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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services

GI

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE
425 Eye Street N.W.
BCIS, AAO, 20 Mass, 3/F
Washington, D.C. 20536

[REDACTED]

FILE: [REDACTED]

Office: San Antonio

Date: JUL 17 2003

IN RE: Obligor: [REDACTED]
Bonded Alien: [REDACTED]

IMMIGRATION BOND: Bond Conditioned for the Delivery of an Alien under Section
103 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103

ON BEHALF OF OBLIGOR:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (Bureau) where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. *Id.*

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.7.

Robert P. Wiemann

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The delivery bond in this matter was declared breached by the District Director, San Antonio, Texas, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record indicates that on March 23, 2000, the obligor posted a \$6,000 bond conditioned for the delivery of the above referenced alien. A Notice to Deliver Alien (Form I-340) dated December 13, 2001, was sent to the obligor via certified mail, return receipt requested. The notice demanded the bonded alien's surrender into the custody of an officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE), at 10:00 a.m. on January 17, 2002, at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The obligor failed to present the alien, and the alien failed to appear as required. On January 18, 2002, the district director informed the obligor that the delivery bond had been breached.

On appeal, counsel contends that the obligor is not bound by the obligations it freely undertook in submitting the bond in this case, and that the BICE cannot enforce the terms of the Form I-352 because "its terms constitute regulations, and the INS did not submit it to Congress for review as required by the Congressional Review Act" (CRA), 5 U.S.C. § 801, et seq. This argument is meritless.

For purposes of the CRA, the term "rule" has, with three exceptions, the same meaning that the term has for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 5 U.S.C. § 804(3). The relevant provision of the APA defines a "rule" as the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4).

There are at least two reasons why Form I-352 is not a "rule" for purposes of the CRA. First, the Form I-352 is not a rule at all. It is a bonding agreement, in effect, a surety contract under which the appellant undertakes to guarantee an alien's appearance in the immigration court, and, if it comes to that, for removal. Section 236(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2), permits the Attorney General, now the Secretary, Department of Homeland Security (Secretary), to release on bond an alien subject to removal proceedings. This section also permits the Secretary to describe the conditions on such bonds, and to approve the security on them. Section 103(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3), permits the Secretary to prescribe bond forms. While Form I-352 may well be a form used to comply with rules relating to release of aliens on bond, the Form itself is not a rule. It is not an "agency statement," 5 U.S.C. § 551(4), but a surety agreement between the obligor and the Government.

Second, even if it can be said that Form I-352 is a "rule," the CRA does not apply. The CRA itself provides that its requirements do not apply to a "rule of particular applicability." 5 U.S.C. § 804(3)(A). If Form I-352 is a "rule," it is "of particular applicability" since it applies only to each particular case in which a person freely agrees to sign and file the Form I-352.

On appeal, counsel states that the bonded alien is a national of El Salvador. Counsel opines that the bonded alien is eligible for Temporary Protected Status (TPS). Counsel further states that the alien's eligibility raises questions whether his bond has "ceased to exist as a matter of law" since a grant of TPS terminates INS detention and removal authority. Counsel cites no law that provides for a delivery bond to "cease to exist."

Jurisdiction over whether an alien is eligible for TPS lies with the Bureau or the immigration judge, not the obligor for the alien's delivery bond. Counsel has not submitted evidence that the bonded alien has been granted Temporary Protected Status by either the Bureau or an immigration judge.

Temporary Protected Status is by definition a temporary status for certain qualifying aliens from designated countries. At the expiration of a validly granted TPS period, absent some further change of the alien's status, the alien will be required to depart the United States. Under the terms of the bond contract, the BICE has the responsibility to maintain the bond to insure the alien's ultimate departure from the United States. Pursuant to part (G) of the bond contract, the delivery bond remains in effect until removal proceedings are finally terminated or the alien is actually accepted for removal.

On appeal, counsel claims that "INS has an affirmative duty to inform [the alien] of her eligibility" for TPS.

Section 244(a)(3) of the Act provides for notice to aliens of their eligibility for Temporary Protected Status in a form and language that the alien can understand. The Bureau has widely publicized the eligibility criteria for each TPS program, both in English and in the native language of the designated country, e.g. Spanish for Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador. This satisfies the notice requirement of the Act.

It is noted that the present record contains evidence that a properly completed questionnaire with the alien's photograph attached was forwarded to the obligor with the notice to surrender pursuant to the Amwest/Reno Settlement Agreement, entered into on June 22, 1995 by the former INS and Far West Surety Insurance Company.

Delivery bonds are violated if the obligor fails to cause the bonded alien to be produced or to produce himself/herself to an immigration officer or immigration judge upon each and every

written request until removal proceedings are finally terminated, or until the alien is actually accepted by the immigration officer for detention or removal. *Matter of Smith*, 16 I&N Dec. 146 (Reg. Comm. 1977).

The regulations provide that an obligor shall be released from liability where there has been "substantial performance" of all conditions imposed by the terms of the bond. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(c)(3). A bond is breached when there has been a substantial violation of the stipulated conditions of the bond. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(e).

8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(a)(2) provides that personal service may be effected by any of the following:

- (i) Delivery of a copy personally;
- (ii) Delivery of a copy at a person's dwelling house or usual place of abode by leaving it with some person of suitable age and discretion;
- (iii) Delivery of a copy at the office of an attorney or other person including a corporation, by leaving it with a person in charge;
- (iv) Mailing a copy by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, addressed to a person at his last known address.

The evidence of record indicates that the Notice to Deliver Alien was sent to the obligor at [REDACTED] on December 13, 2001 via certified mail. This notice demanded that the obligor produce the bonded alien on January 17, 2002. The domestic return receipt indicates the obligor received notice to produce the bonded alien on December 18, 2001. Consequently, the record clearly establishes that the notice was properly served on the obligor in compliance with 8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(a)(2)(iv).

Furthermore, it is clear from the language used in the bond agreement that the obligor shall cause the alien to be produced or the alien shall produce himself to a BICE officer upon each and every request of such officer until removal proceedings are either finally terminated or the alien is accepted by the BICE for detention or removal.

It must be noted that delivery bonds are exacted to insure that aliens will be produced when and where required by the BICE for hearings or removal. Such bonds are necessary in order for the BICE to function in an orderly manner. The courts have long considered the confusion which would result if aliens could be surrendered at any time or place it suited their or the surety's convenience. *Matter of L-*, 3 I&N Dec. 862 (C.O. 1950).



After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the conditions of the bond have been substantially violated, and the collateral has been forfeited. The decision of the district director will not be disturbed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.