



U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

prevent clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536



GI

02 AUG 2002

FILE: [Redacted] Office: Houston

Date:

IN RE: Obligor: [Redacted]
Bonded Alien: [Redacted]

IMMIGRATION BOND: Bond Conditioned for the Delivery of an Alien under Section 103 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1103

IN BEHALF OF OBLIGOR:



Public Copy

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The delivery bond in this matter was declared breached by the District Director, Houston, Texas, and is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be sustained.

The record indicates that on November 5, 1998, the obligor posted a \$5,000 bond conditioned for the delivery of the above referenced alien. A Notice to Deliver Alien (Form I-340) dated November 9, 2001, was sent to the obligor via certified mail, return receipt requested. The notice demanded the bonded alien's surrender into the custody of an officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (the Service) for removal at 9:00 a.m. on December 18, 2001, at 126 Northpoint Drive, Houston, TX 77060. The obligor failed to present the alien, and the alien failed to appear as required. On January 4, 2002, the district director informed the obligor that the delivery bond had been breached.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the Form I-352 is unenforceable because the Service failed to obtain the required OMB approval prior to using this form.

The Immigration Bond (Form I-352) is a collection of information as defined by the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), 5 C.F.R. 1320.3(3)(c). The Service is an agency for the purposes of the PRA and the Form I-352 falls under the PRA. In stating that the Form I-352 is unenforceable because the Service did not seek approval for the Form I-352 after its prior approval lapsed, counsel ignores the provision of the whole law and its plain meaning.

The PRA was intended to rein agency activity by not burdening the public, small businesses, corporations and other government agencies to submit information collection requests on forms that do not display control numbers approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The plain meaning of the PRA makes it clear that a person who fails to comply with a collection of information will not be subject to any penalty. See U.S. v. Burdett, 768 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).

The PRA only protects the public from failing to provide information to a government agency. Here, the obligor did file the information requested on Form I-352, therefore, the obligor cannot avail himself of the affirmative defense provision codified in 44 U.S.C. § 3512. Only those persons who refuse to comply with a collection of information can raise the public protection provision as in Saco River Cellular, Inc. v. FCC, 133 F.3d. 25, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1998). See also U.S. v. Spitzauer, where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that the public protection provision is limited in scope and only protects individuals who fail to file information. (1999 US App Lexis 6535).

On appeal, counsel contends that the obligor is not bound by the obligations it freely undertook in submitting the bond in this case, and that the Service cannot enforce the terms of the Form I-352 because "its terms constitute regulations, and the INS did

not submit it to Congress for review as required by the Congressional Review Act" (CRA), 5 U.S.C. section 801, et seq. This argument is meritless.

For purposes of the CRA, the term "rule" has, with three exceptions, the same meaning that the term has for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 8 U.S.C. section 804(3). The relevant provision of the APA defines a "rule" as the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency. 5 U.S.C. 551(4).

There are at least two reasons why Form I-352 is not a "rule" for purposes of the CRA. First, the Form I-352 is not a rule at all. It is a bonding agreement, in effect, a surety contract under which the appellant undertakes to guarantee an alien's appearance in the immigration court, and, if it comes to that, for removal. Section 236(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. section 1226(a)(2), permits the Attorney General to release on bond an alien subject to removal proceedings. This section also permits the Attorney General to describe the conditions on such bonds, and to approve the security on them. Section 103(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. section 1103(a)(3), permits the Attorney General to prescribe bond forms. While Form I-352 may well be a form used to comply with rules relating to release of aliens on bond, the Form itself is not a rule. It is not an "agency statement," 5 U.S.C. section 551(4), but a surety agreement between the obligor and the Government.

Second, even if it can be said that Form I-352 is a "rule," the CRA does not apply. The CRA itself provides that its requirements do not apply to a "rule of particular applicability." 5 U.S.C. 804(3)(A). If Form I-352 is a "rule," it is "of particular applicability" since it applies only to each particular case in which a person freely agrees to sign and file the Form I-352.

Counsel asserts that the alien was granted voluntary departure by the immigration judge; however, the obligor does not know whether the immigration judge set a voluntary departure bond. Counsel suggests that if the immigration judge failed to set a voluntary departure bond, the delivery bond "ceased to exist as a matter of law." Counsel cites no law that provides for a delivery bond to "cease to exist."

Section 241(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(1), was added by section 305 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) and was effective on April 1, 1997. It superseded former section 242(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1252(c) and changed the six-month period of time to 90 days.

Section 241(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(1), provides, in part:

When a final order of removal under administrative processes is made against any alien, the Attorney General shall have a period of 90 days from the date of such order, or if judicial review is had, then from the date of the final order of the court, within which to effect the alien's departure from the United States, during which period, at the Attorney General's discretion, the alien may be detained, released on bond in an amount and containing such conditions as the Attorney General may prescribe, or released on such other conditions as the Attorney General may prescribe.

The record reflects that removal proceedings were held on February 9, 2000, and the alien was granted voluntary departure from the United States until April 10, 2000, with an alternate order of removal to take effect in the event that the alien failed to depart as required. Subsequently, the bonded alien appealed the judge's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). On May 31, 2001, the BIA dismissed the appeal and granted the alien voluntary departure within 30 days from the date of the BIA's order. Because there is no evidence that the alien departed from the United States by June 30, 2001, the district director exercised his authority to determine custody status by directing the obligor to produce the bonded alien for removal.

As noted previously, the Notice to Deliver Alien was issued by the district director on November 9, 2001. The director has exercised his authority outside of the 90 day period during which he had the statutory authority to detain the alien pursuant to section 241(a)(1) of the Act. As such, the breach is not valid. Therefore, the district director's decision to breach the bond will be withdrawn.

ORDER: The appeal is sustained. The bond is cancelled.