



U.S. Department of Justice  
Immigration and Naturalization Service

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OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS  
425 Eye Street N.W.  
ULLB, 3rd Floor  
Washington, D.C. 20536



FEB 12 2001

File: [Redacted] Office: MANILLA, PHILIPPINES

Date:

IN RE: Applicant:



Application: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212 (i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(i)

IN BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



PUBLIC COPY

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

identification data deleted to prevent clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,  
EXAMINATIONS

Robert P. Wiemann, Acting Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Officer in Charge, Manila, Philippines, and a subsequent appeal was dismissed by the Associate Commissioner for Examinations. The matter is now before the Associate Commissioner on a motion to reopen. The motion will be granted and the order dismissing the appeal will be affirmed. The application will be denied.

The applicant is a native and citizen of the Philippines who was found to be inadmissible to the United States by a consular officer under § 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having attempted to procure an immigrant visa by fraud or willful misrepresentation in 1984. The applicant is the married daughter of a naturalized United States citizen and is the beneficiary of an approved petition for alien relative. The applicant seeks the above waiver in order to travel to the United States to reside and care for her aging mother.

The officer in charge concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly. The Associate Commissioner affirmed that decision on appeal.

On motion, counsel states that the Service erred in implying that there is no hardship because there are relatives living in the United States who can care for the applicant's mother. Counsel submits an affidavit which reflects that one of the applicant's sisters lives too far away to care for the mother on a daily basis and the other sister works full-time and is only able to care for the mother in her spare time. Counsel submits a physician's letter to substantiate the poor health of the applicant's mother.

The record reflects the applicant applied for an immigrant visa in February 1984 as the unmarried daughter of a lawful permanent resident when, in reality, she was already married and not entitled to that preference classification. Her application for an immigrant visa was subsequently denied for willful misrepresentation of a material fact in April 1984.

Section 212(a) CLASSES OF ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS OR ADMISSION.-Except as otherwise provided in this Act, aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States:

(6) ILLEGAL ENTRANTS AND IMMIGRATION VIOLATORS.-

(C) MISREPRESENTATION.-

(i) IN GENERAL.-Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or

has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) ADMISSION OF IMMIGRANT INADMISSIBLE FOR FRAUD OR WILLFUL MISREPRESENTATION OF MATERIAL FACT.-

(1) The Attorney General may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

(2) No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action of the Attorney General regarding a waiver under paragraph (1).

Sections 212(a)(6)(C) and 212(i) of the Act were amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. There is no longer any alternative provision for waiver of a § 212(a)(6)(C)(i) violation due to passage of time. In the absence of explicit statutory direction, an applicant's eligibility is determined under the statute in effect at the time his or her application is finally considered. See Matter of Soriano, 21 I&N Dec. 516 (BIA 1996, A.G. 1997).

If an amendment makes the statute more restrictive after the application is filed, the eligibility is determined under the terms of the amendment. Conversely, if the amendment makes the statute more generous, the application must be considered by more generous terms. Matter of George and Lopez-Alvarez, 11 I&N Dec. 419 (BIA 1965); Matter of Leveque, 12 I&N Dec. 633 (BIA 1968).

After reviewing the amendments to the Act and to other statutes regarding fraud and misrepresentation from 1957 to the present time, and after noting the increased penalties Congress has placed on such activities, including the narrowing of the parameters for eligibility, and the re-inclusion of the perpetual bar, it is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping fraud and misrepresentation related to immigration and other matters.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from § 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent

first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Although extreme hardship is a requirement for § 212(i) relief, once established, it is but one favorable discretionary factor to be considered. See Matter of Mendez, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, Interim Decision 3380 (BIA 1999), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) stipulated that the factors deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to § 212(i) of the Act include, but are not limited to, the following: the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and finally, significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

In Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, the Board also held that the underlying fraud or misrepresentation may be considered as an adverse factor in adjudicating a § 212(i) waiver application in the exercise of discretion. Matter of Tijam, Interim Decision 3372 (BIA 1998), followed. The Board declined to follow the policy set forth by the Commissioner in Matter of Alonso, 17 I&N Dec. 292 (Comm. 1979), and noted that the United States Supreme Court ruled in INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26 (1996), that the Attorney General has the authority to consider any and all negative factors, including the respondent's initial fraud.

The court held in INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

The record reflects that the applicant's mother is 90 years old and suffers from failing health. She has severe peripheral vascular disease with impending gangrene of the toes on her left foot and, according to counsel, now requires amputation of the left leg. The applicant's mother has also had heart valve replacement, a leaking heart valve, and heart bypass surgery among other ailments. Counsel provides statements from a physician that the applicant's mother requires full-time assistance because her health is deteriorating. Documentation in the record reflects that one of applicant's two sisters lives too far away to be able to provide daily assistance while the other sister, with whom the mother lives, can only provide assistance to the mother in her spare time when she is not working.

The thrust of counsel's argument focuses on the separation of the

applicant from her mother and that, due to such separation, her mother will be unable to care for herself and may be put into a State institution at taxpayer's expense. Counsel states that the applicant's mother has no independent income with which to pay for daily care or to pay for a convalescent hospital. Counsel states that the applicant's mother is supported financially by her daughter [REDACTED]. These assertions are unsupported in the record. The assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1998); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980).

Counsel asserts that two additional siblings of the applicant, a brother and a sister, live more than three and one-half hours away and neither one contributes financially to their mother's care. This assertion is also unsupported in the record. Counsel then alleges that, due to the fact that the applicant's two other siblings do not contribute to their mother's care or support, there is an extreme hardship which can be ameliorated by allowing the applicant to come to the United States.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, fails to establish the existence of hardship to the applicant's mother (the only qualifying relative) caused by separation that reaches the level of extreme as envisioned by Congress if the applicant is not allowed to travel to the United States to reside at this time. Although the applicant's mother is 90 years old and suffers a variety of ills associated with her advanced age, she has four children, as well as their immediate family members, residing in the United States to arrange for her care. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under § 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. See Matter of T-S-Y-, 7 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1957). Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the order dismissing the appeal will be affirmed.

**ORDER:** The order of December 10, 1999 dismissing the appeal is affirmed.