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U.S. Department of Justice
Immigration and Naturalization Service

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OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536




FILE: 

Office: Houston


Date: **FEB 27 2003**

IN RE: Obligor:
Bonded Alien:



IMMIGRATION BOND: Bond Conditioned for the Delivery of an Alien under Section 103 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103

IN BEHALF OF OBLIGOR:



identifying data deleted to prevent clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The delivery bond in this matter was declared breached by the District Director, Houston, Texas, and is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record indicates that on December 26, 2001, the obligor posted a \$5,000 bond conditioned for the delivery of the above referenced alien. A Notice to Deliver Alien (Form I-340) dated July 20, 2002, was sent to the obligor via certified mail, return receipt requested. The notice demanded the bonded alien's surrender into the custody of an officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (the Service) at 9:00 a.m. on August 27, 2002, at [REDACTED]. The obligor failed to present the alien, and the alien failed to appear as required. On August 29, 2002, the district director informed the obligor that the delivery bond had been breached.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the director failed to provide the obligor with a properly completed questionnaire as it was not signed.

The Settlement Agreement, Exhibit F, provides that "a questionnaire prepared by the surety with approval of INS will be completed by INS whenever a demand to produce a bonded alien is to be delivered to the surety. The completed questionnaire will be certified correct by an officer of the INS delivered to the surety with the demand." The INS is in compliance with the Settlement Agreement when the questionnaire form is provided to the obligor with the alien's identifying information, such as his or her name, alien number and if available, a photograph. The Settlement Agreement does not require a signature by the certifying officer. Counsel has not alleged or established any prejudice resulting from the Service's failure to sign the questionnaire. More importantly, failure to sign the questionnaire does not invalidate the bond breach.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the alien was granted voluntary departure on March 8, 2002. Counsel indicates that the obligor does not know whether the immigration judge set a voluntary departure bond, whether the alien posted such a bond or whether the alien has departed the United States. Counsel states that one of these events constitutes sufficient grounds for sustaining the appeal and canceling the bond.

The record reflects that a removal hearing was held on March 8, 2002, and the alien was granted voluntary departure from the United States on or before July 5, 2002, with an alternate order of removal to take effect in the event that the alien failed to depart as required. The court did not order the alien to post a voluntary departure bond. The right of appeal was waived.

Voluntary departure may be granted by the Service or by the immigration court under prescribed conditions set forth in the statute at section 240B of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c, and by

regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 240.25 and 8 C.F.R. § 240.26. Under the provisions of section 240B of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c and 8 C.F.R. § 240.26(d), when an immigration court grants a request for voluntary departure, the immigration judge also enters an alternate order of removal to take effect in the event the alien fails to depart as required. The Service, not the immigration court, is statutorily responsible for removing the alien whose order of voluntary departure becomes a final removal order. Section 241 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231. Removal proceedings are not over until the Service has discharged this statutory responsibility. The statute does not extinguish the delivery bond on an alien who remains free to choose whether to voluntarily depart the United States, or to remain in the United States in violation of the order.

The delivery bond will not be canceled until it is replaced by another type of bond to ensure the alien's departure, such as a voluntary departure bond, or under the terms of the bond, until proceedings have terminated or the alien is accepted for removal. As the bonded alien is still in the United States, removal proceedings are not over, and the delivery bond remains in effect.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the obligor has not yet received a response to its FOIA request.

The alleged failure of the Houston District Office to respond to the obligor's FOIA request has no bearing in this matter as bond proceedings are separate and apart from any other proceedings. Furthermore, the mere filing of a FOIA request does not excuse the obligor from delivering the alien as demanded.

On appeal, counsel contends that the obligor is not bound by the obligations it freely undertook in submitting the bond in this case, and that the Service cannot enforce the terms of the Form I-352 because "its terms constitute regulations, and the INS did not submit it to Congress for review as required by the Congressional Review Act" (CRA), 5 U.S.C. § 801, et seq. This argument is meritless.

For purposes of the CRA, the term "rule" has, with three exceptions, the same meaning that the term has for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 8 U.S.C. § 804(3). The relevant provision of the APA defines a "rule" as the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4).

There are at least two reasons why Form I-352 is not a "rule" for purposes of the CRA. First, the Form I-352 is not a rule at all. It is a bonding agreement, in effect, a surety contract under which the appellant undertakes to guarantee an alien's appearance in the immigration court, and, if it comes to that, for removal. Section 236(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2), permits the Attorney

General to release on bond an alien subject to removal proceedings. This section also permits the Attorney General to describe the conditions on such bonds, and to approve the security on them. Section 103(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3), permits the Attorney General to prescribe bond forms. While Form I-352 may well be a form used to comply with rules relating to release of aliens on bond, the Form itself is not a rule. It is not an "agency statement," 5 U.S.C. § 551(4), but a surety agreement between the obligor and the Government.

Second, even if it can be said that Form I-352 is a "rule," the CRA does not apply. The CRA itself provides that its requirements do not apply to a "rule of particular applicability." 5 U.S.C. § 804(3)(A). If Form I-352 is a "rule," it is "of particular applicability" since it applies only to each particular case in which a person freely agrees to sign and file the Form I-352.

Delivery bonds are violated if the obligor fails to cause the bonded alien to be produced or to produce himself/herself to an immigration officer or immigration judge upon each and every written request until removal proceedings are finally terminated, or until the alien is actually accepted by the immigration officer for detention or removal. *Matter of Smith*, 16 I&N Dec. 146 (Reg. Comm. 1977).

The regulations provide that an obligor shall be released from liability where there has been "substantial performance" of all conditions imposed by the terms of the bond. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(c)(3). A bond is breached when there has been a substantial violation of the stipulated conditions of the bond. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(e).

8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(a)(2) provides that personal service may be effected by any of the following:

- (i) Delivery of a copy personally;
- (ii) Delivery of a copy at a person's dwelling house or usual place of abode by leaving it with some person of suitable age and discretion;
- (iii) Delivery of a copy at the office of an attorney or other person including a corporation, by leaving it with a person in charge;
- (iv) Mailing a copy by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, addressed to a person at his last known address.

The bond (Form I-352) provides in pertinent part that the obligor "agrees that any notice to him/her in connection with this bond may be accomplished by mail directed to him/her at the above address." In this case, the Form I-352 listed [REDACTED] as the obligor's address.

The evidence of record indicates that the Notice to Deliver Alien dated July 20, 2002 was hand delivered and signed by a representative of Ranger Insurance Company on July 25, 2002. This notice demanded that the obligor produce the bonded alien on August 27, 2002. Consequently, the record clearly establishes that the notice was properly served on the obligor in compliance with 8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(a)(2)(iv).

Furthermore, it is clear from the language used in the bond agreement that the obligor shall cause the alien to be produced or the alien shall produce himself to a Service officer upon each and every request of such officer until removal proceedings are either finally terminated or the alien is accepted by the Service for detention or removal.

It must be noted that delivery bonds are exacted to insure that aliens will be produced when and where required by the Service for hearings or removal. Such bonds are necessary in order for the Service to function in an orderly manner. The courts have long considered the confusion which would result if aliens could be surrendered at any time or place it suited their or the surety's convenience. *Matter of L-*, 3 I&N Dec. 862 (C.O. 1950).

After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the conditions of the bond have been substantially violated, and the collateral has been forfeited. The decision of the district director will not be disturbed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.