems analyst appear to be standard for the industry. Cf. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Occupational Outlook Handbook*, 2004-05 edition, "Computer Systems Analysts, Database Administrators, and Computer Scientists" (online at <http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos042.htm>). The petitioner asserted that the maintenance and production support of the technological applications require a high degree of skill, expertise, knowledge, and relevant experience, and that the organization has set up training facilities to accommodate these requirements. It is thereby reasonable to conclude that the beneficiary's educational background and claimed in-house training is equivalent to that of others within the field, and not, per se, uncommon or unique or special. In addition, there has been no degree, certificate of completion, or course transcripts submitted as evidence to establish that the beneficiary received specialized training from the foreign entity. Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary would be employed in a specialized knowledge position or that the position requires an individual with specialized knowledge.

On appeal, counsel also referred to a 1988 INS memorandum as a guide for interpreting the statutory definition of specialized knowledge. See Memo, Norton, Assoc. Comm., Examinations (Oct. 27, 1988), reprinted in *65 Interpreter Releases 1194* (Nov. 7, 1988). In the memorandum, the Commissioner noted four characteristics of employees with "specialized knowledge," which counsel uses to emphasize that the beneficiary's training and experience in the software development and maintenance processes establishes that the beneficiary's knowledge differs from that generally found in the computer software application and development industry. The beneficiary's ability to execute software development and maintenance processes does not by itself establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is different from that generally found in the

industry. In *Matter of Penner*, the Commissioner emphasized that the specialized knowledge worker classification was not intended for “all employees with any level of specialized knowledge.” 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982). According to *Matter of Penner*, “[s]uch a conclusion would permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the ‘L-1’ visa” rather than just the “key” personnel that Congress specifically intended. With regard to counsel’s reliance on the 1988 Associate Commissioner’s memorandum, the memorandum was intended as a guide for employees and will not supercede the plain language of the statute or the regulations. Therefore, by itself, counsel’s assertion that the beneficiary’s qualifications are analogous to the examples outlined in the memorandum is insufficient to establish the beneficiary’s qualification for classification as a specialized knowledge professional. As discussed, the petitioner has not submitted probative evidence to establish that the beneficiary’s knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished by some unusual quality and not generally known in the alien’s field of endeavor.

While the AAO acknowledges that the specialized knowledge classification is not solely for those “relatively rare employees with unusual knowledge,” the legislative history for the term “specialized knowledge” provides ample support for a restrictive interpretation of the term. In *1756, Inc. v. Attorney General*, 745 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1990), the court upheld the denial of an L-1 petition for a chef, where the petitioner claimed that the chef possessed specialized knowledge. The court noted that the legislative history demonstrated a concern that the L-1 category would become too large: “The class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be carefully regulated and monitored by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.” *Id.* at 16 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750, 2754, 1970 WL 5815). The court stated, “[I]n light of Congress’ intent that the L-1 category should be limited, it was reasonable for the INS to conclude that specialized knowledge capacity should not extend to all employees with specialized knowledge. On this score, the legislative history provides some guidance: Congress referred to ‘key personnel’ and executives.” *1756, Inc.*, 745 F. Supp. at 16.

Similarly, in *Matter of Penner*, the Commissioner emphasized that the specialized knowledge worker classification was not intended for “all employees with any level of specialized knowledge.” 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982). According to *Matter of Penner*, “[s]uch a conclusion would permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the ‘L-1’ visa” rather than the “key personnel” that Congress specifically intended. *Id.* at 53. In accordance with the statute and the legislative history, it would be inappropriate to expand the visa category to allow the entry of any personnel who already had knowledge of a petitioner’s operations.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The precedent decision *Matter of Penner* pre-dates the 1990 amendment to the definition of “specialized knowledge.” Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized knowledge had to be “proprietary,” however, the 1990 amendment did not greatly alter the definition of the term. In particular, the 1990 Committee Report does not even support the claim that Congress “rejected” the INS interpretation of “specialized knowledge.” The 1990 Committee Report does not criticize, and does not even refer to, any specific INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The Committee Report simply states that the Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of “[v]arying,” [*i.e.*, not specifically incorrect], “interpretations by INS,” H. Rep. No. 101-723(I), *supra*, at 69, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, the Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became § 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. *Id.* The AAO concludes, therefore, that *Matter of Penner* remains useful guidance concerning the intended scope of the “specialized knowledge” L-1B classification.

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In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not sustained that burden.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed