



U.S. Department of Justice
Immigration and Naturalization Service

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OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536



PUBLIC COPY
JAN 30 2001

FILE

Office: Monterrey

Date:

IN RE: Applicant:

APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under § 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(i)

IN BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



identification data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

Mary C. Mulrean, Acting Director
Administrative Appeals Office

wife and she was a U.S. citizen. At that time both claimed to have been married on June 22, 1996. On August 21, 1996, the applicant appeared before a U.S. magistrate and pleaded guilty of a violation of 8 U.S.C. 1325(a)(3). She was sentenced to one day in Service custody and fined. The applicant failed to appear for a hearing on November 14, 1996 regarding her admissibility and the proceedings were cancelled without prejudice.

William pleaded guilty to a violation of 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(2)(A) for attempting to bring an undocumented alien into the United States. He was fined and his leased automobile was seized.

Section 212(a) CLASSES OF ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS OR ADMISSION.-Except as otherwise provided in this Act, aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States:

(6) ILLEGAL ENTRANTS AND IMMIGRATION VIOLATORS.-

(C) MISREPRESENTATION.-

(i) IN GENERAL.-Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

(ii) FALSELY CLAIMING CITIZENSHIP.-Any alien who falsely represents, or has falsely represented himself or herself to be a citizen of the United States for any purpose or benefit under this Act (including § 274A [1324a]) or any other Federal or State law is inadmissible.

Since the applicant's false claim to U.S. citizenship was committed prior to April 1, 1997, she is not subject to the provisions of § 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) of the Act for which no waiver is available.

Section 212(i) ADMISSION OF IMMIGRANT INADMISSIBLE FOR FRAUD OR WILLFUL MISREPRESENTATION OF MATERIAL FACT.-

(1) The Attorney General may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

(2) No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action of the Attorney General regarding a waiver under paragraph (1).

Sections 212(a)(6)(C) and 212(i) of the Act were amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. There is no longer any alternative provision for waiver of a § 212(a)(6)(C)(i) violation due to passage of time. In the absence of explicit statutory direction, an applicant's eligibility is determined under the statute in effect at the time his or her application is finally considered. See Matter of Soriano, 21 I&N Dec. 516 (BIA 1996; A.G. 1997).

If an amendment makes the statute more restrictive after the application is filed, the eligibility is determined under the terms of the amendment. Conversely, if the amendment makes the statute more generous, the application must be considered by more generous terms. Matter of George and Lopez-Alvarez, 11 I&N Dec. 419 (BIA 1965); Matter of Leveque, 12 I&N Dec. 633 (BIA 1968). Nothing could be clearer than Congress' desire in recent years to limit, rather than extend, the relief available to aliens who have committed fraud or misrepresentation. Congress has almost unfettered power to decide which aliens may come to and remain in this country. This power has been recognized repeatedly by the Supreme Court. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972). See also Matter of Yeung, 21 I&N Dec. 610, 612 (BIA 1997).

After reviewing the amendments to the Act and to other statutes regarding fraud and misrepresentation from 1957 to the present time, and after noting the increased impediments Congress has placed on such activities, including the narrowing of the parameters for eligibility, the re-inclusion of the perpetual bar, eliminating alien parents of U.S. citizens and resident aliens as applicants and eliminating children as a consideration in determining the presence of extreme hardship, it is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping fraud and misrepresentation related to immigration and other matters.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from § 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Hardship to the applicant is not a consideration. Although extreme hardship is a requirement for § 212(i) relief, once established, it is but one favorable discretionary factor to be considered. See Matter of Mendez-Morales, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, Interim Decision 3380 (BIA 1999), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) stipulated that the factors deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to § 212(i) of the Act include, but are not limited to, the following: the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and finally, significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

In Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, the Board also held that the underlying fraud or misrepresentation may be considered as an adverse factor in adjudicating a § 212(i) waiver application in the exercise of discretion. Matter of Tijam, Interim Decision 3372 (BIA 1998), followed. The Board declined to follow the policy set forth by the Commissioner in Matter of Alonso, 17 I&N Dec. 292 (Comm. 1979); Matter of Da Silva, 17 I&N Dec. 288 (Comm. 1979), and noted that the United States Supreme Court ruled in INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26 (1996), that the Attorney General has the authority to consider any and all negative factors, including the respondent's initial fraud.

In Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), the court stated that "extreme hardship" is hardship that is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. The common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship.

The court held in INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

According to the record, the applicant lived in the Philippines until January 1997 when she moved to St. John, Antigua. The record also indicates that she worked as a registered nurse in the Philippines and is currently working as a registered nurse in Antigua. The record indicates that William pays for approximately 70% of the applicant's needs in Antigua as her low salary is insufficient. The record contains a detailed discussion of William's past marriages and failed relationships, his psychiatric assessment, his raising his children alone, the renewed emotional and financial hardships from being unable to live with his wife and the expense that their separation has incurred, his employment in the United States that prevents him from moving to Antigua or to the Philippines, plus the emotional hardship imposed on the applicant's parents caused by separation.

The record also contain a medical assessment dated June 7, 1999 in which the physician states that William has vascular lesions which suggest that he has suffered three mini-strokes and hopes that it won't prevent him from pursuing his career. Another assessment dated June 15, 1999 indicates that William is undergoing treatment for atypical affective disorder and depression, cognitive deficits and hypertension.

After a review of the medical, emotional and financial considerations in the record, it is concluded that a combined hardship would be imposed upon the applicant's spouse and parents whether William accompanied his wife to the Philippines and/or to Antigua or if she returned to the Philippines alone while the qualifying relatives remained in the United States, that reach the level of extreme as envisioned by Congress.

The grant or denial of the above waiver does not turn only on the issue of the meaning of "extreme hardship." It also hinges on the discretion of the Attorney General and pursuant to such terms, conditions, and procedures as she may by regulations prescribe.

It is noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Carnalla-Muñoz v. INS, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred to as an after-acquired family tie in Matter of Tijam, Interim Decision 3372 (BIA 1998), need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight.

The applicant in the present matter did not acquire an after-acquired equity as referred to above since she married William abroad and she did not benefit from her attempted false claim to U.S. citizenship. The applicant did not gain entry by fraud or reside unlawfully in the United States or engage in unauthorized employment.

The favorable factors include the applicant's family ties, the absence of a criminal record, and extreme hardship to qualifying relatives (her spouse and parents).

The unfavorable factors include the applicant's attempt to procure admission into the United States by falsely claiming to be a United States citizen.

The United States Supreme Court ruled in INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, that the Attorney General has the authority to consider any and all negative factors in deciding whether or not to grant a favorable exercise of discretion.

Although the applicant's actions in this matter cannot be condoned, the favorable factors in this matter outweigh the unfavorable ones. In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of

inadmissibility under § 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. See Matter of T-S-Y-, 7 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1957). Here, the applicant has met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal is sustained.

ORDER: The appeal is sustained and the application is approved.