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U.S. Department of Justice
Immigration and Naturalization Service

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536



JUN 18 2001

FILE: [REDACTED] Office: ATHENS, GREECE Date:

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under § 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(h)

IN BEHALF OF APPLICANT: SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS: **Public Copy** identification data deleted to prevent clearly unwanted invasion of personal privacy.

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

Robert P. Wiemann, Acting Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Officer in Charge, Athens, Greece, and is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Greece who was found by a consular officer to be inadmissible to the United States under § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The applicant is married to a United States citizen and is the beneficiary of an approved petition for alien relative. He seeks a waiver of this permanent bar to admission as provided under § 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(h), to reside with his spouse in the United States.

The officer in charge concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed upon a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly.

On appeal, the applicant states that he committed his crime over eleven years ago, has committed no further violations of law, and believes that he deserves another chance. The applicant also states that a Greek appellate court reduced his charges to a misdemeanor and that, according to the law of double jeopardy, the last court decision is final. The applicant asserts that he suffered financial losses due to his inadmissibility and that his family wants to return to their home in New York.

The record reflects that the applicant was tried and convicted of third degree arson on November 30, 1990 in Nassau County, New York. Prior to sentencing, where he would have been eligible for up to fifteen years imprisonment, the applicant fled the United States for Greece. The State of New York issued a bench warrant and the U.S. Department of Justice subsequently pursued the case with the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Because the applicant was a Greek citizen and could not be extradited, the Greek government agreed to bring the applicant to trial. He was sentenced to five years imprisonment by a Greek court for the charge of arson in 1995. The applicant appealed the sentence and it was reduced with the right to pay a fine in lieu of two years imprisonment.

Section 212(a) of the Act states:

CLASSES OF ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS OR ADMISSION.-
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, aliens who are ineligible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States:

* * *

(2) CRIMINAL AND RELATED GROUNDS.-

(A) CONVICTION OF CERTAIN CRIMES.-

(i) IN GENERAL.- Except as provided in clause (ii), an alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing such acts which constitute the essential elements of-

(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime, is inadmissible.

Section 212(h) of the Act states:

The Attorney General may, in his discretion, waive application of subparagraphs (A)(i)(I),...if-

(1)(A) in the case of any immigrant it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that-

(i)...the activities for which the alien is inadmissible occurred more than 15 years before the date of the alien's application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status,

(ii) the admission to the United States of such alien would not be contrary to the national welfare, safety, or security of the United States, and

(iii) the alien has been rehabilitated; or

(B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien; and

(2) the Attorney General, in his discretion, and pursuant to such terms, conditions and procedures as he may by regulations prescribe, has consented to the alien's applying or reapplying for a visa, for admission to the United States, or adjustment of status.

No waiver shall be provided under this subsection in the case of an alien who has been convicted of (or who has admitted committing acts that constitute) murder or

criminal acts involving torture, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit murder or a criminal act involving torture. No waiver shall be granted under this subsection in the case of an alien who has previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if either since the date of such admission the alien has been convicted of an aggravated felony or the alien has not lawfully resided continuously in the United States for a period of not less than 7 years immediately preceding the date of initiation of proceedings to remove the alien from the United States. No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision of the Attorney General to grant or deny a waiver under this subsection.

Notwithstanding the Greek appellate court's decision to reduce the applicant's sentence, he was convicted in the United States of third degree arson, a class "C" felony. Under the statutory definition of the term "conviction," no effect is to be given in immigration proceedings to a state action which purports to expunge, dismiss, cancel, vacate, discharge or otherwise remove a guilty plea or other record of guilt or conviction by operation of a state rehabilitative statute. Once an alien is subject to a "conviction" as that term is defined in § 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, the alien remains convicted for immigration purposes notwithstanding a subsequent state action purporting to erase the original determination of guilt through a rehabilitative procedure. See Matter of Roldan-Santoyo, Interim Decision 3377 (BIA 1999).

Here, fewer than 15 years have elapsed since the applicant was last convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Therefore, he is ineligible for the waiver provided by § 212(h)(1)(A) of the Act.

Section 212(h)(1)(B) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from inadmissibility under § 212(a)(2)(B) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. The key term in the provision is "extreme." Therefore, only in cases of great actual or prospective injury to the qualifying relative(s) will the bar be removed. Common results of the bar, such as separation or financial difficulties, in themselves, are insufficient to warrant approval of an application unless combined with much more extreme impacts. Matter of Ngai, 19 I&N Dec. 245 (Comm. 1984). "Extreme hardship" to an alien himself cannot be considered in determining eligibility for a § 212(h) waiver of inadmissibility. Matter of Shaughnessy, 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968).

The record reflects that the applicant's spouse and children have resided with him in Greece for the past ten years. On appeal, the applicant's spouse submits a letter indicating that without her husband's hard work, she would be unable to support herself and her children would not be able to attend college. She states that her

husband and children have suffered enough and that the family wants to return to the United States to reside. She also states that she was diagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis three years ago and that the humid climate in Greece exacerbates her condition.

In Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), the court stated that "extreme hardship" is hardship that is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. The common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship.

The court held in INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

There are no laws that require a the applicant's spouse and children to remain with the applicant abroad. Further, the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See Hassan v. INS, 927 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1991). The uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. See Shooshtary v. INS, 39 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994). In Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States."

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, fails to establish the existence of hardship to the applicant's spouse (the only qualifying relative) caused by separation that reaches the level of extreme as envisioned by Congress if the applicant is not allowed to travel to the United States to reside at this time. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under § 212(h), the burden of establishing that the application merits approval remains entirely with the applicant. Matter of Ngai, supra. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.