

Department of Justice
Immigration and Naturalization Service

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
02 AUG 2002

FILE: [Redacted]

Office: Dallas

Date:

IN RE: Obligor:
Bonded Alien:



IMMIGRATION BOND: Bond Conditioned for the Delivery of an Alien under Section 103
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1103

IN BEHALF OF OBLIGOR:



Public Copy

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The delivery bond in this matter was declared breached by the District Director, Dallas, Texas, and is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record indicates that on July 23, 1999, the obligor posted a \$5,000 bond conditioned for the delivery of the above referenced alien. A Notice to Deliver Alien (Form I-340) dated August 24, 2001, was sent to the obligor via certified mail, return receipt requested. The notice demanded the bonded alien's surrender into the custody of an officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (the Service) for removal at 9:00 a.m. on September 26, 2001, at 8101 North Stemmons Freeway, Dallas, TX 75247. The obligor failed to present the alien, and the alien failed to appear as required. On October 24, 2001, the district director informed the obligor that the delivery bond had been breached.

On appeal, counsel states that the bonded alien is a national of El Salvador. Counsel opines that the bonded alien may be eligible for Temporary Protected Status. Jurisdiction over such a determination lies with the Service or the immigration judge, not the obligor for the alien's delivery bond. Counsel has not submitted evidence that the bonded alien has been granted Temporary Protected Status by either the Service or an immigration judge. Counsel's opinion of the bonded alien's eligibility for an immigration benefit has no effect on the obligation of the obligor to produce the bonded alien on demand.

On appeal, counsel further states that the obligor has not yet received a response to its FOIA request.

The alleged failure of the Dallas District office to respond to the obligor's FOIA request has no bearing in this matter as bond proceedings are separate and apart from any other proceedings. Furthermore, the mere filing of a FOIA request does not excuse the obligor from delivering the alien as demanded.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the Form I-352 is unenforceable because the Service failed to obtain the required OMB approval prior to using this form.

The Immigration Bond (Form I-352) is a collection of information as defined by the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), 5 C.F.R. 1320.3(c). The Service is an agency for the purposes of the PRA and the Form I-352 falls under the PRA. In stating that the Form I-352 is unenforceable because the Service did not seek approval for the Form I-352 after its prior approval lapsed, counsel ignores the provision of the whole law and its plain meaning.

The PRA was intended to rein agency activity by not burdening the public, small businesses, corporations and other government agencies to submit information collection requests on forms that do not display control numbers approved by the Office of Management

and Budget (OMB). The plain meaning of the PRA makes it clear that a person who fails to comply with a collection of information will not be subject to any penalty. See U.S. v. Burdett, 768 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).

The PRA only protects the public from failing to provide information to a government agency. Here, the obligor did file the information requested on Form I-352, therefore, the obligor cannot avail himself of the affirmative defense provision codified in 44 U.S.C. § 3512. Only those persons who refuse to comply with a collection of information can raise the public protection provision as in Saco River Cellular, Inc. v. FCC, 133 F.3d. 25, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The U.S. Court of Appeals has stated that the public protection provision is limited in scope and only protects individuals who fail to file information. U.S. v. Spitzauer 176 F.3d 486 (9th Cir. 1999) (Unpublished, text in Westlaw); cert denied 528 U.S. 921, 120 S.Ct. 283 (Oct. 4, 1999).

On appeal, counsel further asserts that the Service failed to provide all the required information on the questionnaire.

The questionnaire form states in part that it is to be completed on the basis of information available. As there is no evidence in the record to suggest the applicant had been detained by a penal, mental, or other institution, subsequent to posting of the bond, counsel's assertion on appeal is moot. It is noted that the questionnaire did include the bonded alien's identity information (name, A-number, and photograph).

On appeal, counsel contends that the obligor is not bound by the obligations it freely undertook in submitting the bond in this case, and that the Service cannot enforce the terms of the Form I-352 because "its terms constitute regulations, and the INS did not submit it to Congress for review as required by the Congressional Review Act" (CRA), 5 U.S.C. section 801, et seq. This argument is meritless.

For purposes of the CRA, the term "rule" has, with three exceptions, the same meaning that the term has for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 8 U.S.C. section 804(3). The relevant provision of the APA defines a "rule" as the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency. 5 U.S.C. 551(4).

There are at least two reasons why Form I-352 is not a "rule" for purposes of the CRA. First, the Form I-352 is not a rule at all. It is a bonding agreement, in effect, a surety contract under which the appellant undertakes to guarantee an alien's appearance in the immigration court, and, if it comes to that, for removal. Section 236(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. section 1226(a)(2), permits the Attorney General to release on bond an alien subject to removal

proceedings. This section also permits the Attorney General to describe the conditions on such bonds, and to approve the security on them. Section 103(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. section 1103(a)(3), permits the Attorney General to prescribe bond forms. While Form I-352 may well be a form used to comply with rules relating to release of aliens on bond, the Form itself is not a rule. It is not an "agency statement," 5 U.S.C. section 551(4), but a surety agreement between the obligor and the Government.

Second, even if it can be said that Form I-352 is a "rule," the CRA does not apply. The CRA itself provides that its requirements do not apply to a "rule of particular applicability." 5 U.S.C. 804(3)(A). If Form I-352 is a "rule," it is "of particular applicability" since it applies only to each particular case in which a person freely agrees to sign and file the Form I-352.

Delivery bonds are violated if the obligor fails to cause the bonded alien to be produced or to produce himself/herself to an immigration officer or immigration judge upon each and every written request until removal proceedings are finally terminated, or until the alien is actually accepted by the immigration officer for detention or removal. Matter of Smith, 16 I&N Dec. 146 (Reg. Comm. 1977).

The regulations provide that an obligor shall be released from liability where there has been "substantial performance" of all conditions imposed by the terms of the bond. 8 C.F.R. 103.6(c)(3). A bond is breached when there has been a substantial violation of the stipulated conditions of the bond. 8 C.F.R. 103.6(e).

8 C.F.R. 103.5a(a)(2) provides that personal service may be effected by any of the following:

- (i) Delivery of a copy personally;
- (ii) Delivery of a copy at a person's dwelling house or usual place of abode by leaving it with some person of suitable age and discretion;
- (iii) Delivery of a copy at the office of an attorney or other person including a corporation, by leaving it with a person in charge;
- (iv) Mailing a copy by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, addressed to a person at his last known address.

The bond (Form I-352) provides in pertinent part that the obligor "agrees that any notice to him/her in connection with this bond may be accomplished by mail directed to him/her at the above address." In this case, the Form I-352 listed 407 Fannin St., Houston, TX 77002 as the obligor's address.

Contained in the record is a certified mail receipt which indicates that the Notice to Deliver Alien was sent to the obligor at 407 Fannin St., Houston, TX 77002 on August 24, 2001. This notice demanded that the obligor produce the bonded alien for removal on September 26, 2001. The receipt also indicates the obligor received notice to produce the bonded alien on August 30, 2001. Consequently, the record clearly establishes that the notice was properly served on the obligor in compliance with 8 C.F.R. 103.5a(a)(2)(iv).

Furthermore, it is clear from the language used in the bond agreement that the obligor shall cause the alien to be produced or the alien shall produce himself to a Service officer upon each and every request of such officer until removal proceedings are either finally terminated or the alien is accepted by the Service for detention or removal.

It must be noted that delivery bonds are exacted to insure that aliens will be produced when and where required by the Service for hearings or removal. Such bonds are necessary in order for the Service to function in an orderly manner. The courts have long considered the confusion which would result if aliens could be surrendered at any time or place it suited their or the surety's convenience. Matter of L-, 3 I&N Dec. 862 (C.O. 1950).

After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the conditions of the bond have been substantially violated, and the collateral has been forfeited. The decision of the district director will not be disturbed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.