

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Citizenship and Immigration Services

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ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE
CIS, AAO, 20 Mass, 3/F
425 I Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20536

FILE: [REDACTED] Office: Miami

Date:

OCT 07 2003

IN RE: Obligor:
Bonded Alien:

[REDACTED]

IMMIGRATION BOND: Bond Conditioned for the Delivery of an Alien under Section
103 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103

ON BEHALF OF OBLIGOR:

[REDACTED]

PUBLIC COPY

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. *Id.*

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.7.

Robert P. Wiemann

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The delivery bond in this matter was declared breached by the District Director, Miami, Florida, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record indicates that on May 30, 2002, the obligor posted a \$5,000 bond conditioned for the delivery of the above referenced alien. A Notice to Deliver Alien (Form I-340) dated December 14, 2002, was sent to the obligor via certified mail, return receipt requested. The notice demanded the bonded alien's surrender into the custody of an officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), at 9:00 a.m. on December 27, 2002, at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The obligor failed to present the alien, and the alien failed to appear as required. On January 7, 2003, the district director informed the obligor that the delivery bond had been breached.

On appeal, counsel contends that the obligor is not bound by the obligations it freely undertook in submitting the bond in this case, and that ICE cannot enforce the terms of the Form I-352 because "its terms constitute regulations, and the INS [now ICE] did not submit it to Congress for review as required by the Congressional Review Act" (CRA), 5 U.S.C. § 801, et seq. This argument is meritless.

For purposes of the CRA, the term "rule" has, with three exceptions, the same meaning that the term has for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 8 U.S.C. § 804(3). The relevant provision of the APA defines a "rule" as the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4).

There are at least two reasons why Form I-352 is not a "rule" for purposes of the CRA. First, the Form I-352 is not a rule at all. It is a bonding agreement, in effect, a surety contract under which the appellant undertakes to guarantee an alien's appearance in the immigration court, and, if it comes to that, for removal. Section 236(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2), permits the Attorney General, now the Secretary, Department of Homeland Security (Secretary), to release on bond an alien subject to removal proceedings. This section also permits the Secretary to describe the conditions on such bonds, and to approve the security on them. Section 103(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3), permits the Secretary to prescribe bond forms. While Form I-352 may well be a form used to comply with rules relating to release of aliens on bond, the Form itself is not a rule. It is not an "agency statement," 5 U.S.C. § 551(4), but a surety agreement between the obligor and the Government.

Second, even if it can be said that Form I-352 is a "rule," the CRA does not apply. The CRA itself provides that its requirements do

not apply to a "rule of particular applicability." 5 U.S.C. § 804(3)(A). Assuming, arguendo, that Form I-352 can be called a rule, it applies only to each particular case in which a person freely agrees to sign and file the Form I-352. Thus, even if the obligor were correct in saying Form I-352 is a rule, it would be a rule of particular applicability, exempt from the reporting requirement.

On appeal, counsel states that the director ignored the language in Exhibit G of the Amwest/Reno Settlement Agreement entered into on June 22, 1995 by the former INS and Far West Surety Insurance Company (Settlement Agreement). Counsel argues that calling the alien in for an interview when there was an Order of Removal issued and upheld by the Board of Immigration Appeals is an incorrect statement of purpose. Counsel asserts that the bond breach must be rescinded.

ICE records show that removal proceedings were held in absentia on October 17, 2002, and the alien was ordered removed from the United States. The evidence does not indicate that an appeal was filed.

A review of the record indicates the Form I-340, dated December 14, 2002, demanded surrender of the alien on December 27, 2002 for the purpose of deportation or exclusion. Counsel's argument is thus wholly without merit.

On appeal, counsel asserts that ICE failed to meet the 72-hour deadline established by procedures implementing the Settlement Agreement for responding to the obligor's request for the early surrender of the alien. Counsel argues that the 24 days that elapsed between the obligor's request for early surrender and ICE's issuance of the Form I-340 requires cancellation of the bond, as ICE blatantly disregarded such procedures. Counsel fails to submit any documentation to support his argument. The assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Laureano*, 19 I&N Dec. 1, 3 (BIA 1983); *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980).

The Settlement Agreement, exhibit H, indicates that the obligor may request revocation of the bond upon early surrender of the alien. Filing the petition to request early surrender does not constitute substantial compliance with the conditions of the bond agreement. Exhibit H further indicates that the decision to revoke the alien's bond is in the sole discretion of the district director or his designee. Counsel has not shown that the 24 days it took the district director to issue the Form I-340 was unreasonable or prejudiced the obligor from delivering the alien as required.

It is noted that the present record contains evidence that a properly completed questionnaire with the alien's photograph attached was forwarded to the obligor with the notice to surrender

pursuant to the Amwest/Reno Settlement Agreement, entered into on June 22, 1995 by the former INS and Far West Surety Insurance Company.

Delivery bonds are violated if the obligor fails to cause the bonded alien to be produced or to produce himself/herself to an immigration officer or immigration judge upon each and every written request until removal proceedings are finally terminated, or until the alien is actually accepted by the ICE for detention or removal. *Matter of Smith*, 16 I&N Dec. 146 (Reg. Comm. 1977).

The regulations provide that an obligor shall be released from liability where there has been "substantial performance" of all conditions imposed by the terms of the bond. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(c)(3). A bond is breached when there has been a substantial violation of the stipulated conditions of the bond. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(e).

8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(a)(2) provides that personal service may be effected by any of the following:

- (i) Delivery of a copy personally;
- (ii) Delivery of a copy at a person's dwelling house or usual place of abode by leaving it with some person of suitable age and discretion;
- (iii) Delivery of a copy at the office of an attorney or other person including a corporation, by leaving it with a person in charge;
- (iv) Mailing a copy by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, addressed to a person at his last known address.

The evidence of record indicates that the Notice to Deliver Alien was sent to the obligor at [REDACTED] on December 14, 2002 via certified mail. This notice demanded that the obligor produce the bonded alien on December 27, 2002. The domestic return receipt indicates the obligor received notice to produce the bonded alien on December 19, 2002. Consequently, the record clearly establishes that the notice was properly served on the obligor in compliance with 8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(a)(2)(iv).

Furthermore, it is clear from the language used in the bond agreement that the obligor shall cause the alien to be produced or the alien shall produce himself to an ICE officer upon each and every request of such officer until removal proceedings are either finally terminated or the alien is accepted by ICE for detention or removal.

It must be noted that delivery bonds are exacted to insure that aliens will be produced when and where required by ICE for hearings or removal. Such bonds are necessary in order for ICE to function

in an orderly manner. The courts have long considered the confusion which would result if aliens could be surrendered at any time or place it suited the alien's or the surety's convenience. *Matter of L-*, 3 I&N Dec. 862 (C.O. 1950).

After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the conditions of the bond have been substantially violated, and the collateral has been forfeited. The decision of the district director will not be disturbed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.