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File: EAC 02 101 50635 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: **FEB 01 2006**

IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:



Petition: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L)

IN BEHALF OF BENEFICIARY:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.


Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The petitioner appealed this denial to the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The AAO will dismiss the appeal.

The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to extend the employment of the beneficiary in the position of project leader as an L-1B nonimmigrant intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner describes its business as being a "software development consultancy." The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary for a period of two years.

The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary has been or will be employed in the United States in a capacity involving specialized knowledge.

On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the petitioner has satisfied the criteria for establishing that the beneficiary has been and will be employed in the United States in a specialized knowledge capacity. Counsel argues that the beneficiary's purported specialized knowledge was imparted by a combination of training and experience.

To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form I-129 shall be accompanied by:

- (i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(1)(ii)(G) of this section.
- (ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed.
- (iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of the petition.
- (iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior education, training, and employment qualifies him/her to perform the intended services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the

same work which the alien performed abroad.

Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(B), provides:

For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company.

Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(D) defines “specialized knowledge” as:

[S]pecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization’s product, service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization’s processes and procedures.

The primary issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary has been or will be employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(l)(3)(ii) and (iv).

The petitioner described the beneficiary’s job duties abroad and proposed job duties in the United States in the Form I-129 as follows:

As Project Leader, [the beneficiary] is responsible for generating test plans and writing, pre-integration and post-implementation testing, Unigraphics V-19 phase 1-7 writing test plans and test cases, interacting with group developers, coordinating with the offshore testing group, ensuring proper documentation of methodologies, processes, procedures, and standards, defining the testing for unit and system testing, defining the tools that need to be developed, reviewing the project plans and ensuring that they adhere to all aspects of the functionality requested by UGS, providing technical assistance to the offshore team, monitoring the progress of the offshore team, and making any changes to the schedule in accordance with [the petitioning organization’s] protocols.

The petitioner described the beneficiary’s purported specialized knowledge in a memorandum appended to the petition as follows:

[The beneficiary] was selected for this project because of his in-depth knowledge of [the petitioning organization’s] project management procedures, internally designed software engineering procedures and tools, particularly those related to Unigraphics projects, including the use of its proprietary management and development tools – FPAT for effort estimation, DELTA for quality tracking and SPMW for project management, scheduling, costing and status reporting and its internally developed CASEPAC tools. Since he joined [the petitioning organization] on November 14, 1999, [the beneficiary] has acquired an in-depth knowledge of [the petitioning organization’s] own quality management system, software

development cycle and project management procedures for Unigraphics projects.

The petitioner also claims that the beneficiary "received training in [the petitioning organization's] own CAD/CAM methodologies and proprietary tools and in [the petitioning organization's] established standards for these projects.

On March 25, 2002, the director requested additional evidence. The director requested, *inter alia*, evidence establishing that the beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished by some unusual quality and is not generally known by practitioners in the beneficiary's field of endeavor; evidence establishing that the beneficiary's advanced level of knowledge distinguishes him from those with only elementary or basic knowledge; and evidence addressing the training required for the proffered position.

In response, counsel submitted a letter dated April 5, 2002 in which she further describes the beneficiary's claimed specialized knowledge and purported acquisition thereof as follows:

[The beneficiary's] specialized knowledge of [the petitioning organization's] proprietary tools, procedures, management techniques, and value added products, is derived from both [the petitioning organization's] training and more than seven years of experience with [the petitioning organization]. [The beneficiary] has received training in [the petitioning organization's] maintenance methodologies, design and development techniques, established standards for software engineering projects, management techniques, and other proprietary products and tools throughout his more than seven years of employment with [the petitioning organization]. [The petitioning organization] develops a range of software for specific applications in specific industries, such as their Computer Aided Systems Engineering Package (CASEPAC) used for specialized systems engineering. [The beneficiary] in his seven years of work experience with [the petitioning organization] has gained an in-depth knowledge of these [petitioning organization] developed proprietary tools and products, their benefits to the client, and the [the petitioning organization] quality control certified procedures for using them. He has worked as a Project Leader on a [petitioning organization] Unigraphics application administration project for [REDACTED] in Pune, India. He was responsible for installing Unigraphics Software, configuring and license management and customizing Unigraphics software using C, UFUNC, and GRIP program languages in accordance with [the petitioning organization] protocols and in conjunction with [the petitioning organization's] proprietary tools. [The beneficiary] gained specialized knowledge specifically useful to his work in the U.S. in customization of Unigraphics applications and Unigraphics application support. He additionally utilizes his training in [the petitioning organization's] proprietary procedures, tools, and protocols in order to provide the service and end-product which provides [the petitioning organization] its name in the market. He uses [the petitioning organization's] project documenting, review, and quality assurance techniques, which are proprietary in nature.

* * *

[The beneficiary] could only obtain this knowledge through his prior employment experience with [the petitioning organization]. This knowledge would not be easily transferred to or taught to another individual because it requires and [sic] understanding of [the petitioning organization's] abilities and how they function in the market and with specific systems in complete [sic] the requirements of the job. This may only be obtained by the type of mix of training, education, and on the job experience that [the beneficiary] has. A minimum of a year experience with [the petitioning organization], significant [petitioning organization] training, and a [sic] an appropriate educational background would be required for [sic] to perform the duties of this position. [The beneficiary] has had periodic training in [the petitioning organization's] techniques, protocols, tools, and proprietary products, including four months of specific training regarding [the petitioning organization's] projects utilizing Unigraphics and separate courses on CAD/CAM/, Solid Modeling, Parametric Modeling, Assembly Modeling, and Pro-E, which is necessary for an understanding of how to use [the petitioning organization's] value added products. He holds specialized knowledge of [the petitioning organization's] capabilities and how to utilize them on a [petitioning organization] project that is required for the performance of his duties in the role of Project Leader with [the petitioning organization's] project for Unigraphics.

On July 30, 2002, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary has been or will be employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge.

On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the petitioner has satisfied the criteria for establishing that the beneficiary has been and will be employed in the United States in a specialized knowledge capacity. Counsel argues that the beneficiary's purported specialized knowledge was imparted by a combination of training and experience.

Upon review, the petitioner's assertions are not persuasive in demonstrating that the beneficiary will be employed in a position involving specialized knowledge as defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(D) or that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. The record is also not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary was employed abroad in a capacity involving specialized knowledge for the requisite one-year period.

In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3). The petitioner must submit a detailed job description of the services to be performed sufficient to establish specialized knowledge. In this matter, the petitioner fails to establish that this position requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has been employed in a specialized knowledge capacity for the requisite one-year period abroad. The petitioner also fails to establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is specialized.

Although the petitioner repeatedly asserts that the beneficiary's proposed position in the United States requires specialized knowledge, that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge, and that the beneficiary has been employed abroad in a position involving specialized knowledge, the petitioner has not adequately articulated any basis to support these claims. The petitioner has failed to identify any special or advanced

body of knowledge which would distinguish the beneficiary's role from that of other similarly experienced software workers employed by the petitioning organization or in the industry at large. Going on record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties involve specialized knowledge; otherwise, meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. See *Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava*, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), *aff'd*, 905, F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990).

The petitioner asserts that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge of the petitioning organization's project management procedures and techniques, "internally designed" software engineering procedures, and proprietary tools and products, including those procedures and tools associated with certain client projects. The petitioner asserts that this knowledge is neither widely known nor commonly utilized in the industry and that it can only be imparted to a worker through a year or more of training, education, and on-the-job experience. However, despite these assertions, the record does not establish how, exactly, the petitioning organization's procedures, techniques, tools, and products are so materially different from similar software development processes and procedures that a similarly experienced and educated software worker could not perform the duties of the positions abroad and in the United States.

Overall, the record does not establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is substantially different from the knowledge possessed by software workers generally throughout the industry or by other employees of the petitioning organization. The assertion that the beneficiary and a select group of workers possess a very specific set of skills related to certain processes, procedures, and tools does not alone establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is indeed uncommon or noteworthy. The petitioner has not established that the beneficiary's knowledge would be difficult to impart to another similarly educated worker without suffering significant economic inconvenience. All employees can be said to possess unique and unparalleled skill sets to some degree; however, a unique skill set that can be imparted to another similarly experienced and educated employee without significant economic inconvenience is not "specialized knowledge." Moreover, the proprietary or unique qualities of the petitioner's process do not establish that any knowledge of this process is "specialized." Rather, the petitioner must establish that qualities of the unique or proprietary process require this employee to have knowledge beyond what is common in the industry. This has not been established in this matter. The fact that other professionals may not have very specific, proprietary knowledge regarding the petitioner's processes is not relevant to these proceedings if this knowledge gap could be closed by the petitioner by simply revealing the information to a newly hired, similarly educated or experienced employee.

Furthermore, while the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary received training and on-the-job experience which imparted the claimed specialized knowledge to him, the record is devoid of evidence addressing the length or substance of this training or of evidence specifically tying this training and experience to the knowledge in question. Absent detailed information addressing the length and substance of the training and its availability to the petitioning organization's workforce, it is impossible to conclude that the purported specialized knowledge would be significantly economically inconvenient to impart to similar workers. Once again, going on record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of

proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190).

The AAO does not dispute the possibility that the beneficiary is a skilled and experienced employee who has been, and would be, a valuable asset to the petitioner. However, it is appropriate for the AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making process. *Matter of Colley*, 18 I&N Dec. 117, 120 (Comm. 1981) (citing *Matter of Raulin*, 13 I&N Dec. 618(R.C. 1970) and *Matter of LeBlanc*, 13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971)). As stated by the Commissioner in *Matter of Penner*, when considering whether the beneficiaries possessed specialized knowledge, "the *LeBlanc* and *Raulin* decisions did not find that the occupations inherently qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." 18 I&N Dec. at 52. Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. *Id.* The Commissioner also provided the following clarification:

A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential to the business firm's operation.

Id. at 53.

It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized knowledge" is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in *1756, Inc. v. Attorney General*, "[s]imply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key personnel." See generally, H.R. REP. NO. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's II New College Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and the general labor market, but also between the employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. While it may be correct to say that the beneficiary in the instant case is a highly skilled and productive employee, this fact alone is not enough to bring the beneficiary to the level of "key personnel."

Moreover, in *Matter of Penner*, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of the specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982). The decision noted that the 1970 House Report, H.R. REP. NO. 91-851, stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 classification "will not be large" and that "[t]he class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be carefully regulated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." *Id.* at 51. The decision further noted that

the House Report was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge, but that during the course of the subcommittee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." *Matter of Penner*, 18 I&N at 50 (citing H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445, 91st Cong. 210, 218, 223, 240, 248 (November 12, 1969)).

Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded in *Matter of Penner* that an expansive reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and technicians, is not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that the specialized knowledge worker classification was not intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." *Matter of Penner*, 18 I&N Dec. at 53. Or, as noted in *Matter of Colley*, "[m]ost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be concluded that all employees with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as intracompany transferees." 18 I&N Dec. at 119. According to *Matter of Penner*, "[s]uch a conclusion would permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-1' visa" rather than the "key personnel" that Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; *see also 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General*, 745 F. Supp. at 15 (concluding that Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend to all employees with specialized knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and "executives.")

A 1994 Immigration and Naturalization Service (now Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)) memorandum written by the then Acting Executive Associate Commissioner also directs CIS to compare the beneficiary's knowledge to the general United States labor market and the petitioner's workforce in order to distinguish between specialized and general knowledge. The Executive Associate Commissioner notes in the memorandum that "officers adjudicating petitions involving specialized knowledge must ensure that the knowledge possessed by the beneficiary is not general knowledge held commonly throughout the industry but that it is truly specialized." Memorandum from James A. Puleo, Acting Executive Associate Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, *Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge*, CO 214L-P (March 9, 1994). A comparison of the beneficiary's knowledge to the knowledge possessed by others in the field is therefore necessary in order to determine the level of the beneficiary's skills and knowledge and to ascertain whether the beneficiary's knowledge is advanced. In other words, absent an outside group to which to compare the beneficiary's knowledge, CIS would not be able to "ensure that the knowledge possessed by the beneficiary is truly specialized." *Id.* The analysis for specialized knowledge therefore requires a test of the knowledge possessed by the United States labor market, but does not consider whether workers are available in the United States to perform the beneficiary's job duties.

As explained above, the record does not distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge as more special or advanced than the knowledge possessed by other people employed by the petitioning organization or by software workers employed elsewhere. As the petitioner has failed to document any materially unique qualities to the beneficiary's knowledge, the petitioner's claims are not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary, while perhaps highly skilled, would be a "key" employee. There is no indication that the beneficiary has any knowledge that exceeds that of any other similarly experienced professional or that he has received special

training in the company's methodologies or processes which would separate him from other professionals employed with the foreign entity or elsewhere. It is simply not reasonable to classify this employee as a key employee of crucial importance to the organization.

The legislative history of the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized knowledge. *See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General*, 745 F. Supp. at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is concluded that the beneficiary will not be employed in the United States, and was not employed abroad, in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. For these reasons, the appeal will be dismissed.

Beyond the decision of the director, the record in this matter is not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary is a "specialized knowledge professional" as defined in the regulations. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(E).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(4)(ii) states that "managers, executives, and specialized knowledge professionals" employed by a qualifying organization pursuant to an approved blanket petition may be classified as intracompany transferees and admitted to the United States. "Specialized knowledge professional" is defined as "an individual who has specialized knowledge as defined in [8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(D)] of this section and is a member of the professions as defined in [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(32)]." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(E). In evaluating whether a beneficiary is a member of the professions, the AAO must evaluate whether the beneficiary has earned a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor. Section 101(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(32), states that "[t]he term *profession* shall include but not be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." The term "profession" contemplates knowledge or learning, not merely skill, of an advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and study of at least baccalaureate level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into the particular field of endeavor. *Matter of Sea*, 19 I&N Dec. 817 (Comm. 1988); *Matter of Ling*, 13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968); *Matter of Shin*, 11 I&N Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966).

In this matter, the beneficiary obtained an L-1 visa, and was subsequently admitted to the United States, under the petitioning organization's approved blanket petition (EAC 00 136 50959) as an intracompany transferee having specialized knowledge. The petitioner now seeks to continue the beneficiary's previously approved employment and to extend the beneficiary's stay in the United States pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(15)(i). In support of the instant petition, the petitioner submits a Form I-129, a Form I-129S, Nonimmigrant Petition based on Blanket L Petition, and a Form I-797, Approval Notice, for the petitioner's blanket L petition. As both the beneficiary's current and continued employment are based on this approved blanket petition, the petitioner must establish both that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge and that the beneficiary is a "specialized knowledge professional." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(4)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(E).

Upon review, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary is a "specialized knowledge professional." As noted above, the petitioner has failed to establish that beneficiary has specialized knowledge. *See supra*. However, even assuming that the beneficiary has special or advanced knowledge, the

petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary is a "professional" as that term is defined above. The petitioner claims that the beneficiary has earned an "associate's degree in Science in Mechanical Technology" and a "diploma in Mechanical Engineering." First, there is no evidence in the record that the beneficiary has actually been awarded the degrees claimed. Second, it does not appear that either of these degrees, or the combination thereof, is equivalent to a United States bachelor's degree. Once again, going on record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190).

Accordingly, as it has not been established that the beneficiary is a "specialized knowledge professional," the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary is eligible under the blanket petition for a continuation of the previously approved employment.

An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a *de novo* basis).

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's enumerated grounds. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc.*, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043.

In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.