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
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U.S. Citizenship
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


Office: HOUSTON

Date: **SEP 02 2005**

IN RE:

Obligor:



Bonded Alien:



IMMIGRATION BOND:

Bond Conditioned for the Delivery of an Alien under Section 103 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103

ON BEHALF OF OBLIGOR:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Mari Johnson

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The delivery bond in this matter was declared breached by the Field Office Director, Detention and Removal, Houston, Texas, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record indicates that May 5, 2004, the obligor posted a \$5,000 bond conditioned for the delivery of the above referenced alien. A Notice to Deliver Alien (Form I-340) dated May 19, 2005, was sent via certified mail, return receipt requested. The notice demanded the bonded alien's surrender into the custody of an officer of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at 9:00 a.m. on June 22, 2005, at [REDACTED]. The obligor failed to present the alien, and the alien failed to appear as required. On June 29, 2005, the field office director informed the obligor that the delivery bond had been breached.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the delivery bond should be canceled because prior to the breach notice the: 1) alien was in ICE's custody; 2) alien was granted permanent residency; and 3) alien's removal proceedings were terminated. Counsel, however, fails to submit evidence to support any of his arguments. The assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Laureano*, 19 I&N Dec. 1, 3 (BIA 1983); *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980).

On appeal, counsel argues that the breach is invalid because ICE failed to comply with the Amwest/Reno Settlement Agreement with respect to the requisite notice and questionnaire to be sent to both the obligor and co-obligor.

On April 6, 2005, the Headquarters Office of Detention and Removal Operations issued a memorandum entitled *Declarations of Breach of Delivery Bonds*. This memorandum confirms that the terms of the Amwest I and Amwest II Settlement Agreements are binding only on those companies who were parties to the agreements. Accordingly, as the obligor was not a party to Amwest I or Amwest II Settlement Agreements, counsel's claim is without merit.

The Form I-352 provides that the obligor and co-obligor are jointly and severally liable for the obligations imposed by the bond contract. As such, ICE may pursue a breach of bond against one or both of the contracting parties. See *Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty* § 50 (1996). Consequently, the record clearly establishes that the notice was properly served on either the obligor or the co-obligor in compliance with 8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(a)(2)(iv). Reference in this decision to the obligor is equally applicable to the co-obligor and vice versa.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the bonded alien was ordered deported on January 5, 2005. Counsel further asserts that the delivery bond should be canceled as a matter of law as required by the *Amwest v. Reno* Settlement Agreement and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (legacy INS) implementing memorandum because ICE made no attempt to execute this order within 90 days, and has lost detention authority.

As previously mentioned, as the obligor was not a party to Amwest I or Amwest II Settlement Agreements, counsel's claim is without merit.

The record reflects that a removal hearing was held on January 7, 2005 and the alien was ordered removed in absentia.

In *Bartholomeu v. INS*, 487 F. Supp. 315 (D. Md. 1980), the judge stated regarding former section 242(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) that, although the statute limited the authority of the Attorney General, now the Secretary, Department of Homeland Security (Secretary), to detain an alien after a six-month period (at that time) following the entry of an order of removal, the period had been extended where the delay in effecting removal arose not from any dalliance on the part of the Attorney General but from the alien's own resort to delay or avoid removal. The Attorney General never had his unhampered and unimpeded six-month period in which to effect the alien's timely removal because the alien failed to appear for removal and remained a fugitive.

Present section 241(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2), gives the Secretary authority to physically detain an alien for a period of 90 days from the date of final order of removal for the purpose of effecting removal, and was intended to give the Secretary a specific unhampered period of time within which to effect removal. Section 241(a)(1)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C), specifically provides for an extension of the removal period beyond the 90-day period when the alien conspires or acts to prevent his own removal. As the alien in this case failed to appear for the removal hearing, the Secretary's detention authority is suspended, and, following *Bartholomeu*, will be deemed to start running when the alien is apprehended and otherwise available for actual removal.

As noted above, the Secretary maintains detention authority in this case, as the alien failed to appear for her removal hearing and to surrender to ICE for removal. We will nevertheless fully address counsel's arguments below.

The AAO has continually held that the Secretary's authority to maintain a delivery bond is not contingent upon his authority to detain the alien. Counsel argues this ruling is contrary to *Shrode v. Rowoldt*, 213 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1954).

Following his arrest for violating immigration laws, [REDACTED] the alien in *Shrode*, was released on a bond conditioned upon his appearance for deportation proceedings. Although the order of deportation became final in April 1952, he was not deported. In October 1952, more than six months after the deportation order became final, [REDACTED] was placed on supervisory parole. Immigration officials, however, refused to release him from bond.

In upholding the lower court's decision releasing [REDACTED] from bond, the appellate court noted that the statute granted the Attorney General supervisory and limited detention authority but did not authorize the posting of bond. The court stated that the requirement to post bail is tantamount to making the sureties jailers, and that the power to require bail connotes the power to imprison in the absence of such bail. Since the only authority the Attorney General could exercise in [REDACTED] case was supervisory, a bond could not be required.

Since *Shrode*, section 305 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA) added section 241(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1). It provides generally that the Secretary shall remove an alien from the United States within 90 days following the order of removal, with the 90-day period suspended for cause. During the 90-day removal period, the Secretary shall exercise detention authority by taking the alien into custody and canceling any previously posted bond unless the bond has been breached or is subject to being breached. Section 241(a)(2) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 241.3(a).

Section 241(a)(3) of the Act provides that if an alien does not leave or is not removed during the 90-day period, the alien shall be subject to supervision under regulations prescribed by the Secretary. Posting of a bond may be authorized as a condition of release after the 90-day detention period. 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(b). Thus, unlike in *Shrode*, the Secretary has the continuing authority to require aliens to post bond following the 90-day post-order detention period.

The obligor is bound by the terms of the contract to which it obligated itself. The terms of the Form I-352 for bonds conditioned upon the delivery of the alien establish the following condition: "the obligor shall cause the alien to be produced or to produce himself/herself . . . upon each and every written request until *exclusion/deportation/removal proceedings* . . . are finally terminated." (Emphasis added). Thus, the obligor is bound to deliver the alien by the express terms of the bond contract until either exclusion, deportation or removal proceedings are finally terminated, or one of the other conditions occurs.

In *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court expressly recognized the authority of the legacy INS to require the posting of a bond as a condition of release after it lost detention authority over the alien, even though a bond was not provided as a condition of release by the statute. In *Doan v. INS*, 311 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2002), the 9th Circuit held the legacy INS had the authority to require a \$10,000 delivery bond in a supervised release context even though it did not have detention authority. These cases arose in the post-removal period, and it is obvious from the rulings that detention authority is not the sole determining factor as to whether ICE can require a delivery bond.

The bond contract provides that it may be canceled when (1) exclusion/deportation/removal proceedings are finally terminated; (2) the alien is accepted by ICE for detention or deportation/removal; or (3) the bond is otherwise canceled. The circumstances under which the bond may be "otherwise canceled" occur when the Secretary or the Attorney General imposes a requirement for another bond, and the alien posts such a bond, or when an order of deportation has been issued and the alien is taken into custody. As the obligor has not shown that any of these circumstances apply, the bond is not canceled.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the breach was improper as the alien was given voluntary departure status. Counsel's assertion is unfounded as the record clearly reflects that the alien was ordered *removed* from the United States.

Delivery bonds are violated if the obligor fails to cause the bonded alien to be produced or to produce himself/herself to an immigration officer or immigration judge upon each and every written request until removal proceedings are finally terminated, or until the alien is actually accepted by the immigration officer for detention or removal. *Matter of Smith*, 16 I&N Dec. 146 (Reg. Comm. 1977).

The regulations provide that an obligor shall be released from liability where there has been "substantial performance" of all conditions imposed by the terms of the bond. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(c)(3). A bond is breached when there has been a substantial violation of the stipulated conditions of the bond. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(e).

8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(a)(2) provides that personal service may be effected by any of the following:

- (i) Delivery of a copy personally;

(ii) Delivery of a copy at a person's dwelling house or usual place of abode by leaving it with some person of suitable age and discretion;

(iii) Delivery of a copy at the office of an attorney or other person including a corporation, by leaving it with a person in charge;

(iv) Mailing a copy by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, addressed to a person at his last known address.

The evidence of record indicates that the Notice to Deliver Alien dated May 19, 2005 was sent via certified mail. This notice demanded that the obligor produce the bonded alien on June 22, 2005. The domestic return receipt shows it was signed by a representative of AAA Bonding Agency, and was subsequently received by ICE on May 27, 2005. Consequently, the record clearly establishes that the notice was properly served on the obligor in compliance with 8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(a)(2)(iv).

It is clear from the language used in the bond agreement that the obligor shall cause the alien to be produced or the alien shall produce himself to an ICE officer upon each and every request of such officer until removal proceedings are either finally terminated or the alien is accepted by ICE for detention or removal.

It must be noted that delivery bonds are exacted to insure that aliens will be produced when and where required by ICE for hearings or removal. Such bonds are necessary in order for ICE to function in an orderly manner. The courts have long considered the confusion which would result if aliens could be surrendered at any time or place it suited the alien's or the surety's convenience. *Matter of L-*, 3 I&N Dec. 862 (C.O. 1950).

After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the conditions of the bond have been substantially violated, and the collateral has been forfeited. The decision of the field office director will not be disturbed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.