



U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

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OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536

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FILE: [redacted] Office: Houston

Date: 11 JUN 2002

IN RE: Obligor: [redacted]
Bonded Alien: [redacted]

IMMIGRATION BOND: Bond Conditioned for the Delivery of an Alien under Section 103
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1103

IN BEHALF OF OBLIGOR:

[redacted]

Public Copy

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The delivery bond in this matter was declared breached by the District Director, Houston, Texas, and is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record indicates that on October 6, 2000, the obligor posted a \$5,000 bond conditioned for the delivery of the above referenced alien. A Notice to Deliver Alien (Form I-340) dated August 9, 2001, was sent to the obligor via certified mail, return receipt requested. The notice demanded the bonded alien's surrender into the custody of an officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (the Service) for removal at 9:00 a.m. on September 11, 2001, at 126 Northpoint Drive, Houston, TX 77060. The obligor failed to present the alien, and the alien failed to appear as required. On October 3, 2001, the district director informed the obligor that the delivery bond had been breached.

On appeal, counsel contends that the obligor is not bound by the obligations it freely undertook in submitting the bond in this case, and that the Service cannot enforce the terms of the Form I-352 because "its terms constitute regulations, and the INS did not submit it to Congress for review as required by the Congressional Review Act" (CRA), 5 U.S.C. section 801, et seq. This argument is meritless.

For purposes of the CRA, the term "rule" has, with three exceptions, the same meaning that the term has for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 8 U.S.C. section 804(3). The relevant provision of the APA defines a "rule" as the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency. 5 U.S.C. 551(4).

There are at least two reasons why Form I-352 is not a "rule" for purposes of the CRA. First, the Form I-352 is not a rule at all. It is a bonding agreement, in effect, a surety contract under which the appellant undertakes to guarantee an alien's appearance in the immigration court, and, if it comes to that, for removal. Section 236(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. section 1226(a)(2), permits the Attorney General to release on bond an alien subject to removal proceedings. This section also permits the Attorney General to describe the conditions on such bonds, and to approve the security on them. Section 103(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. section 1103(a)(3), permits the Attorney General to prescribe bond forms. While Form I-352 may well be a form used to comply with rules relating to release of aliens on bond, the Form itself is not a rule. It is not an "agency statement," 5 U.S.C. section 551(4), but a surety agreement between the obligor and the Government.

Second, even if it can be said that Form I-352 is a "rule," the CRA does not apply. The CRA itself provides that its requirements do not apply to a "rule of particular applicability." 5 U.S.C. 804(3)(A). If Form I-352 is a "rule," it is "of particular

applicability" since it applies only to each particular case in which a person freely agrees to sign and file the Form I-352.

On appeal, counsel states that the bonded alien is a national of El Salvador. Counsel opines that the bonded alien may be eligible for Temporary Protected Status. Jurisdiction over such a determination lies with the Service or the immigration judge, not the obligor for the alien's delivery bond. Counsel has not submitted evidence that the bonded alien has been granted Temporary Protected Status by either the Service or an immigration judge. Counsel's opinion of the bonded alien's eligibility for an immigration benefit has no effect on the obligation of the obligor to produce the bonded alien on demand.

It is further noted that the present record contains evidence that a properly completed questionnaire with the alien's photograph attached was forwarded to the obligor with the notice to surrender pursuant to the Amwest/Reno Settlement Agreement, entered into on June 22, 1995, by the Service and Far West Surety Insurance Company.

Delivery bonds are violated if the obligor fails to cause the bonded alien to be produced or to produce himself/herself to an immigration officer or immigration judge upon each and every written request until removal proceedings are finally terminated, or until the alien is actually accepted by the immigration officer for detention or removal. Matter of Smith, 16 I&N Dec. 146 (Reg. Comm. 1977).

The regulations provide that an obligor shall be released from liability where there has been "substantial performance" of all conditions imposed by the terms of the bond. 8 C.F.R. 103.6(c)(3). A bond is breached when there has been a substantial violation of the stipulated conditions of the bond. 8 C.F.R. 103.6(e).

8 C.F.R. 103.5a(a)(2) provides that personal service may be effected by any of the following:

- (i) Delivery of a copy personally;
- (ii) Delivery of a copy at a person's dwelling house or usual place of abode by leaving it with some person of suitable age and discretion;
- (iii) Delivery of a copy at the office of an attorney or other person including a corporation, by leaving it with a person in charge;
- (iv) Mailing a copy by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, addressed to a person at his last known address.

The bond (Form I-352) provides in pertinent part that the obligor "agrees that any notice to him/her in connection with this bond may

be accomplished by mail directed to him/her at the above address." In this case, the Form I-352 listed [REDACTED] as the obligor's address.

Contained in the record is a certified mail receipt which indicates that the Notice to Deliver Alien was sent to the obligor at [REDACTED] on August 9, 2001. This notice demanded that the obligor produce the bonded alien for removal on September 11, 2001. The receipt also indicates the obligor received notice to produce the bonded alien on August 18, 2001. Consequently, the record clearly establishes that the notice was properly served on the obligor in compliance with 8 C.F.R. 103.5a(a)(2)(iv).

On appeal, counsel asserts that the obligor surrendered the bonded alien on September 26, 15 days subsequent to the surrender date. Counsel states that the Service has made no showing that this surrender was not substantial compliance with the terms of the bond.

8 C.F.R. 103.6(c)(3) provides that an obligor shall be released from liability where there has been "substantial performance" of all conditions imposed by the terms of the bond. 8 C.F.R. 103.6(e) provides that a bond is breached when there has been "substantial violation of the stipulated conditions of the bond." "Substantial performance" exists where there has been no willful departure from the terms or conditions of a bond, where the conditions have been honestly and faithfully complied with and the only variance from their strict and actual performance consists of technical or unimportant occurrences. "Substantial violation" exists where there is a willful departure from the terms or conditions of the bond or the failure to comply or adhere to the essential elements of those terms or conditions. See Matter of Nguyen, 15 I&N Dec. 176 (Reg. Comm. 1975); Matter of Arbelaez-Naranjo, 18 I&N Dec. 403 (Reg. Comm. 1983).

Where there is a variance from the strict and literal performance of the conditions of a delivery bond, an obligor must establish substantial performance which is of benefit to the government. Proceedings regarding administrative cancellation of removal before a district director or the Board of Immigration Appeals are set forth by regulation. See 8 C.F.R. 241.6.

In Matter of Allied Fidelity Insurance Company, 19 I&N Dec. 124 (Comm. 1984), it was held that determining whether a violation is "substantial" within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. 103.6(e) requires consideration of the following factors:

- (a) Extent of the breach;
- (b) Whether the violation was intentional or accidental on the part of the alien;

(c) Whether the actions which constitute the violation were committed in good faith; and

(d) Whether the alien took steps to made amends, or to put himself in compliance.

Following the guidelines contained in Matter of Allied Fidelity Insurance Company, supra, the violation was intentional because the bonded alien absconded and made the demand upon him impossible by his own actions. See Matter of S-, 3 I&N Dec. 813 (C.O. 1949). The alien's actions were not committed in good faith and he failed to take steps to put himself in compliance. Such action demonstrates a complete absence of good faith on the part of the bonded alien as held in Matter of Allied Fidelity Insurance Company, supra.

Furthermore, it is clear from the language used in the bond agreement that the obligor shall cause the alien to be produced or the alien shall produce himself to a Service officer upon each and every request of such officer until removal proceedings are either finally terminated or the alien is accepted by the Service for detention or removal.

It must be noted that delivery bonds are exacted to insure that aliens will be produced when and where required by the Service for hearings or removal. Such bonds are necessary in order for the Service to function in an orderly manner. The courts have long considered the confusion which would result if aliens could be surrendered at any time or place it suited their or the surety's convenience. Matter of L-, 3 I&N Dec. 862 (C.O. 1950).

After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the conditions of the bond have been substantially violated, and the collateral has been forfeited. The decision of the district director will not be disturbed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.