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U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Citizenship and Immigration Services

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE  
CIS, AAO, 20 Mass, 3/F  
425 I Street N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20536



**PUBLIC COPY**

FILE # [redacted] Office: Dallas Date:

IN RE: Obligor: [redacted]  
Bonded Alien: [redacted]

DEC 29 2011

IMMIGRATION BOND: Bond Conditioned for the Delivery of an Alien under Section 103 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103

ON BEHALF OF OBLIGOR: [redacted]

Identifying data related to  
proceedings involving  
invasion of personal privacy

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of Citizenship and Immigrations Services (CIS) where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. *Id.*

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.7.

*Mari Johnson*  
Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The delivery bond in this matter was declared breached by the District Director, Dallas, Texas, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record indicates that on January 31, 2001, the obligor posted a \$10,000 bond conditioned for the delivery of the above referenced alien. A Notice to Deliver Alien (Form I-340) dated August 7, 2002 was sent to the obligor via certified mail, return receipt requested. The notice demanded the bonded alien's surrender into the custody of an officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (legacy INS), now Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), at 10:00 a.m. on September 5, 2002, at [REDACTED] Dallas, TX 75247. The obligor failed to present the alien, and the alien failed to appear as required. On September 10, 2002, the district director informed the obligor that the delivery bond had been breached.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the district director failed to provide the obligor with a properly completed questionnaire, as the officer did not sign the questionnaire attesting to its accuracy. Counsel argues that the failure of the officer to sign the questionnaire requires cancellation of the bond because it does not comply with settlement negotiations relating to the Amwest/Reno Settlement Agreement entered into on June 22, 1995 by the legacy INS and Far West Surety Insurance Company.

The Settlement Agreement at Exhibit F provides that "a questionnaire prepared by the surety with approval of the INS [now ICE] will be completed by [ICE] whenever a demand to produce a bonded alien is to be delivered to the surety. The completed questionnaire will be certified correct by an officer of [ICE] delivered to the surety with the demand."

ICE is in substantial compliance with the Settlement Agreement when the questionnaire provides the obligor with sufficient identifying information to assist in expeditiously locating the alien, and does not mislead the obligor. Each case must be considered on its own merits. Failure to include a photograph, for example, which is not absolutely required under the terms of the Agreement, does not have the same impact as an improper alien number or wrong name. The AAO must look at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the obligor has been prejudiced by ICE's failure to fill in all of the blanks or to sign the questionnaire.

The obligor has not alleged or established any prejudice resulting from the district director's failure to sign the questionnaire. More importantly, failure to complete each section or to sign the questionnaire does not invalidate the bond breach.

On appeal, counsel states that the alien was granted voluntary departure on January 2, 2002. Counsel states that the obligor

does not know whether the immigration judge (IJ) set a voluntary departure bond, whether the alien posted such a bond or whether the alien has departed the United States. Counsel asserts that, according to ICE training, any one of these events constitutes sufficient grounds for sustaining the appeal and canceling the bond.

Counsel provides documentation developed by the Office of General Counsel (OGC) of the legacy INS, now Office of the Chief Counsel (OCC), that states a delivery bond must be canceled if an immigration court grants voluntary departure in a removal proceeding without the requirement of a voluntary departure bond and without setting other conditions on the grant of voluntary departure. The AAO has held in a precedent decision that OGC memoranda are merely opinions. OGC is not an adjudicative body and is in the position only of being an advisor; as such, adjudicators are not bound by OGC recommendations. See *Matter of Izummi*, 22 I&N Dec. 169 (Comm. 1998). Further, the AAO is not bound to follow a policy that violates procedure established by statute or regulation. *Accardi v. Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).

The record reflects that a removal hearing was held on January 2, 2002 and the alien was granted voluntary departure from the United States on or before March 3, 2002, with an alternate order of removal to take effect in the event that the alien failed to depart as required. The court ordered the alien to post a \$10,000 voluntary departure bond. The court also ordered that the delivery bond previously posted by the alien be converted to a voluntary departure bond upon representation of counsel that this would be with the obligor's consent. Despite the obligor's apparent acquiescence in the judge's order, the attempt to convert the delivery bond without the obligor's consent in writing to the requirements imposed by a voluntary departure bond is ineffective. Therefore, the delivery bond remains in place.

On appeal, counsel states that ICE lost statutory detention authority and hence the authority to maintain the delivery bond if the immigration judge granted the alien voluntary departure without the requirement of a bond or other conditions.

The AAO has continually held that the Secretary's authority to maintain a delivery bond is not contingent upon his authority to detain the alien.

The obligor is bound by the terms of the contract to which it obligated itself. Under the terms of the Form I-352 for bonds conditioned upon the delivery of the alien, the obligor contracted to "cause the alien to be produced or to produce himself/herself . . . upon each and every written request until *exclusion/deportation/removal proceedings* . . . are finally terminated." (Emphasis added). Thus, the obligor is bound to deliver the alien by the express terms of the bond contract until either exclusion, deportation or removal proceedings are finally

terminated, or one of the other conditions occurs.

Counsel suggests that once ICE no longer has detention authority over the alien, the delivery bond must terminate by operation of law. However, this is contrary to the holdings of *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) and *Doan v. INS*, 311 F.3d 1160 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002). In *Zadvydas*, the Supreme Court expressly recognized the authority of the legacy INS to require the posting of a bond as a condition of release after it lost detention authority over the alien, even though a bond was not provided as a condition of release by the statute. In *Doan*, the 9<sup>th</sup> Circuit held the legacy INS had the authority to require a \$10,000 delivery bond in a supervised release context even though it did not have detention authority. Even though these cases arose in the post-removal period, it is obvious from the rulings that detention authority is not the sole determining factor as to whether ICE can require a delivery bond.

The bond contract provides that it may be canceled when (1) exclusion/deportation/removal proceedings are finally terminated; (2) the alien is accepted by ICE for detention or deportation/removal; or (3) the bond is otherwise canceled. The circumstances under which the bond may be "otherwise canceled" occur when the Secretary or the Attorney General imposes a requirement for another bond, and the alien posts such a bond, or when an order of removal has been issued and the alien is taken into custody. As the obligor has not shown that any of these circumstances apply, the bond is not canceled.

The immigration court's failure to order the posting of a voluntary departure bond would not alter the terms of the bond contract, and would not serve to extinguish the delivery bond despite ICE loss of detention authority during the period of voluntary departure. The delivery bond requires delivery of the alien to ICE upon demand or until proceedings have terminated, and is not conditioned upon a theory of constructive detention.

It is noted that the present record contains evidence that a properly completed questionnaire was forwarded to the obligor with the notice to surrender pursuant to the Amwest/Reno Settlement Agreement.

Delivery bonds are violated if the obligor fails to cause the bonded alien to be produced or to produce himself/herself to an ICE officer or immigration judge upon each and every written request until removal proceedings are finally terminated, or until the alien is actually accepted by the ICE officer for detention or removal. *Matter of Smith*, 16 I&N Dec. 146 (Reg. Comm. 1977).

The regulations provide that an obligor shall be released from liability where there has been "substantial performance" of all conditions imposed by the terms of the bond. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(c)(3). A bond is breached when there has been a substantial

violation of the stipulated conditions of the bond. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(e).

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(a)(2), personal service may be effected by any of the following:

- (i) Delivery of a copy personally;
- (ii) Delivery of a copy at a person's dwelling house or usual place of abode by leaving it with some person of suitable age and discretion;
- (iii) Delivery of a copy at the office of an attorney or other person including a corporation, by leaving it with a person in charge;
- (iv) Mailing a copy by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, addressed to a person at his last known address.

Although the record does not contain a domestic return receipt that indicates that the Notice to Deliver Alien was signed by the obligor, counsel acknowledges, on appeal, that the obligor received the notice. Consequently, the record clearly establishes that the notice was properly served on the obligor in compliance with 8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(a)(2)(iv).

Furthermore, it is clear from the language used in the bond agreement that the obligor shall cause the alien to be produced or the alien shall produce himself to an ICE officer upon each and every request of such officer until removal proceedings are either finally terminated or the alien is accepted by ICE for detention or removal.

It must be noted that delivery bonds are exacted to insure that aliens will be produced when and where required by ICE for hearings or removal. Such bonds are necessary in order for ICE to function in an orderly manner. The courts have long considered the confusion which would result if aliens could be surrendered at any time or place it suited the alien's or the surety's convenience. *Matter of L-*, 3 I&N Dec. 862 (C.O. 1950).

After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the conditions of the bond have been substantially violated, and the collateral has been forfeited.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.